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A book is just like a fingerprint. There are no identical fingerprints. We, therefore, 
could figure out the identity of a human being from its fingerprint. As each 
fingerprint is different from others, so is each book. Each book has its own 
uniqueness, because it reveals the whole experience of the writer in its writing, 
contents and style. Every writer puts his/her own thought, experience, vision, 
idea and even soul into his/her book. That way each book has its own fragrance. 
Thus, when we read a book we could feel who the writer is and draw out his/her 
fermented life. At that time, the book becomes an authentic one which conveys 
a sparkling insight and a persuasive power to the reader. 
This book entitled “Nationalism, Communism, and Christian Identity: 
Protestant Theological Reflection from Korea and Hungary” is one of those works 
which has its distinctive fragrance. The fragrance of this work is a blended aroma 
mixed from two different scent-bottles: Hungary and Korea. It is an emergent 
fragrance from a margin where 46o year old Hungarian Reformed church and 
135 year young Korean Protestant church meet together. Each church has tried to 
formulate her own tradition and ministry apart from a modern Western centered 
Christianity. Even though Hungary and Korea located far away from each other, 
there have been some commonalities which has recognized from the starting 
points of Hungarian (Hun) and Korean (Han) Theological Forum (HHFT). First 
of all, both countries have been suffered from the international superpowers 
during the twentieth century. Therefore the nationalism and division of their 
nation is a deep concern for both countries. Secondly, communism also made 
an indelible impact on the Hungarian and Korean nations, presenting issues 
such as reconciliation and forgiveness. Thirdly, secularization is a crucial issue 
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[ VIII ]           
for Hungarians who had faced a new world after the collapse of communism 
since 1989. At the same time Koreans also experience an unparalleled and swift 
change since the 1990s. In the midst of these commonalities, HHFT has looked 
for the encounter between Hungarian church and Korean church and tried to 
share each experience together during last three consecutive conferences. 
The articles in this book are some results of the 2nd and 3rd HHTF. The 2nd 
HHFT was held in 24-29 October, 2016, in Honam Theological University and 
Seminary, Gwangju, Korea. The 2nd theme was “Church and State in Hungary 
and Korea: From a Historical Approach.” The 3rd HHFT was held in 8-12 January, 
2018, hosted by Sárospatak Reformed Theological University, Hungary. The 
theme was “Hungarian and Korean Reformed perspectives on Nationalism and 
Christian identity before the collapse of Communism.” 26 papers were presented 
during 2nd and 3rd forums. Both forums provided opportunities to be familiar 
with and to learn from each historical context of its nation and church. Among 
those presented papers, 10 articles were selected for the publication of this work 
which is focused on the theme of this book. Many of papers on the 2nd and 
3rd Forum were focused on the period of during and after Japanese occupation 
in Korea and Communist regime in Hungary. Thus, this work is consists of two 
parts: Part I Korean Protestant Churches before and after Liberation, and Part 
II Hungarian Reformed Churches during Communism. The period of Japanese 
Occupation and Communist Regime were a traumatic experience in Korean 
church and Hungarian church respectively. The articles in each part deliberately 
present historical and theological reflections on those periods. As a first stage 
of HHTF, most articles intend to introduce the experience, context, and history 
of each church for sharing, understanding, and learning from each other. These 
articles in this book would be the warp and weft for weaving mosaic textiles 
which would be some parts of world Christianity. 
 Our hope is that these articles will stir further debates and stimulate new 
theological thinks on both sides, in Hungary and Korea. Any book is best used if 
students read it, therefore, this volume hopefully will be used as a textbook for 
students who wish to study in a comparative manner topics that are evergreen for 
theologians, scholars of religion and historian. It is believed that the contributions 
made here will excite, provoke and initiate critical theological reflections that 
may be useful not only the respective two nations but to the churches across the 
world with similar concern in Asia, Africa, the Americas, Australia and Europe.
Gwangju-Debrecen
30 October, 2019.
Part I
Korean Protestant Churches 
before and after  
Japanese Colonization

Jihoon Hong
Introduction
Nationalism can take on various meanings dependent on historical contexts 
and situations. It is not easy to define a general concept of nationalism due 
to these cultural, regional, and national differences. Nevertheless, the rise of 
nationalism has greatly influenced the formation of modern national states. 
I consider that Korean nationalism was developed through experiences of sev-
eral serious external aggressions during the Chosun-Dynasty. The Japanese 
aggression from 1592 to 1598 and the plunder by the Chinese Ching-Dynasty, 
1636-1637, are some of those examples. 
At the end of the 19th century, the Korean peninsula was encircled by three 
large countries, Russia, China and Japan. They had the initiative in the political 
negotiation with the Korean government due to their superiority in power. 
In 1910, Korea was annexed by Japan, and the Korean government lost its 
sovereignty. From that time on, some Korean people have protested against the 
governing of Japan, and as a natural consequence the March 1st Independence 
Movement arose in 1919 with the support of the majority of the Korean people. 
But this peaceful movement was suppressed brutally. From that time on, under 
the stimulus of nationalistic resistance against colonialism, independence 
movements continued with the use of violence until 1945. 
This paper focuses on the character of Christian nationalism during this time 
of resistance in the Korean colonial age. However, the major part of Korean 
The Character of Korean 
Protestant Nationalism in 
Japanese Colony
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Christians had discontinued their resistance against Japanese colonialism after 
the 1919’s independence movement, because of the Christian idea of nonviolence. 
This paper will ask whether Christian nationalism had lost its way, and whether 
Christian nationalism had changed its character from “resistant nationalism” into 
“non-resistant nationalism (Statism).” 
The Political Situation of Korea at the Age of Protestant 
Introduction
The Protestant mission in Korea was relatively successful compared with other 
countries. The success of the Korean mission can be seen not only by the rapid 
growth of Christian followers, but also by the role of Christianity for enlightenment 
in 19th century Korea. At the same time, the age of Protestant mission was one of 
the most politically confusing times in modern Korean history.
In 1871, the American government dispatched an army to Korea. Five 
warships attacked Gangwhado (Synmi Yangyo), because an American merchant 
ship, named General Sherman, which entered into Pyeongyang in order to 
force a trade treaty in July 1866, was completely destroyed by fire.1 In the same 
year (1866), the French military invaded Gwangwhado and plundered national 
manuscripts of the Yi-Dynasty (Byeongin Yangyo). Therefore, the Korean Catholic 
Christians were persecuted more than before, as they were believed to be agents 
of Western invasion.   
In 1876, Japan forced an agreement with Korea, the Gangwhado Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship between Korea and Japan, which was an unequal treaty. In 
1884 there was political upheaval, named Gapsin Jeongbyeon, led by some pro-
Japanese political leaders, and was brought to an end after three days. In 1895 
Japan assassinated Korean Queen Min, who was hostile toward Japan. This is 
called Eulmi Sabyeon.
It was in this political situation of the Korean peninsula that Protestantism was 
introduced into Korea by American missionaries. Therefore, the missionaries needed 
to establish a moderate policy of mission, meaning they wanted to avoid conflict 
with the Korean government or the Japanese ruling power. However two decisive 
incidents happened due to the Japanese Governing-power, the Protectorate Treaty 
at 1905 (Eulsabohojoyak) and the Japanese Annexation of Korea (1910). 
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The moderate policy of Protestant missions in Korea meant a non-political 
and non-social attitude of Christians. After the Protectorate Treaty in 1905, 
some Korean Protestant leaders began to show such attitudes more openly. 
On the other hand, some Korean Protestant leaders protested against Japanese 
domination with their Christian faith and nationalism. The failed result of the 
Independence Movement on 1st March 1919 became the turning point of the 
Korean church to be non-political.2 
Reflecting this radical change in the Korean political situation, the character 
of Korean Protestant nationalism in this paper will be considered in three 
divided periods: before the Japanese Annexation (1910), from annexation to the 
Independence Movement (1919), and after the Independence Movement. 
Character of Protestant Nationalism in the Formative 
Period of Protestantism in Korea
The introduction of missionaries itself was a political problem. They wanted to 
seem non-political, because they knew enough about the political situation 
of Korea and also about negative backlash on the mission work if they acted 
politically. We can verify their non-political attitude in their mission policy, the 
Nevius Method of mission work (1890). 
The Nevius Method influenced the general mission rules of the Korean 
Presbyterian church (1893). From the Nevius Method, missionaries focused on 
two points in their mission. The first was denying self-governance to Korean 
Christians, and the second was checking the growth of nationalism within 
Korean churches.3 At the same time, the non-political and non-social attitude of 
mission policy was responsible for the growth of “other-worldly faith” of Korean 
Protestantism. The most representative Korean pastor was Rev. Gil Sun-Ju (1869-
1935), who was educated by this method and was very famous as a leader of the 
Pyeongyang great revival movement in 1907.
After the revivalism of Korean Protestantism, we can see the non-political 
character of churches, and, “the great revival movement can be considered to be 
a movement that arose in interactions between the external factor, that is, the 
U. S. policy toward Korea, and the internal factor designed to make the Korean 
church non-political and transform it into salvation one.”4In this moment we must 
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ask, whether this non-political policy was successful in Korean Protestantism 
generally. I believe that we cannot give a positive answer to this question, as 
some of the continuant resistances of nationalistic Christians against Japanese 
governing arose centered around churches.5
Protestantism and Nationalism under Japanese 
Suppression (1910-1919)
After Annexation in 1910, Japan began to suppress Korean nationalists, who 
resisted through enlightenment, education and restoration of national rights 
against Japanese colonialism. Most of these nationalists are Christian. The 
Anak Incident (1910) broke out in Hwanghae-province, and 28 nationalists were 
imprisoned, including Kim Gu and Kim Hong-Nyang. There was also the ‘105 
persons Incident’ in Pyeongan-province, when 700 nationalists were arrested, 
and after severe police torture, 105 of them were sentenced to imprisonment at 
first trial.6Yet the response of the mission station on this incident was surprising. 
At the second trial, just 6 persons were sentenced to imprisonment, and the 
mission center explained to the colonial government that they (missionaries) 
taught Korean church leaders to obey authorities and did not permit them to 
participate in lawless activity.7
Here we understand two ways of Christian faith in front of the national crisis. 
One is a way that emphasized on social responsibility, and the other is pietic, 
conservative, evangelical faith.8 But it is very difficult to verify, how deeply and far 
Christianity or the Christian faith played as motivation in the national movement 
of nationalistic Christians. 
Although Lee Sang-Jae (1850-1927), Lee Seung-Hoon (1864-1930), An Chang-
Ho (1878-1938), Namgung Uk (1863-1939), Cho Man-Sik (1883-1950), and etc. are 
sufficient to be called as representative nationalistic Christians. For An Chang-
Ho, participation in the independence movement of Korea meant practicing 
Christian love.
At first, the Christian faith helped awaken a nationalistic conscience to deny 
colonialism, however, the evangelical faith of the great revivalism with the 
Pyeongyang grest revival movement in 1907 revealed a dualistic tendency by 
dividing the world into a profane and divine world. Noh said, that the evangelicals 
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insisted the dependence on God’s providence through all difficulties of the 
national crisis. Therefore, he defines this attitude as a “psychological problem 
solve of the social crisis”.9 Yet we cannot easily verify all evangelicals as non-
nationalistic as, there were evangelical leaders who preached and prayed for the 
future of Korea. However, after the failed March 1st Independence Movement 
in 1919, a clear characteristic change of Protestantism around the concept of 
nationalism appeared.
For example, the representative evangelical preacher Rev. Joo Ki-Cheol (1897-
1944), who was arrested several times by Japanese police and ultimately died in 
jail in 1944 due to severe torture by police, preached publicly that the national 
movement had nothing to do with Christianity. In his last sermon we cannot find 
any words about nation or patriotism, except for the righteousness of God. In 
spite of his non-political stand-point he was arrested and died in jail as a political 
criminal, because he refused to worship the Japanese national god of Shindoism.
Nationalism and Protestantism after the March 1st 
Independence Movement 
The March 1st Independence Movement was broke out with active participation 
by Protestants. The number of Christian participants held superiority, and 16 out 
of 33 national leaders who signed the Declaration of Korean Independence were 
Christians. But the Protestant churches not only lost the initiative to draft the 
Declaration, but also hesitated to participate officially in the Movement, because 
the Protestant leaders had no conviction, “whether participation in a political 
movement accords with the will of God or not.”10 Also, most western missionaries 
did not recognize any possibility of Korean independence, because of the power 
deficiency of Korea against the Japanese military. At last, most missionaries were 
compelled to be pro-Japanese.
After the failure of March 1st Independence Movement, the Korean non-
political stand-point was settled in Korean Protestantism. When the Anti-Japanese 
movements in church were no longer possible, many Christian nationalist leaders left 
the church.11 Therefore, the year of 1919 was a remarkable turning point for dividing 
Christian faith and nationalism. A conservative theologian even said, that he did not 
agree on the socialization, Koreanization and nationalization of Christianity.12
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Here I will distinguish this non-political Christian entity into three groups. 
The first group continuously tried to awaken Korean Christians with a faithful 
conviction for nationalism, in spite of renunciation of active independent 
movement. I believe that the representative person was Kim Kyo-Shin (1901-
1945), who maintained the Christian faith and national spirit went together and 
published the journal, Bible-Chosun. He was known as a type of native Christianity, 
so-called “Christianity born in Chosun”.13 Also Kim was a “creative restoration of 
national identity”.14
The second group is characterized by those imprisoned due to their 
participation in the March 1st Independence Movement and that had decided 
to concentrate just on church-life after being released from prison. For example, 
Rev. Joo Gi-Cheol and Rev. Lee Yong-Do (1901-1933) had no more concerns on 
national independence. Yet most of them did not hesitate to resist against the 
Japanese suppression, if what the Japanese demanded was idolatry, such as a 
worship of the Japanese Shindoism.
The third group not only turned away from national activities, but also 
cooperated with the Japanese Government. Such as Choi Nam-Sun (1890-1957), 
who as a typical nationalist (non-Christian) drafted the Independence Declaration 
in 1919, and turned to pro-Japanese activity. Of course it can be assumed that 
it was forced through threat and appeasement from the Japanese governing-
power. Nevertheless, many famous patriotic nationalists changed their attitudes 
to pro-Japanese at that time.
In 1938, the General Assembly of the Korean Presbyterian Church eventually 
determined to agree with Japanese Shindo-worship. This determination of the 
Korean church would be considered as “Submission to Japanese Statism”.15 In 
my opinion, the concept of “Statism” is a “variant nationalism”. The Assembly 
insisted that Shindo-worship is not religious, but civil and national. Instead of the 
powerless and right-less Korean state, they selected the Japanese sovereignty as 
their own nation.  
Conclusion
At the initial period of Protestant introduction, Korea was in an inferior political 
situation in between strong countries. Through compulsory treaties, Korea 
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opened with an expectation of enlightenment and self-strengthening of nation. 
Protestantism was also expected to be helpful for the modernization of Korea. 
Because of this reason we can say, that early Protestantism had political and 
national character.
However, after the Protectorate Treaty in 1905 (Eulsabohojoyak) and the 
Japanese Annexation of Korea in 1910, many missionaries and Korean Christian 
leaders taught their belief, that political activities for national independence 
may not be faithful to Christianity. This change can be called an internalization 
of the Christian faith, and the beginning point of such internalization was the 
Pyeongyang great revival movement in 1907.
The U. S. government permitted tacitly the Japanese invasion and governing 
of Korea, and the non-political attitude of American missionaries also meant 
the same stand-point. Therefore, I would like to define this period, from the 
introduction of the Protestantism to the Japanese annexation in 1910, as a period 
of “tension between Christian nationalism and non-political faith of missionaries”. 
From 1910 to 1919, the character of Protestant nationalism was at the head of the 
independence movement. We can define this period as a “resistant, nationalistic 
Protestantism”. After the March 1st Independence Movement, the character 
of Protestantism on nationalism was divided in at least three ways as I have 
written, such as “faithful resistance with nationalism”, “faithful resistance against 
religious suppression” and “change to Statism”. This differentiation occurred not 
simultaneously, but separately in time until 1945. 
Here I did not refer to any nationalists, who did not give up their violent 
resistance for independence of the nation. They left the institutional church, 
which did not allow any kind of resistance against the Japanese Statism. They 
were also Protestant Christians, but it is not easy to define whether they resisted 
against colonialism violently on a foundation of Christian faith.
[ 10 ] Jihoon Hong 
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Chang-Uk Byun 
Nationalism and Biblical  
Symbols in the  
Anti-Japanese Movement  
of the Protestant Church  
in Korea, 1884-1919 
Introduction
The first Protestant missionary reached Korea in 1884 when Japanese influence 
was starting to grow1. Officially annexed by Japan in 1910, Korea was not liberated 
until 1945. Early Korean Christians were educated not to participate in socio-
political affairs by American missionaries. Despite the missionaries’ teachings, 
early Korean Christians staged anti-colonial resistance for the sake of national 
independence. This article critically reviews the factors which caused the Korean 
Christians to actively participate in the anti-Japanese movement.
As Korean Christians understood their context under Japanese rule, biblical 
symbols such as liberation (Exodus) and millennial hope (Revelation) functioned 
as the driving force behind social and political change. The power of these 
symbols in addition to national consciousness in the independence movement 
during the Japanese occupation of Korea will be expounded in this paper. This 
study covers the period from the first Protestant mission (1884) to the March 1st 
Independence Movement (Samil Undong) of 1919,2 the apex of the anti-Japanese 
struggle. 
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The Socio-Political Milieu of the Anti-Japanese Movement
The Korean church had been taught to be conservative and indifferent to 
political affairs from the outset by the missionaries. At the end of the nineteenth 
century, Protestant Christianity was first introduced to Korea. At the same time, 
the country was in the process of being annexed by Japan. Christians with 
national consciousness took the lead in anti-Japanese struggles. The national 
independence movement, however, was never supported by missionaries. 
Missionaries (mostly Americans) were against the participation of Korean 
Christians in the political movement. In fact, missionaries attempted to prevent 
such anti-Japanese endeavors by all available means.
Japan’s victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and over Russia 
in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 decisively gave Japan the upper hand in 
controlling Korea among international powers. With the Portsmouth Conference 
of 1905, which terminated the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese hegemony of 
Korea was internationally recognized. Together with Britain, the United States 
promptly approached Japan to ascertain Tokyo’s understanding of Washington’s 
trusteeship of the Philippines, and thus, came to actively defend Japan’s special 
interests in Korea. The overall pro-Japanese nature of American missionaries 
should be understood from the perspective of such international relations as 
well as their own conservatism.3
In 1905, a protectorate treaty was signed which gave Korea’s sovereignty 
to Japan. The office of the Japanese Resident General was opened in Seoul as 
the supreme authority. Japanese military police soon landed in Korea to seize 
judicial rights and the Korean Royal Army was disbanded. The missionaries led a 
revival movement in 1907 and the main features of these revival meetings were 
confession and repentance of sins after a convicting sermon and loud prayers 
in unison. Korean church historian George Paik suggests three reasons for this 
Great Revival Movement of 1907: a sense of failure, a desire for deeper spiritual 
experience, and the deliberate efforts of the missionaries.4 
Most mission reports on these revival meetings were limited in focus to 
immoral sins and did not mention the political unrest of Korea. The complete 
absence in these reports of how Korean Christians dealt with their intense feeling 
about the destiny of their nation is remarkable.5 It should be noticed that the 
newspaper Korea Daily News (Taehan Maeil Sinbo),6 which usually criticized the 
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Japanese aggression policy of the Japanese imperialists and defended Korean 
independence ethos, almost ignored the Revival Movement of 1907, whereas 
a British newspaper The London Times allotted large spaces to the movement 
day after day. This most likely had something to do with Britain’s pro-Japanese 
policy at that time. At any rate, missionaries’ disregard to historical reference in 
describing the “spiritual” revival experience is conspicuously incongruent with 
the circumstances of that time.7
After the Eulsa Treaty or Korea-Japan Protectorate Treaty of 1905 was signed,8 
the Christians’ nationalistic movement gradually transformed from prayer to active 
anti-Japanese efforts.9 The treaty had made Japan the virtual ruler of Korea, and 
five years later this was actualized at the Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty (1910). 
After the annexation, the national consciousness of Korean Christians developed 
more than ever. An American missionary to Korea and mission historian, Samuel 
H. Moffett remarked, “The annexation was a humiliating blow to a proud and 
sensitive people… Nationalist sentiments boiled in Christian circles, though 
missionaries counseled moderation and sought to avoid involvement in political 
problems.”10
The Mission Policy of Depoliticization and Other-
Worldliness
The early American missionaries to Korea were of a strongly conservative and 
evangelical theology.11 This has become the characterizing traits of Protestant 
Christianity in Korea. Missionaries who were trained against the background of 
conservatism did not fully realize the socio-political implications of the gospel. 
As early as August 1902, Arthur Judson Brown (1856-1963), secretary of the Board 
of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the USA, reported about the 
relations of American missionaries to the authorities concerned in Korea as follows: 
The missionaries [in Korea] strongly believe with the [mission] boards 
at home that all respects should be paid to the lawfully constituted 
civil authorities… not to needlessly embarrass them… it is better 
for the disciples of Christ to patiently endure some injustice than to 
array Christianity in antagonism to the governments under which 
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they labor. … Already ambitious political leaders have tried to 
enlist the cooperation of the Korean Christians, but the missionaries 
have promptly and decisively prevented the consummation of the 
intrigues. I believe with them that it would be as indeed as it would 
be suicidal to allow the infant [Korean] Church to array itself against 
the government.12
When Korea became the protectorate of Japan in 1905, missionaries were 
sympathetic toward Koreans because they were losing their political sovereignty. 
At the same time, missionaries realized that future missionary work depended on 
the favorable attitude of the Japanese regime. Brown explicitly stated, 
They [American missionaries] are on friendly terms with the 
government and officials, and they are determined that by no act 
of theirs, and by no rashness of the Korean whom they control, shall 
the Church be led into a position which would surely result in tumult, 
persecution, and perhaps irretrievable disaster.13
In the same article as above, Brown contended that the Korean church should 
distance itself from all political matters. He went on to say, “No Christian 
should make the mistake which Moses made when he smote the Egyptian 
and ‘supposed that God by his hand was giving deliverance.’”14 Brown was not 
concerned about the missionaries because he was convinced that they fully 
understood the importance of political neutrality. Consequently, missionaries 
actively discouraged nationalistic actions taken by Korean Christians. Thus, they 
kept a politically neutral stance for the mission.
Most of the pioneer missionaries in Korea followed this line of thinking. 
A letter written to Brown, the secretary of the mission board of the Presbyterian 
Church of America, on February 5, 1908 by Charles Allen Clark (1878-1961) of 
the Northern Presbyterian mission clearly revealed the same position by field 
missionaries on depoliticization:
As to the Board’s action for a neutral policy concerning political 
matters, it does not change by one iota our mission policy for it has 
always been rigidly held and enforced… We believe that the church 
as a church has absolutely nothing to do twith politics in any way… 
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The church is a spiritual organization and as such is not concerned 
with politics.15
As a result, many missionaries welcomed the colonial rule of the Japanese in 
Korea. Arthur Brown went so far as to say that “the Japanese administration is 
far better than Korea would otherwise have had and far better than Korea had 
under its own rule.”16 It’s shocking to find that Brown even argued that “in the 
evolution of the race and the development of the plan of God, the time had come 
when it was for the best interests of the world and for the welfare of the Koreans 
themselves that Korea should come under the tutelage of Japan.”17
Korea was, in the eyes of Western missionaries, a very backward and primitive 
country, not only pagan in religion but also behind in civilization. Some 
missionaries thought that they could work together with Japan to introduce into 
Korea a new faith and a new civilization. Missionaries looked upon Japan as the 
introducer of an advanced civilization to Korea, not as an imperial power. This 
was especially true of Arthur Brown. In his book, The Mastery of the Far East, Brown 
devoted an entire chapter to the “Benefits of Japanese Rule in Korea.” Speaking 
in favor of the colonial expansion of Japan, Brown argued: 
They [Japanese] were forced to occupy Korea to prevent a Russian 
occupation, which would have menaced their own independence 
as a nation… the Koreans could not be independent anyway under 
present conditions in the Far East, and they are far better off under 
the Japanese than they were under their own rulers or than they 
would have been under the Russians… They [Japanese] have 
made some mistakes… but on the whole their work in Korea has 
been beneficent in many ways… His alien masters are, as a rule, 
more just with him than the native officials were prior to Japanese 
occupation.18
Ironically, exactly two months after the publication of Brown’s book, the 
nationwide anti-colonial movement broke out in Korea on March 1st, 1919.
At the start of the twentieth century, Japan’s aggressive colonialism was 
closely linked with Shintoism. Under the divine rule of their Emperor, the Japanese 
believed it to be their role to rule over Asia. Their aggression was a holy one, 
designed to bring peace to the conquered nation as conquered nations enjoyed 
the benefits of Japanese culture. The Japanese so believed in their superiority that 
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they thought they were doing a favor to the nations they invaded.  Additionally, 
some of the Japanese Christians, especially the Japanese Congregational Church, 
understood the Japanese annexation of Korea as the conquest of Canaan and 
thought it justified.19 These Christians of the Congregational Church quoted 
Deuteronomy 31:7-820 in their belief that Korea was the promised land that God 
had sworn.21
The missionary acceptance of the Japanese occupation became the officially 
accepted position of the Korean church. Many American missionaries endorsed 
the occupation, justifying this stance with the teaching of Jesus, who said: “So 
give back to Caesar what is Caesar’s” (Matthew 22:21), and of Paul, who said: 
“Everyone must submit to the governing authorities, for there is no authority 
except that which God has established” (Romans 13:1). In 1910, the Korean 
Presbyterian Church which was under the control of the missionaries made the 
following resolution:
The church is dedicated to God, not designed for the discussion of 
national affairs. Churches and chapels are facilities for church service 
but not the place to discuss national affairs.22
Missionaries not only declared their own neutrality on political affairs but also 
wanted to neutralize the Korean church and Korean Christians. Missionary 
neutrality on political affairs was designed specifically to reduce the fears 
and suspicions of the Japanese colonial regime and to protect future mission 
work. Missionaries most likely felt that any political action could jeopardize the 
chance to preach the gospel. This situation effectively made them depoliticize 
the church, at least on the official level. While Protestant churches served as “a 
safe place” for Korean patriots to promote their nationalistic ends and carry out 
activities to mobilize against the Japanese, the political neutrality of missionaries 
made many national-minded Koreans leave the church.23
As mentioned above, the Korean church was nurtured to be conservative and 
apolitical. This became one of the typical characteristics of the Korean Christian 
community under the missionary leadership: i.e., “other-worldly” consciousness.24 
Christians were trained to seek utopia in the other world. The natural consequence 
was the suppression of any social thinking about political matters. This was an 
almost deliberate policy of the missionaries. They suppressed any socio-political 
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thinking. After the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, Arthur Brown argues 
that:
As a matter of fact, the missionaries, in so far as they have touched 
political matters at all, have used their great influence to induce the 
Koreans to acquiesce in Japanese rule. Indeed, it has often been said 
that if it had not been for the missionaries, a revolution would have 
broken out when Korea was annexed to Japan. The Japanese fully 
appreciate this.25
 
Following this line of thinking, the missionaries incessantly preached that the duty 
of every Christian was not to engage in political affairs. Some Christians suspected 
of political activity were denied from responsible positions in the church, and in 
some cases were excommunicated. They were even treated as heretics.
To promote satisfactory relations between the missionaries and 
the Japanese in Korea… they[mission boards] and the missionaries 
continued to… cultivate friendly relations with the  Japanese 
officials… and teach the Korean Christians to respect and obey the 
lawfully constituted authorities; limit their activities to missionary 
duties and keep themselves and, as far as possible, the Korean 
churches wholly apart from all political matters.26
The Korean Christians were encouraged to recognize the Japanese power as 
the absolute legal master of Korea. As a result, the missionaries tried to foster 
amicable relations with the Japanese authorities during the colonial period. 
Despite the missionaries’ intent, circumstances in Korea pushed the Korean 
church in a direction the missionaries had not intended.
Biblical Symbols and Nationalism in the Anti-Japanese 
Resistance Movement 
The theological understanding of the early Korean Protestant Church was 
based entirely on the teachings of the first missionaries to Korea. They were 
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theologically conservative and antagonistic toward higher biblical criticism and 
liberal theology. Thus, the early church had an extremely other-worldly view of 
salvation. It did not consider the implications of the gospel for those suffering in 
this world. Political matters were not discussed in the churches. Considering the 
efforts of the missionaries to depoliticize the church, it’s significant to note that 
Korean Christians played a central role in the March 1st Independence Movement 
of 1919.27 That is to say, the missionaries’ attempt to separate church and politics 
was not wholly successful.28 Although the missionaries resolutely sought to keep 
the churches aloof from all political movements, it was in vain.
Even though the Korean Christians gladly responded to the message of the 
gospel, the progressive shift toward “this-worldly” disposition can be found in the 
anti-Japanese activities of the newly fledged church. After the Protectorate Treaty 
of 1905, the Korean Christians began to interpret their callings as  increasingly 
“this-worldly” in purpose and scope. After the annexation in 1910, the national 
consciousness of Koreans was awakened more than ever. At the same time, 
many Korean Christians hoped that “in Christianity they would find the answer 
to national weakness and their personal insecurity.”29 These new “this-worldly” 
impulses stepped beyond approved doctrinal boundaries and these climaxed in 
the March 1st Independence Movement of 1919.
In 1918, at the end of World War I, Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), President of 
the United States, set forth ‘the doctrine of self-determination’ of small nations. 
The changes taking place around the world encouraged the Korean people 
to believe that a new age of peace had arrived. Thus, the people reached the 
consensus that now was the time to achieve independence. This group included 
Christian churches, nationalist leaders, and a few Buddhists, who were also 
encouraged by Korean nationalists abroad. On February 22, 1919, the Emperor 
of Korea, Gojong, passed away. His funeral was the event which sparked the 
national movement. Mourners gathered from all over the nation and many 
traveled to Seoul to pay their respects. It was at this time that the nationalists 
prepared the Korean Declaration of Independence. The declaration was signed 
by 33 influential leaders: 16 Christians (Protestant), 15 Cheondogyo (Religion of 
the Heavenly Way) adherents, and 2 Buddhists. 
The March 1st Independence Movement was carried out as an entirely 
voluntary movement of the Korean people. No foreign missionaries had any part 
in the preparation of the movement. To defend their innocence, missionaries 
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stated: “No missionaries could have such a foolish idea of fighting Japan, one 
of the world powers, without a single weapon.”30 American Methodist Bishop 
Herbert Welch (1862-1968), who was in charge of Japan and Korean mission, 
expressed discontent at the fact that the Korean independence declaration 
was read at many churches.31 Korean Christians played a pivotal role in the anti-
Japanese  movement. It was mostly Christians who planned and executed the 
fight for freedom. They also served as messengers across the country through 
the church which served as a nationwide organizational network.32
Regarding the early Korean Christians, Brown wrote that they were theologically 
conservative. They did not have questions about biblical miracles and believed 
everything missionaries had taught them. He went on to say that “The account 
of the Garden of Eden, the experience of Jonah, the virgin birth of our Lord, the 
resurrection of Lazarus, and of the gates of pearls and streets of pure gold in the 
Heavenly City were taken as historical descriptions of actual facts.”33
However, the Bible and the Christian message were not apolitical or neutral 
to the political situation in Korea. Because the Korean Christians took the Word 
literally, they applied the biblical symbols directly to their historical experience. 
They interpreted the Bible stories as symbolizing their own experiences. Old 
Testament stories describing the national deliverance of Israel were taken to 
heart as promising Korean deliverance, with the Christians being at the forefront 
of the nationalistic movement.
A key aspect of the contextualization of the Christian message was the adoption 
of biblical stories. Two of the most beloved and frequently employed sermon 
texts were Exodus and the Babylonian captivity of Israel.34 Korean believers 
whole-heartedly believed the God of Israel was with them. They identified 
themselves with Israel in the Book of Exodus. The story of Moses functioned as a 
powerful symbol to fight the oppressive evil force, the Japanese colonial power. 
Koreans read the plight of Israel in Egypt as their own and regarded the Japanese 
as the Egyptians and other Old Testament oppressors such as the Assyrians and 
the Babylonians. Korean Christians strongly desired liberation from oppression. 
In public prayers at church, they would often ask, “Send us a leader like Moses, 
who can lead us from the present bondage to liberation.”35
Coincidentally, Korea was then called ‘Chosen’ which paralleled with Israel, 
God’s chosen people. The symbolic identification of oppressed Koreans with 
Israelites in Egyptian bondage gradually increased hope for freedom among 
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Korean Christians. They believed that if they turned to God, He would deliver them 
from the tyranny of the oppressors. In this sense, the metaphors and symbolic 
language of Exodus directly applied to the Sitz im Leben of the Korean people.
The Book of Revelation was another popular text among the Christians as it 
offered hope to a suffering people. Korean pastors often quoted from this book 
in church services. The depiction of the Roman Empire was a powerful symbol to 
describe Japan’s political oppression. It promised the coming of the Messiah and 
the destruction of the colonial power, with the anti-Christ naturally symbolizing 
the Japanese oppressors36 (Kim 1981:110; Kim and Kim 2010:219). These symbols 
were used by the Korean people to make sense of their historical situation. The 
language and symbols of Revelation had immediacy for the Korean Christians 
at that time. The cross was also regarded as symbolic of the people’s suffering.37 
The Messiah and the second coming  were the promise of a restored Korea, a 
Kingdom established in this world. 
Furthermore, around the outbreak of the March 1st Independence Movement, 
a leaflet entitled Tokripdan Tonggomun (Notification Statement of the Korean 
Independent League) was distributed to the Christians who participated in the 
movement. It reads as follows:
Our esteemed and noble Independent League members, do not 
insult the Japanese, throw stones at them, or beat them with your 
fists. Christians should pray three times a day, fast on Sunday, and 
read the Bible every day. Read Isaiah chapter 10 on Monday, Jeremiah 
chapter 12 on Tuesday, Deuteronomy chapter 28 on Wednesday, 
James chapter 5 on Thursday, Isaiah chapter 59 on Friday, and 
Romans chapter 8 on Saturday.38 
The topics of the reading differed each day. Monday’s topic was God’s punishment 
against Assyria for destroying Israel. On Tuesday, it was the explanation for Judah’s 
destruction. Wednesday’s reading looked at the invasion of Israel and her suffering 
from other nations. Thursday was about encouragement for suffering Christians 
to pray and endure. Friday subject highlighted how God will save when a sinful 
people repents. Last but not least, the passage for Saturday mentioned how the 
present suffering is nothing compared to the glory that will appear in the future.
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The leaflet clearly demonstrates “the strong influence of non-violence of 
Protestantism”39 and the power of the biblical symbols for the participants of 
the March 1st Movement. The biblical symbols functioned as a catalyst for the 
anti-Japanese movement. These Scriptures served as a motive for Christians to 
continue to participate in the March 1st Movement without losing hope in the 
midst of suffering.
The language of the coming of Israel’s Messiah, “the new heaven and the new 
earth,” and “the new Jerusalem” might seem like distant or unreal language. For 
the oppressed Koreans, however, these “eschatological” symbols were powerful 
enough to make sense of their own history and to provide hope and vision for the 
future.40 In the course of the anti-Japanese movement, this symbolic language 
became an important tool for the Korean Christians to perceive their historical 
experience under Japanese rule. The combination of these factors created a 
remarkable result in which Korean Christians could never become other-worldly, 
nor politically neutral.
In response, the Japanese police kept close watch on all public meetings 
and worship services held at the church and Christian institutions.41 Under strict 
surveillance of the Japanese police, every utterance of preachers and pastors 
was carefully scrutinized.42 It was not surprising that the Japanese colonial 
government banned the Korean church’s preaching from the text of Exodus and 
singing hymnals that could foster the spirit of freedom.43 Simply put, Koreans had 
applied the Bible message to their present context. 
Concluding Remarks
Protestant Christianity grew to be the most promising resource for Korea to 
withstand the oppression of the colonial power of Japan. From 1905 onwards, 
Korean pastors equated the struggles of Moses against Pharaoh with that of their 
own against the Japanese. There can be no doubt that this was in the minds of 
Koreans as they expounded the Bible story. They had a keen sense that what 
was happening in their day resonated with the experience of Israel in the Old 
Testament. Korean Christians clearly realized that scripture remained a dead 
letter without addressing their situation.
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Thus, Christianity and Korean nationalism became inextricably linked, and the 
collaboration of the two paved the way for the rather quick and easy acceptance 
of the gospel message. Korean Christians, especially under Japanese colonial 
rule, endeavored to seek meaningful interpretations of life and the world. 
Answers to particularly pressing questions on oppression and suffering required 
relevant interpretations of the Bible. As for the Korean Christians’ exposition of 
Scripture, they did not hesitate to read the Bible in the light of the events and 
circumstances of their time.
The biblical symbols were closely related to the socio-political experience of the 
Korean people. The metaphors and symbolic language provided the oppressed 
with a new perspective and a transforming power for their historical reality. 
This gave impetus to Korean Christians to save their nation from the Japanese 
imperial power. This also meant that they could never become completely other-
worldly. Missionaries sought salvation through other-worldliness, but Korean 
Christians sought salvation through this-worldliness. The same political situation 
in Korea was the driving force behind the opposite actions between the two 
parties: Korean Christians and American missionaries. 
History shows that nationalism and Christianity have always been “uneasy 
bedfellows.” The relationship between Christianity and nationalism in most 
regions of Asia in the twentieth century was “in mutual opposition.” In fact, outside 
of Korea, Christianity was branded as the “western colonial oppressor,” leading 
to Asian nationalism assuming an “anti-Christian character.”44 However, Korea 
did not regard Christianity as a vanguard of Western colonialism, since Japan 
was the more immediate and threatening colonial power. Korea stands out as 
an exceptional case where Christianity and nationalism became complementary 
partners prompting the willing reception of the biblical narratives as a messianic 
message of much waited hope and liberation.
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Protestantism  
after Liberation Period 
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Introduction
In 1945, there were about 5,500 churches and about 400,000 Protestants in 
Korea.1 The Protestant population became about 600,000 in 1950, but the 
number of Korean Protestants was still under 5% of the Korean population. 70 
years since Korean Protestantism became the largest and the most influential 
religion in Korea. After the first Protestant missionaries came into Korea in 1884, 
Korean Protestantism had experienced a remarkable growth and finally became 
the largest and the most influential religion in Korea. According to a 2015 census 
compiled by the Korean government, 19.7% of the population (about 9.7 millions) 
belongs to Protestantism, 15.5% to Buddhism (7.6 millions), and 7.9% to the 
Catholicism (3.9 millions).2 The rest belongs to various new religions including 
Won Buddhism, Cheondoism, and Jeungsando.3
According to a survey by the Department of Public Information in United States 
Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIC, hereafter the USMG) in August 
1946, 70% of Koreans preferred socialism, 14% capitalism, 7% communism, and 
8% had no preference.4 Considering the illiteracy rate was about 70% of the 
Korean population during the Liberation period, there might be a possibility 
that only the intellectuals could respond to the survey. Even though there might 
be different interpretations on their backgrounds of the preference, it was true 
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that among the intellectuals, socialism and communism were more preferable to 
capitalism.
Korean society has become one of the most capitalized societies, and Korean 
Protestantism has become freed from being in the captivity of capitalistic spirit. 
Rather, Protestantism in Korea has pursued the fruits of capitalism in its structure, 
administration and message. Most mega-churches in Korean Protestantism have 
become corporate churches which embody the spirit of materialism and are 
consonant with global capitalism.
Confronted with the rapid shifting of ideological and religious landscape in 
Korea, we can raise some questions: What has happened in Korean society after 
Liberation for making this radical shift of religious population and ideology? How 
has Korean Protestantism become the most influential religion in Korean society? 
How has Korean society become an anti-communist capitalistic society? 
This paper aims to describe some factors which had resulted into the growth of 
Korean Protestantism and the decline of socialism in South Korea after Liberation. 
The starting point of this discussion is as follows: During the Cold War period after 
the Pacific War, the US government and the USMG considered the communist 
group in Korea as the chief obstacle in constructing South Korea as the vanguard 
of anti-communism. The US missionaries in Korea, who worked with the USMG, 
introduced and recommended many Korean Protestants for some key positions in 
the USMG. Those Korean Protestants, preferred by the USMG, were not only to speak 
English and be familiar with western culture, but also had a strong anti-communist 
tendency. Korean Protestantism also had received some benefits from the USMG 
during the disposal process of the confiscated property after liberation, and had 
almost monopolized the distribution of foreign relief aids during and after the 
Korean War. Finally, some policies established and carried out by Rhee’s government 
were friendlier to Christianity than other religions in Korea. With the favor of the 
USMG and of the following Rhee administration, Korean Protestantism became a 
major influential group in Korean society and put the firm foundation for catching 
up with its competitive religions, such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Cheondoism, 
and so on. Three factors - human resources, material resource allocation, and policy 
making - were the major means which Protestant-friendly efforts during the USMG, 
the Korean War period, and Rhee Syngman’s government were practiced.
However, this arguing position does not intend to deny other internal factors 
within Korean Protestantism for its growth, and Christian influence on the Korean 
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society before and during Japanese occupation. Neither does it insist that some 
external factors had taken key roles to the growth of Korean Protestantism 
and of capitalism rather than that of socialism or communism in Korea since 
the Liberation period. These three factors are not the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the growth of Korean Protestantism and the decline of Socialism 
in South Korea. As for understanding the whole growing trajectory of Korean 
Protestantism, it is clear that we need to consider multi-related factors including 
inner, outer, and multi-layered ones.
To achieve the goal of this paper, we will trace its backgrounds and factors 
which had been related to the growth of Korean Protestantism during post-
Liberation and Korean War period. Three factors, human resources, material 
resources, policy resources, will be examined focusing on the relationship among 
the USMG, the US missionaries, Rhee’s government, and Korean Protestants. 
The following four sections will display the unfolding process how Korean 
Protestantism had achieved hegemony in Korean society after the end of the 
Pacific War: A Historical Background: the USMG and the US missionaries; Human 
Resources: the US missionaries and Korean Protestants in the USMG; Material 
Resources: the disposal of the confiscated properties after Liberation and the 
distribution of foreign relief aids during and after Korean War; Policy Resources: 
Rhee Syngman government and Protestant-friendly policies; Summary will be 
followed as a conclusion.
A Historical Background: The USMG and  
the US Missionaries in Korea
It was after Liberation that Korean Protestantism became an apparent part of the 
ruling establishment in South Korea. The USMG especially was the decisive factor 
in the expansion of Protestant influence in South Korea. To Korean Protestants, 
the USA was the Christian nation that had introduced Protestantism into Korea. 
The majority of Korean Christians had been pro-American-oriented since the late 
nineteenth century. In addition, many Protestant leaders took modern education 
in mission schools or in the USA with the support of the US missionaries and thus 
could communicate in English.5 
[ 30 ] Jaeshik Shin
The USMG welcomed the participation of Korean Protestant leaders 
and appointed many Korean Protestants to high administrative positions in 
cooperation with missionaries from the USA. After the ruling of the USMG, many 
Christians could charge leadership positions in all areas of Korean society. As the 
influx of Protestants into the USMG and other public circles continued, Korean 
Protestantism was integrated into the ruling establishment. Let us examine the 
process in relationship with the role of the US missionaries.
In 1945, the US armed forces established a military government that exercised 
governing authority over South Korea. John Hodge, the Commander of the 
24th Corps of the US Army, arrived in Seoul and took over the administrative 
organization of the Japanese Government-General in Joseon (Korea). Because 
Commander John Hodge had been engaged in field warfare before coming 
to Korea, he did not have any enough information about Korea. Therefore, he 
planned to inherit the Korean personnel who had been working in and for the 
Japanese administrative system during the colonial period, and begin the military 
rule with those pro-Japanese collaborators. This administrative plan, however, 
was faced with strong opposition from most Koreans.6
Robert T. Oliver, once an adviser of Rhee Syngman the first President of ROK, 
points out several reasons of the difficulties with which the USMG had experienced 
as follows: (1) basically, the US Government did no sufficient preparation for the 
rebuilding of Korea; (2) the US Governmental decision regarding personnel to 
be used was inappropriate and unwise; (3) the USMG had no clear policy for 
handling with communists, who were fundamentally disruptive factors in South 
Korea; (4) both the Koreans and the Americans were almost ignorant about each 
other’s people and culture; (5) Koreans generally dislike an imposed foreign 
government and resist it by all available means; (6) the USMG in Korea did not 
effectively control communist and populist cells that were widespread all through 
the country; (7) the USMG did not like so much the mass of the Koreans as pro-
Japanese collaborators who were “successful” economically or educationally; (8) 
finally, there was jealously deep-seated resentment over the far greater speed 
and thoroughness of the rehabilitation of Japan under the MacArthur Military 
Administration.7
It was the US missionaries that complemented the lacked information on 
Korea during the USMG. Commander John Hodge and the USMG, greatly lacking 
the necessary information on Korea, gradually came to notice the practical value 
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of the US missionaries who had worked in Korea during the Japanese occupation. 
He opened doors for the US missionaries to return to Korea. In November 1945, 
John Hodge requested the US State Department to dispatch 20 missionaries (10 
Protestants and 10 Catholics) to Korea.8 Without the permission of the USMG in 
Korea, the US missionaries could not enter into Korea to resume their mission 
works. Each denomination’s board of foreign mission responded promptly to 
send its missionaries to Korea, where there had been no US missionary since 
1942.9
After the Pacific War broke out virtually all the US missionaries had to leave 
Korea before December 1941.10 They were designated as hostile subjects of the 
enemy country, and thus all their rights were taken away, their properties were 
classified as enemy properties, and were confiscated and put under the control 
of the special appointees by the Government-General in Seoul. The compounds 
and school campuses owned by missionary organizations were commandeered. 
The Western missionaries who managed to stay until the last possible moment 
were mostly the missionaries from Northern Presbyterian Church of the US, such 
as Horace H. Underwood, Edwin W. Koons and Edward H. Miller, who refused 
to close down their educational mission endeavors, and some other medical 
missionaries like Archibald G. Fletcher and John D. Bigger.11 After even these 
missionaries were deported by force in exchange for the Japanese residents 
in Great Britain and the United States in early July 1942, there were no Western 
missionaries left in Korea. Toward the end of the Pacific War all Korean Christian 
denominations were amalgamated into one unified church, as had been done in 
Japan.
The missionaries who were forced to return to the United States maintained 
their contacts and gatherings among them, and prepared to resume their mission 
works when the war was over. Some of them worked for the US government 
during the Pacific War. Their information was very valuable for establishing the 
Korean policies during and after the war, especially for some aspects on the issues 
of Korean independence. Horace H. Underwood played a very important role 
for the US government. He had reported various information on Korea during 
the meetings with intelligent agencies: Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Office 
of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Military Intelligence Services (MIS), Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and Office of War Information (OWI). He worked as interim staff 
at the Korea desk on the Board of Foreign Mission of the Northern Presbyterian 
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Church and later exerted a great deal of influence upon the direction of the 
mission work in Korea. He insisted that it needed to use the pro-American and 
pro-Christian attitude of Koreans. 
Some other missionaries, such as Oliver R. Avison and Homer B. Hulbert, 
advocated in America for the independence of Korea after returning to the 
US. Oliver Avison formed an organization called Christian Friends of Korea to 
foster the support for the independence of Korea, and the core members of 
the organization came from those who had previously worked as missionaries 
in Korea.12 During their staying in the US, those senior missionaries in Seoul 
and Gyeonggi area, including Horace Underwood, Oliver Avison, and Alice 
Appenzeller (daughter of Henry Appenzeller), supported Rhee Syngman.
Other second-generation missionaries also served as officers or agents for 
the US government. George M. McGune worked in the OSS Washington office. 
Clarence N. Weems Jr. (a son of Clarence N. Weems, 1875-1952 a Methodist 
missionary) worked in the OSS San Francisco office and Chongqing office in 
China during the war. After Liberation he served as an assistant of John Hodge in 
the USMG. Herold J. Noble, after finishing his doctorate degree, worked in OSS, 
ONI, the Department of States, and the Department of Army. After the end of 
Pacific War, he served as a political adviser of the USMG in Korea. 
When John Hodge served as the Commander of the USMG, he used to mention 
that all Americans were missionaries. As did Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan,13 Hodge considered Christianity 
very important in the American activities in the third world. As the missionaries 
served as an interpreter, an official and an advisor in the various departments in 
the USMG, so-called “the politics of missionary” began in Korea.
Human Resources: The US Missionaries and the Korean 
Protestants in the USMG
During the period under the USMG, the Protestant churches in South Korea were 
able to grow and develop freely with the support of the USMG. After liberation, 
US missionaries and their descendants who worked with the USMG were a great 
help for Korean Protestantism. These missionaries and their descendants, who 
had worked in Korea during Japanese occupation, returned to become the 
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officials or advisors of the USMG. They recommended Korean Protestants who 
had close relationships to them as officials or advisors of the USMG and suggested 
the Protestant-friendly policy during the period of the USMG. They took on the 
bridge role for connecting between the USMG and Korean Protestants.14
From the early stages of the USMG, the second-generation of the US 
missionaries, such as George Z. Williams and Clarence N. Weems Jr., who worked 
as an interpreter, played an important role to introduce and recommend Korean 
Protestant for the USGM administration. Even though there were official tests for 
the public employment of administrative staffs in the USMG, the recommendation 
was the most important method to appoint the high administrative positions. 
This personal recommendation was an effective method to discern strong 
anti-communism, which was the most important qualification to work with the 
USMG. Once Koreans were appointed as high-ranking positions of the USMG, 
they would recommend other Koreans who had a similar religious, ideological 
and political background as their own staff.15 Those Korean administrative staff 
came to formulate a conservative domestic political group.
For example, George Z. Williams became an assistant to and interpreter 
for John Hodge. He was the son of Frank E. C. Williams, who had served as a 
missionary in Gongju, worked at the Department of Agriculture of the USMG. 
George Z. Williams played a key role in appointing Korean Protestants to high-
ranking positions within the USMG, i.e., in appointing the highest Korean officer 
position for the police force. Jo Byeong-Ok, who became the Director of Police 
Affairs, was a graduate of Young Myeong Secondary School in Gongju which was 
established in 1906 by Frank E. C. Williams and Sharf Ellis. George Z. Williams 
and Jo Byeong-Ok were good friends from their childhood. In spite of only three 
months working for John Hodge, George Z. Williams considerably influenced on 
the political landscape during and after the USMG. He considered that the Korean 
situation was in opposition between radicals vs. democrats and, as a political 
conservative and anti-communist, supported Rhee Syngman as a Political leader 
in Korea.16 Clarence N. Weems, Jr., a son of missionary Clarence N. Weems, who 
had been engaged in the mission work in Gaeseong, also became an assistant 
to Hodge and helped deploy many Korean Protestants to the USMG. Henry G. 
Appenzeller and Horace G. Underwood, the sons of the first missionaries to 
Korea, and Harold Nobel, the son of missionary William N. Nobel, also received 
important posts in the USMG.
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In this way, the missionaries and their Korean-born second-generation, who 
spoke fluent Korean and were familiar with Korean culture, played a key role in 
building the bridge between the USMG and the Korean Protestants. Among 
them two missionaries are needed to be referred: Horace H. Underwood, a 
Presbyterian missionary, and J. Earnest Fisher, a Methodist missionary. 
Horace H. Underwood and J. Earnest Fisher played especially important roles 
during the USMG. Horace. H. Underwood was a civilian officer with the rank of 
army major, who worked as a staff officer for Archibald V. Arnold, the Military 
Governor, and as an adviser of John Hodge, who exercised great influence 
on the USMG. J. Earnest Fisher, who had once worked as a specialist of Japan, 
Korea and the Philippines in the OSS Washington office during the Pacific War, 
served in the USMG’s Department of Public Information. He was very close to 
John Hodge. During their works in the USMG, Underwood and Fisher vigorously 
recommended that the US missionaries and their descendants serve in the 
USMG. Underwood and Fisher had been professors at Yonhee Jeonmun (Yonhee 
College, now Yonsei University) during the Japanese occupation and their works 
on Korea were on the required reading list for the officials and staffs of the USMG. 
They recommended many graduates from the Christian mission schools to the 
USMG, especially those from Yonhee College. As the results, people even called 
the USMG “the Yonhee Jeonmun Government.”17 Underwood also reported that 
John Hodge had a very friendly attitude to missionaries and their activities, and 
most important positions in the USMG were taken by the Korean Protestants 
from missionary schools. He mentioned the USMG as the “Chosen Christian 
College Government”18
With the strong recommendation of the US missionaries, many Korean 
Protestants, who had studied in the US and even served as civil servants for the 
US government during the Second World War, worked within the USMG. They 
served as assistant staffs, interpreters, and the directors of the Bureaus of Finance, 
Public Safety, Mining and Industry, Agriculture and Commerce, Public Health, 
Education, Justice, and Communication and Transportation. In 1946, 35 Protestants 
worked among 50 high Korean positions in the USMG. As many Christians worked 
as interpreters, advisors and directors in the USMG, they ended up exercising a 
certain influence on the post-Liberation political scenes through so-called “politics 
by interpretation” and “politics by advisors.” In the process of supporting Korean 
Protestants, even though the political positions of missionaries were slightly 
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different, most Korean Protestants working in the USMG became the main stream 
of the conservative political party after the USGM.
Material Resources: Disposed Properties and Foreign Relief 
Aids 
For the growth of Korean Protestantism and expansion of its influence, there were 
two opportunities. One was the disposed properties after Liberation and the 
other was the foreign relief aids during the Korean War period. Korean Protestant 
had almost monopolized the benefit with the support of the US missionaries 
and the USGM, and Rhee Syngman government respectively. The disposed 
properties and relief program became the main resources of the expansion and 
growth Korean Protestantism. 
However, there have been some fragmentary data on the disposal of religious 
properties. The detailed data, which could be used for drawing the whole picture 
of disposed properties, have not been found yet, and there is little research on 
this issue.19 Therefore, we might confer that those confiscated properties were 
disposed in the context of USMG policy to secure the US hegemony in South 
Korea. That is, Korean Protestantism had been the most benefited group among 
the Korean religions during the disposal of the confiscated religious priorities.
One of the examples that clearly demonstrate such a favorable attitude of the 
USMG and the role of missionaries toward Korean Protestantism was in the matter 
of the disposition of properties formerly owned by various Japanese colonial 
components. Horace Underwood, as a Property Custodian in General Affairs of 
the USMG, cooperated with Methodist Church, Southern Presbyterian Church, 
Salvation Army, YMCA and so on, and in 1946 was appointed as an administrator 
of Presbyterian Mission Properties who charged all religious properties owned 
by Japanese before Liberation.
There were many properties that the variety of Japanese religious 
organizations had left behind. Those properties, established by Japanese 
religious organizations, were classified as the facilities like churches or schools. At 
the end of Japanese Occupation, there were 327 Shindo-sect temples (about 250 
were in South Korea), 138 Japanese Buddhist temples (about 120 were in South 
Korea), 54 Japanese Christian churches, and about 1,000 Shindo shrines. There 
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were also some educational institutions (8 schools, 44 kindergartens, and 13 
training schools), four hospitals, and 12 social welfare organizations established 
by Japanese Buddhism. One school and four kindergartens were run by Japanese 
Christianity.20 Those religious properties were confiscated by the USMG and 
disposed during the USMG and the following Rhee’s government. 
Even though some buildings among those properties owned by Japanese 
were also disposed to other religions such as Daejonggyo, the properties of 
Japanese Shinto, Tenrikyo, and Johapgyohoe (Japanese Congregational Church 
that was active in Korea during the Japanese occupation.) were given to the 
Protestant groups.21 Youngnak Church, Gyeongdong Church, and the Museum 
of Christianity and Presbyterian Theological Seminary, both at Namsan in 
Seoul, were founded on the disposed properties. Korean Protestants were the 
most benefited group from the USMG during the disposing process of enemy 
properties. The representatives of refugee churches in Seoul, the core base 
of anti-communism, were established under the benefits from the USMG. As 
Japanese Shinto shrine temples transformed into Protestant churches and 
institutions, some Koreans would rejoice over these as God’s special blessings as 
well as the victory of Christianity.
The relief work during the period of post-Liberation and Korea War was 
another opportunity for Korean Protestantism to expand its influence in Korean 
society. As most of the foreign relief agencies had Christian backgrounds, and as 
the US missionary directed the relief work of the Church World Service (CWS) in 
Korea, Korean Protestants began to monopolize the whole operational process 
of the relief and social welfare works in Korea. 
After the outbreak of the Korean War, foreign relief agencies came to South 
Korea and began to play an important role in relief activities for Korean society 
and Korean people. The relief organizations provided emergency relief to 
refugees and other war-affected, operated orphanages and overseas adoption, 
dispensed assistance to war-widows, rebuilt and restored damaged houses, and 
carried out projects in areas such as education, public health, and community 
development. The majority of the foreign civilian aid organizations that came 
to Korea were churches or church-related Christian relief organizations from 
Europe and North America, such as the World Council of Churches (WCC), the 
International Missionary Council (IMC), the CWS, and the War Relief Service of the 
National Catholic Welfare Conference.22 Among about 40 agencies, the Church 
           [ 37 ]A Formation of Christian Nationalism in Korean Protestantism
World Service and War Relief Service of the Nation Catholic Welfare Conference 
played prominent roles in relief and restoration during and after the Korean War. 
In February 1951, Henry D. Appenzeller took charge of the relief work of 
the CWS in Korea.23 In result, his mission colleagues and Korean Protestant 
associates were engaged in distributing supplies, in assisting refugees and in 
their settlement with the cooperation of other foreign relief agencies such as War 
Relief Service Committee and American Friends Service Committee. As the areas 
of relief operations expanded, the CWS in Korea, operating under the guidance 
and support of the CWS in the USA, had 125 regional committees, comprising of 
county (gun) level units, throughout South Korea during the Korean War. These 
regional committees consisted of pastors and lay elders from the Presbyterian, 
Methodist, and Evangelical Holiness Churches as well as the Salvation Army, and 
they provided the direct distribution of the relief goods.
The relief activities, mainly controlling relief supplies, provided another 
opportunity for intensifying the anti-communism in the Korean society during 
and after the Korean War period. The foreign Christian agencies and the US 
missionaries, who charged the war relief supplies, which were the largest 
portion of financial resource at that time, took the Northwest refugee Christians 
as their partners for the war relief activities.24 The CWS founded in the US in 
1946 was interested in the refugee anti-communist Christians from North Korea. 
The CWS had a meaningful role in the formation of anti-communists with a 
close partnership with Northwestern refugee Christians through relief goods 
and mission funds. Han Gyeong-Jik, an interpreter and an associate of the US 
missionaries, was the representative of the Northwestern refugee Christians and 
took hegemony within the Korean Protestant churches. With the support of the 
US missionaries and through the war relief activities, anti-communist Korean 
Christians took the leadership within the Korean Protestantism, which became 
the core of anti-communist movement after the Korean War within Korean 
society until now. 
As most of the foreign relief agencies were either Christian mission associations 
from Europe or North America, or had Christian backgrounds, the operations 
for relief and social welfare in Korea reflected strong Christian influences. These 
social relief and outreach programs played such important roles during the 
1950s that the Christian churches came to be known as social relief agencies to 
the whole of Korean, and not just to the Korean Christians. With the vast support 
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and assistance from the foreign churches, the churches in Korea entered a period 
of the most active social mission outreach in their history. However, this does 
not mean that the impact of these foreign relief agencies on Korean society and 
Korean Christian communities were always positive. The process of distributing 
the relief goods sometimes became the source of trouble and scandal in the 
Korean Protestantism.
Policy Resources: Rhee Syngman Government and the 
Protestant-Friendly Policies
Rhee Syngman was elected as the first President of South Korea and had 
exercised his power for 12 years, with the strong support of the USMG, most 
US missionaries and the conservative anti-communist Protestants in Korea. The 
USMG backed Rhee Syngman’s anti-communist policy and most missionaries 
at Yonhee College such as Horace Underwood and J. Earnest Fisher supported 
him. Also, a great number of refugee Protestants who fled from Northwestern 
Korea actively participated in political activities to eliminate leftist elements in 
South Korea.25 When Rhee Syngman emerged in 1948 as the first President of 
the Republic of Korea with the support of the USMG and the anti-communist 
Protestants leftist elements in the church were purged. The leaders of the USMG 
in Korea especially considered that it was their mission to protect democracy 
from totalitarianism such as communism, and some even said that the “founding 
of the country should be based on Christian principles.”26 Only Rhee, among all 
Protestant political leaders, had an opportunity to try to realize Christianity as 
the guiding principles for founding a country.
Rhee Syngman had observed the Christian ritual during the official national 
events.27 At the opening ceremony of the first National Assembly of the Republic 
of Korea in May 1948, Rhee, as the Speaker of the National Assembly, asked 
Lee Yun-Young, a member of the National Assembly and Methodist pastor, 
to pray as the first order of the ceremony. When Rhee was being sworn in as 
the Speaker of the National Assembly, he did it “before God, the deceased 
patriots and thirty-million Korean compatriots.” As he was elected as the first 
President of the Republic of Korea, he again took the oath at the inauguration 
ceremony “before God and fellow Korean compatriots.” After this, all the national 
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ceremonies of the First Republic were observed in a Christian way, while national 
governing institutions and systems reflecting Christian values began to appear, 
and many Protestants were appointed to the key posts in all departments in 
his administration. From the very beginning of the formation of the Republic of 
Korea, Christianity penetrated deeply into the national institutions and society of 
the newly founded nation.
The Christian influence on the Rhee Syngman government was manifested 
clearly in the high number of Protestants among the high officials of the 
government. 44 out of 208 members of the National Assembly, that is about 
21%, were Protestants. Considering the fact that the Protestant population 
was less than 5% of the total Korean population, this was indeed a very high 
proportion. The proportion of Protestants in the executive branch was even 
higher. The analysis, that 38% of the 242 ministers and deputy-ministers of the 
19 departments of the First Republic were Protestants, explains well the role and 
the comparative importance of the Protestants in the first national government 
of the Republic of Korea.28 Rhee Syngman described the situation as follows: “The 
influences of the one million Christians are felt in the government, in the National 
Assembly and throughout the whole country.”29 Christianity became the spiritual 
foundation of Korea under the Rhee Syngman Administration. It had been a 
mere sixty years since Protestantism was introduced to Korea. However, the high 
proportion of Protestants in the Rhee government also meant that Protestants 
were not free from blame for the injustice and corruption in that government.
Moreover, a series of new Protestant-friendly practices were carried out in 
early 1950.30 Christian prison ministry, Christian chaplaincy in the armed services 
and the salute to the national flag (by silently beholding it with a right hand on 
the heart, instead of military style salute or bow down salute in Japanese Shinto 
worship) could be referred as the examples of Rhee Syngman implementing the 
Christian principles in the national reconstruction. The military chaplaincy was 
the most representative example of the Christianization of national institutions 
under the Rhee Syngman government. With the introduction of the military 
chaplaincy in 1951, the number of Christians in the Korean military had grown 
rapidly. For example, in 1954, 24% of the entire Korean military were Christians 
(Protestant 20%, Catholic 4%), and this was indeed a very high percentage 
compared to that of the Korean Christians in the entire country. Other religions, 
however, were excluded from military chaplaincy from the beginning, for it was 
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a program of the US Armed Forces. In the 1950s, world-famous missionaries 
frequently visited Korea and led large-scale evangelical gatherings. Rhee 
Syngman supported these Protestant gatherings. After the Rhee’s government, 
the outreach of Korea Protestantism took many forms. Christian universities 
became leading educational institutions in Korea. Church-sponsored hospitals 
and clinics had consistently led the way in health care delivery for the Korean 
people. Among the many special programs were those that assisted workers in 
factories, children in need of adoption and girls from the countryside in search of 
city jobs. The churches sponsored extensive ministries to students on campuses. 
Christian radio stations carried the message into every corner of Korea.
The Rhee Syngman government would accept churches’ requests without 
exception whenever there were important social issues. The Constitution 
articulated the freedom of religion but religious equality was not guaranteed 
in terms of policies. The USMG and the Rhee Syngman government maintained 
Japan’s regulations against Buddhist and Confucian facilities and suppressed 
these religions. The government’s preferential treatment of Christianity was 
obvious and visible. During the USMG and Rhee’s government, Protestantism 
was treated as a kind of national religion.
Conclusion
We have examined the historical backgrounds and factors for expansion of the 
Protestant influence in Korea. The US occupation was the decisive factor in the 
growth of Protestant influence in South Korea. During the post-liberation period, 
Korean Protestantism was able to grow and develop freely with the support of 
the USMG and that of the US missionaries. Korean Protestants were the only 
qualified group for supporting the USMG, for they on the whole had been the 
most pro-American Korean since the late nineteenth century. Moreover many 
Protestant leaders obtained modern education in mission schools or in the US 
with the support of the US missionaries. During the USMG, Korean Protestants 
had received a special benefit in the area of human resources and material 
resources. The following Rhee administration after the USMG had established 
and practiced some Protestant friendly policies as well.
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The three benefit areas for Korean Protestantism are human resources, material 
resources, and policy resources. Those three resources were secured as follows: 
(1) the USMG faced with the lack of information on Korea; (2) US missionaries, 
working in the USMG, provided the needed information and carried out their 
influence on making policies toward Korea; (3) The US missionaries recommended 
Korean Protestants to be appointed important positions in the USMG; (4) The 
US missionaries provided special benefits the Korean Protestantism during the 
disposal process of confiscated properties; and (5) Rhee Syngman government, 
after the USMG ruling, carried out Protestant-friendly policies.
After the post-Liberation period, the Protestant hegemony and the influence 
within Korean society had been expanded within the three areas of human, 
material, and policy through the fourfold cooperation among the USMG, the 
US missionaries, Korean Protestants and Rhee Syngman government. These 
four groups are four concentric circles. With the backing and support of the 
USMG and the US missionaries and finally Rhee Syngman government, Korean 
Protestantism took the majority of political, social and economic positions and 
power. With exclusive benefits for Korean Protestants, such as the disposal of 
confiscated properties, the operation of the relief work, and some Protestant-
friendly policies by Rhee’s government, Korean Protestantism was allowed the 
opportunity for expanding its influence on all the areas of Korean society.
Of course, there have been many answers for explaining the rapid growth 
of the Korean Protestantism. These interrelated factors could be considered as 
probable factors for the rapid expansion of Korean Protestantism, and the decline 
of socialism in South Korea after Liberation. In this paper, however, the relationship 
between the growth of Korean Protestantism and the decline of socialism cannot 
be dealt with. There had been a competitive relationship between the socialist 
group in South Korea and the refugee Christian group from Northeastern part of 
North Korea which took the hegemony with Korean Protestantism and became 
the advanced guard for attacking the socialist and communist groups in South 
Korea. The selective affinity of growth of Korean Protestantism and decline of 
Socialism in South Korea is mentioned very shortly. This theme is needed to be 
presented with more detailed and empirical arguments as other related research. 
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Byung-Joon Chung
A Reflection on the  
Growth and Decline  
of the Korean  
Protestant Church
The sudden politico-economic changes in Korean society and the commitment 
of the Korean Christians had created very favourable conditions for Protestantism. 
However, those conditions now disappeared, and the church must overcome its 
inability to accommodate itself to the new changes. One of the impending tasks 
of the Korean church is to set qualitative goals and gain the costly respect and 
credibility of the Korean populace.
Korean Churches and Evangelism
Christianity has now become a major religion in Korea, in spite of its relatively short 
history: 230 years for Roman Catholicism and 130 years for Protestantism. Most 
churches in Asia ﬁnd it difﬁcult to engage in evangelism, partly because many 
Asians believe that their own traditional religions are better than Christianity, 
but also because the majority of Asian countries have experienced the negative 
effects of Western colonialism. Incidentally, Korea was not colonized by a Western 
country; this may not be the sole reason we have seen substantial growth of the 
church in Korea. According to the most recent government statistics, collected in 
2005, the Christian population in Korea was 29.2 percent of the total population: 
18.3 percent Protestants and 10.9 percent Catholics. The next most prominent 
religion was Buddhism, at 22.8 percent.
However, the Protestant population has declined over the past 10 years, since 
2005, while the membership of the Catholic Church has grown rapidly. This has 
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attracted the interest of many academics. Scholars are investigating this religious 
phenomenon in order to analyze the reasons behind this growth in Catholicism 
and decline in Protestantism.
This article is written with the intention of sharing the unique experience of 
the Korean churches in terms of church growth and decline, hoping that it will 
provide other contexts with some insight. In order to do so, both socio-political 
and theological approaches to the history of the Korean Protestant church are 
used to ﬁnd out the main reasons for the church growth. In addition, the following 
ﬁve types of evangelism, as set out by the Church Growth School, have been 
borrowed and will be used to analyze the main reasons for the church growth.1 
1. Presence type (P-1): non-verbal witness through diakonia, Christian 
morality, social participation in social justice and peace action, or solidarity 
with the poor. 
2. Proclamation type (P-2): proclaiming the gospel in a direct way or through 
mass media.
3. Persuasion type (P-3): invitation to a deep fellowship with Christ, nurturing, 
and persuasion to commit oneself to Christ. 
4. Power Evangelism type (P-4): healing and counselling, or showing the 
power of God. 
5. Proclamation Community Formed type (P-5) : training task force teams 
and church planting.
Successful Settlement: 1884-1909
The major traditional religions of Korea were Shamanism, Buddhism and 
Confucianism, until Christianity came in. From the end of the 18th century, some 
Confucian scholars accepted Roman Catholicism through some of the Chinese 
translations of Catholic teaching. The belief spread among commoners and 
women. During the 19th century, several periods of ofﬁcial persecution produced 
more than 10,000 martyrs.
Before the ﬁrst Protestant missionary came into Korea in 1884, a few Koreans 
had already received Christianity in Manchuria with the help of the Rev. John 
Ross, a Scotch Presbyterian missionary. They translated the gospels and the New 
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Testament into the Korean language. The Koreans also spread the gospel into 
Korea, risking their lives, and even planted the ﬁrst Korean native church
At the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference in 1910, missionaries said that 
Korea was the most rapidly growing mission ﬁeld in the world. Protestants alone 
reached nearly 200,000 persons in only 25 years. What made such growth possible?
1. The ﬁrst non-theological reason is that the Protestant missions to Korea 
came in with no imperialist, colonial tag. Instead, they brought the 
motif of emancipation for women and the humble, and some value of 
the modern culture for the intellectuals, establishing a high standard 
of ethical life for the society. These factors provided a very favourable 
condition for mission. The preaching of biblical egalitarianism accelerated 
the dismantling process of the highly stratiﬁed class system and gender 
discrimination. The church requested believers to live a puritan style of 
life by prohibiting concubinage and smoking/alcohol, forbidding the 
abandonment of wives, and emphasizing parents’ duty to their children.   
The Protestant church also promoted the formation of modern culture with 
education and medicine. In the early stage, the Korean King Gojong allowed 
only Western doctors and teachers to come into Korea. His decision was a 
way of accepting Western technology while avoiding a strong resistance 
of Confucian scholars against Western culture. The American Boards of 
Mission also favoured this as a wise method to avoid probable religious 
persecution in sending their missionaries. This factor greatly reduced the 
resistance of the traditional religions against Christianity. 
2. The second non-theological reason is that Protestants came in at a time 
when Korea’s religious and cultural heritage was crumbling. At the end of 
the 19th century, Koreans were surprised to see Japan’s victory over China 
and Russia, and the Japanese protectorate to Korea. The Koreans began 
to question the old Confucian value. This sort of unstable socio-political 
context became a spiritual seedbed for mission. Graph 1 shows that the 
Protestant membership rapidly increased from 1,000 to 4,000 after the 
Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) and from 35,000 to 55,000 after the Russo-
Japanese War (1904–05). Some theological and ecclesiological reasons 
for church growth in the early period are much more crucial than others, 
because they characterized the features of the Korean Protestant church.
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Graph 1: Protestant Church Growth in Korea, 1896-1909
3. The third reason is the wise mission policy of the early Presbyterian 
missionaries. They adopted the so-called Nevius Mission Policy in 1890. The 
aim of the policy was to establish a self-propagating, self-governing, self-
supporting native church as soon as possible.2 According to the principles, 
each one of the native believers had to be trained as an energetic worker 
for their neighbours’ conversion. To be a communicant, a Christian had to 
win at least one convert. That is why the Presbyterians grew faster than the 
Methodists in Korea. 
4. The Great Revival of 1905–1907 swept the whole country. The experience 
of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit brought spiritual rebirth to the Korean 
church. The motivations of the early Korean church members were mostly 
extrinsic to Christian faith. Poor people came to church to get economic 
benefits and protection from local officials by Western missionaries. 
Intellectuals accepted Christianity with patriotic motivations. Yet the revival 
awoke the deep and real meaning of Christian faith. It also promoted the 
formation of the indigenization of Christian culture, such as simultaneous 
audible prayer, dawn prayer meeting, all-night prayer meeting, rice 
offering, day offering for evangelism,3 and weekly Bible class. During the 
revival, Protestant membership doubled, from 55,542 to 118,246. 
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5. Finally, the reason for the growth is the initiative of the Korean Christians. 
The Korean Protestant Christians are even now very committed to Christ. 
They willingly devote themselves to their local church community. They 
naturally accept that observing the Sabbath, giving weekly offerings, 
faithful tithing and contributing financially to the work of the local church 
is a Christian duty which they must perform, and also a token of their faith 
in God. This religious commitment originated from the earliest period.
In the early period, Korean Christianity did not polarize evangelism and social action. 
The church growth originated from the emancipation motif, the modern value, the 
Christians’ moral life, the revival experience, Bible study and the prayer culture. The 
“Presence” type (P-1) and the “Proclamation” type (P-2) of evangelism prevailed.
Japanese Domination: 1910-1945
During the Japanese occupation, the Korean church suffered oppression by 
the colonial rule, as Christian faith in God conﬂicted with the divine emperor 
ideology of Japan. The Korean church was a strong cradle of the patriotic national 
movement and was also closely connected to the British and American churches. 
The Japanese policies to the Korean church strongly inﬂuenced the church’s 
growth and decline. As Graph 2 shows, the growth-decline curve is repeated 
four times. From 1910 to 1937, Protestant membership doubled from 177,692 to 
374,653. Yet church membership rapidly decreased after 1938
Graph 2: Protestant Church Growth, 1910-1942 
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1. The most powerful factor for church growth in this period is no doubt the 
fact that Protestantism was a delivery room for the patriotic independence 
movement. For instance, after Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910, the 
Japanese fabricated the case of Governor-General Attempted Murder 
in order to exterminate any root for the national movement. One 
hundred and five Korean leaders were prosecuted after being severely 
tortured; 85 percent of them were the Protestant church leaders.   
The Protestant church was also a prominent leader of the March First 
Independence Movement in 1919. This movement was accompanied 
by a great peaceful nationwide demonstration of millions of people for 
six months. Among the 33 national leaders who signed the Letter of 
Declaration for Independence, there were 16 Protestants, 15 Chondogyo 
leaders, and two Buddhists. Around 40,000 people were arrested and 6,000 
people were murdered. Though the Protestants were less than 2 percent 
of the population, around 25 percent of those arrested were Protestants. 
Graph 2 shows that the Protestant population grew rapidly from 1920 after 
the brief decrease of 1919. Before that event, the Protestant church was 
just a foreign religion; afterward, it was at last the national religion that had 
gained the costly respect of the Korean people.
2. The Korean Protestant church became strong and autonomous from the 
Western missions. The Presbyterian Church in Korea established its General 
Assembly in 1912. The Korean Methodist Church became independent in 
1930. They worked hard for evangelism through revival meetings, Bible 
classes, Sunday schools, medical and educational missions, and more. 
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They even sent Korean missionaries to China, Russia, Japan and Manchuria. 
3. Under the Japanese domination, the Korean church clung to the last 
hope of the second coming of Jesus Christ. This kind of pre-millennial 
eschatological faith encouraged the believers to fervently conduct 
evangelism. The church also offered spiritual power to console and soothe 
the minds of people who were in despair and suffering. In many cases, 
revival meetings were accompanied by miraculous healings.
4. Korean Christianity peacefully co-existed with traditional religions. In the 
early days, Korean Christians accepted persecution in humility as a minority 
religion. However, with time, Korean Christians have engaged in various 
forms of interfaith dialogue and have learned to coexist with people of 
other religions in their family, among friends and as neighbours, while 
bravely witnessing to their faith, particularly through their moral example. 
It is only in recent times that Korean Protestantism has been criticized as 
being exclusivist.
There are some reasons for the decline in membership of the church during 
this period. From the mid 1920s to 1945, 2.5 million Korean peasants who were 
deprived of their land emigrated to Manchuria, Japan, Russia, and Hawaii. 
This affected the church’s decline. However, the church sent pastors to those 
migrant areas, and developed the enlighten movement for rural communities. In 
addition, the growing socialist movement, accepted by the younger generation 
as an alternative national independence movement after the Russian Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917, criticized pro-Americanism, irrational mysticism and the 
otherworldliness of the church. as a result a large number of young people left 
the church. 
The Japanese army invaded Manchuria in 1930 and inland China in 1938, 
rushing into the Paciﬁc War. From 1930 to 1945, the Korean peninsula became 
the warfare supply base for Japan. The Japanese government forced the Korean 
church to participate in the Japanese Shinto Shrine worship. In fact, it was an 
ideology attempting national integration and mobilization for warfare. It was also 
the idolized emperor’s worship. In the meantime, there were many conﬂicts in the 
Korean churches, between the conservative and the liberal theologies within the 
Presbyterian churches, between the Presbyterian and the Methodist churches, 
between the nationalistic Korean churches and the foreign missionaries. In 
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addition, there was inter-regional conﬂict. The Korean church failed to respond 
effectively to the disunion policy of Japanese authority and its coercion for the 
Japanese Shinto shrine worship. The Presbyterian Church in Korea, which had 
resisted the shrine worship, ﬁnally surrendered to the Japanese in 1938. All the 
denominations were dissolved or integrated into the Japanese Union Church. 
The Protestant population decreased back to the levels of the year 1915. In the 
process of the anti-Shrine worship movement, around 2,000 Korean Christians 
suffered torture and imprisonment, and around 50 became martyrs.
During this period, the types of “Presence” (P-1), “Proclamation” (P-2) and 
“Power Evangelism” (P-4) appeared.
Recovery after Liberation and the Korean War: 1945-1960 
In 1945, the Korean peninsula was divided into north and south soon after the 
liberation from Japanese domination. Christianity was persecuted in North 
Korea, while the South Korean church largely grew with the special favour of 
the American Military Government (1945–48) and the subsequent government 
(1948–60).
1. The ﬁrst non-theological reason for the growth of the church was the 
sociopolitical and military structure, which provided a favourable condition 
for the church. Protestants actively participated in the political activities 
and Korean church leaders also skillfully utilized the pro-Christian regime 
for the beneﬁt of the church, such as the monopoly of chaplaincy positions 
in the prisons and the army, and preferential disposal of former Japanese 
religious property to the church. From 1945 to 1950, the Protestant 
population doubled from 240,000 to 500,000.
2. The second non-theological reason is the anomic situation of the 
Korean society, which took place after the Korean War (1950–53). During 
the war, three million casualties occurred, the whole country and key 
industries were devastated, the majority of the churches were scorched, 
and many leaders were killed and kidnapped to the north.   
One million refugees came from the north. The refugee Christians from the 
north spread the gospel and built up their churches upon settling down. 
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They also provided comfort communities for other refugees. In addition, a 
large amount of relief material from Christian nations and churches during 
the war assisted victims and resulted in the growth of the church. By 1960, 
the Protestant population had reached 623,000 (a growth rate of 24.6 
percent over 10 years). 
3. It is important to remember that the Korean church continuously sought 
to spread the gospel throughout the Korean population. For example, 
famous international evangelists, such as Rev. Billy Graham, held large 
revival meetings with the support of the Korean churches. In 1955, the 
Presbyterian church set out a Five-Year Evangelism Plan for church planting 
in the 490 towns and urban areas where no local church existed. Other 
churches also made similar efforts, with a tremendous effect.
4. During this period, the Protestant churches and denominations 
experienced divisions. Korean Protestant sects sprang up rapidly, reaching 
up to over 200 sectarian or cultic groups. This sort of factionalism resulted 
in the total increase of the Christian population.4
In this period, “Proclamation” (P-1) type and “Power Evangelism” (P-4) type were 
inﬂuential. Yet the Korean Protestant church lost its pre-eminence in terms of 
the prophetic role due to its dependence upon the authoritative political power, 
projecting a pro-government and pro-America image. “Presence” (P-2) type 
weakened as a result.
Explosive Growth during Industrialization and 
Urbanization: 1960-1995 
A military government regime took power through a military coup d’état in 1961 
and powerfully drove an industrialization policy. This resulted in a mass rural-
urban migration. In 1960, the urban population was 39.15 percent but by 1990 it 
was 81.95 percent. The mass migration created large slum areas around cities and 
destroyed the traditional extended family structure. The gap between the haves 
and the have nots became greater. In the urban areas, many people felt rootless 
and longed for intimate communal support.
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1. The Protestant church found a great opportunity for church growth in 
the process of the industrialization and urbanization of Korean society. 
Churches promoted evangelistic activities and church planting in urban 
areas. These urban areas seemed to welcome church visitors from large 
denominations, which set numerical goals and put all their efforts into 
achieving them.
For instance, an inter-denominational national evangelization movement 
took place in 1965. In the ﬁrst stage, church ministers gathered together for 
prayer meetings according to their regions. Thereafter, they mobilized their 
congregations in a place for prayer meetings and trained them for evangelism, 
also paying home visits. In that year, there were 2,239 meetings and 40,000 new 
members were added.
According to Graph 3, the Protestant population in 1966 was 0.9 million (3 
percent of the population), while four years later it reached 3.2 million (10.2 
percent). This ﬁgure shows that industrialization and urbanization have had a 
great inﬂuence on Protestant church growth. In 1980, Protestant membership 
reached 5.34 million (14.3 percent).
From 1980 to 1990, 2.7 million new members were added, reaching 8.7 million 
(19.7 percent of the population) by 1995.
Graph 3: Protestant Church Growth: 1950-2005
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2. One of the notable results of church growth in Korea is the emergence of 
Protestant mega-churches. Among the 50 largest churches in the world, 
23 of them are in Korea. There are 15 mega-churches, each of which has 
more than 10,000 adult worshippers. The largest Methodist church in the 
world is not in England, the largest Presbyterian church is not in Geneva, 
and the largest Pentecostal church is not in South California. They are all 
in Seoul, Korea.
The growth of the mega-churches has now become a model case that most 
Korean medium-sized or small churches are looking for. For example, the Yoido 
Full-Gospel Church (YFGC) started in a slum area in Seoul with ﬁve members 
of humble origin in 1958. Its membership grew to 800 in 1962; 18,000 in 1973; 
503,000 in 1986; and 709,000 in 1997.
Rev. Young-Hoon Lee, the present senior pastor of the YFGC, claims six reasons 
for the development of that church: a strong positive message, powerful healing 
ministry the Prayer Mountain movement, baptism in the Holy Spirit and speaking 
in tongues, home cell group meetings, and the use of mass media.5
The YFGC has been a persuasive power for poor and marginalized people. 
The founder, Pastor Yong-Gi Cho, appealed to them with the promise of spiritual 
salvation, physical healing, material blessings and prosperity in their life here 
and now. His message addressed exactly what the urban populace desired. 
The emergence of the Korean mega-churches was a result of modernization, 
which was accompanied by industrialization and urbanization. The government 
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ideology of economic development was closely related to the numerical church 
growth strategy in Korea. The market enterprise culture developed the “bigger is 
best” syndrome. This capitalist culture inspired an egoistic local church-ism and 
church competition. The size of the church is understood as a measure of success. 
In the religious market, “religious institutions became consumer commodities.6”
The Korean mega-churches adopted Church Growth Theology, developed 
bureaucratic systems to earn better efficiency, and utilized the best technology 
to control the spirituality of the people (closed-circuit television service, internet 
broadcasting station, satellite service, and so on). “The dynamism of the mega-
churches is due to the ability of the charismatic pastors.” They displayed their 
special gifts to lead their congregations to transcendent religious experiences 
and to the belief in divine guidance.
One strong impact of modernity on religion is “its privatization” and “no 
institutional loyalty.” To overcome these problems the mega-church leaders 
systematically developed their own effective use of small cell strategies. Pastor 
Yong-Gi Cho divided up his congregation into homogeneous cells of 5-10 
members with common orientations or occupations within geographical areas. 
The cell leaders were lay women who were well trained. In 1985 there were no 
less than 50,000 cells in the YFGC. The cell system has kept religious commitment 
among the congregation. To sum up, the particular features of the Korean mega-
churches are a strong charismatic leadership, diverse sorts of cell system, and 
modern technological pragmatism. 
3. Since the 1970s, the educational level of Korean pastors has become higher, 
and their concerns in pastoral and church growth strategies have also been 
heightened. Pernoctacion prayer meeting, Bible study, disciple training 
and reinforcement of the home cell system of the parish, lay training as 
well as various programs were developed. In the 1970s, the Korean church 
extended its mission work, including military mission, police mission, 
hospital mission, school mission and urban industrial mission.
4. University mission organizations such as the Campus Crusade for Christ, the 
Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship, the Navigators–international organizations, 
Joy mission, University Bible Fellowship–Korean inter-denominational 
organizations, and so on developed methodologies of evangelism, Bible 
study and cell organizations, all greatly contributing to church growth.
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5. In 1970s and 1980s, some of the progressive Christians based on the National 
Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK) and the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) 
took leadership in the human rights and democracy movement against the 
military dictatorship government. They also became pioneers in initiating 
the reuniﬁcation movement between North and South Korea. Since the 
mid-1980s, the liberating tradition of Protestantism has been succeeded 
by the minjung church movement. The minjung churches mainly belong 
to the Presbyterian Church in Korea, the Presbyterian Church in the 
Republic of Korea (PROK) and the Methodist Church in Korea. They regard 
today’s minjung as the least, such as single parents, differently abled 
people, daily workers, ex-convicts, the unemployed, prostitutes, the urban 
poor, prisoners of conscience and migrant workers.7 They are working 
for unemployed and casual workers, the homeless, migrant workers, and 
international wives of Korean men.
Such activities of the minjung churches have not inﬂuenced numerical church 
growth, but they do show a practical way of promoting a preferential option for 
victims and suggest the direction of church renewal. After the democratization 
of Korea, the civil government borrowed the ideas of the minjung churches in 
constructing the national welfare system.
Despite the overall growth of Korean Protestantism during this time, holistic 
evangelism did not ﬂourish. In spite of the development of church planting 
and good training courses for their new believers, the social responsibility and 
prophetic role was left to small groups of progressive Christians in the NCCK, 
the URM and the minjung churches. The “Proclamation” (P-2), “Persuasion” (P-
3) and “Proclamation Community formed”(P-5) types appeared strongly. Yet 
the“Presence”type(P-1) was still weak.
Decline after Industrialization and Democratization:  
1995-2005
By 1995, Protestants reached the highest mark, but from 1995 to 2005, the 
Protestant membership decreased by 140,000. It is interesting to investigate 
why the Korean Protestant population started to decline. We may attribute the 
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reasons to economic growth and the democratization of Korea, as well as the 
internal corruption of the church.
First, many of the advantageous socio-political factors for church growth have 
disappeared. Today, religious pluralism prevails in Korea. Many people enjoy 
economic prosperity and leisure activities instead of religious practice, while the 
democratization of the country brought relative social stability.
On the other hand, the Protestant church is now losing its social credibility 
because of the immoral conduct of some church leaders, sectarian competition, 
low social responsibility, exclusivist attitude toward other religions, and the wide 
gaps between large and small churches and between urban and rural churches.8 
Another factor is the fact that Korean Protestantism is unable to adjust to the 
political developments after 1998, when the opposite party came into power 
after 32 years of military dictatorship and ﬁve years of the conservative party’s 
ruling. The civil society had grown enough to request clear transparency of the 
religious institutions. However, the majority of church leaders were afraid of the 
Sunshine polity for North Korea and progressive reforms, which led to many 
young people leaving their conservative churches.
Yet the secularization theory that modernization weakens the inﬂuence of 
religions on society does not seem appropriate in the Korean religious context.
Table 4 Distribution of Population by Religion
Table 4 shows that the religious population in Korea is steadily growing in spite of 
modernization. The rate of the Roman Catholics to the population increased by 4.3 
percent in the last 10 years, yet the rate of Protestants decreased by 1.4 percent.
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Seung-ho Kim argues that the inter-relation between city population and 
the number of churches has a great inﬂuence on church growth and decline.9 
The increasing number of pastors and their competitive church planting in the 
cities were favourable factors for the growth of church members during the 
time of rapid urbanization of 1960 to 1990. Yet they have produced a contrary 
effect since 1990, when the city population began to move to suburban areas. 
In contrast to the Protestant churches, the Korean Roman Catholics had not 
achieved such explosive growth before 1990. Yet since then, their membership 
has rapidly increased, without any signiﬁcant change in the number of churches 
and priests.10 Kim argues that the Korean Protestant churches need to stop 
producing more seminary students than needed and must carefully plan church 
planting.
Conclusion 
The growth of the Protestant church in Korea was astonishing and miraculous. 
The reasons are largely divided into the external socio-political ones and the 
internal spiritual and theological ones. It is true that the sudden politico-economic 
changes in Korean society created very favourable conditions for Protestantism. 
Korean history, which is full of suffering, we believe, probably became the 
spiritual blessing for the Korean church. However, without the church’s efforts 
and its passionate spirituality and perseverance, such growth would have been 
impossible. As the apostle Paul says, planting and watering is our job, while we 
must let God take care of the growth.
We cannot choose just one of these tasks, however. Planting and watering 
work together. In the early stage, Korean Protestantism preached the gospel and 
at the same time provided the liberation motive to the poor and marginalized 
people. It also carried out a prophetic role against the social injustices of the 
Japanese colonial rule. The church gained the respect of Korean peoples through 
holistic evangelism and the growth of the church.
In the 1970s and 1980s, in the face of industrialization and urbanization, the 
Korean Protestant church carried out active evangelism and church planting, 
achieving rapid growth. Yet most of the Korean churches clung to quantitative 
growth; these number-driven churches lost their sense of social responsibility. 
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On the other hand, the URM, the NCCK and the minjung churches led the 
democratization of the country, the human rights movement, and minjung 
mission, but they were a minority in the Korean Protestant church. After Korean 
churches became rich (even though 40 percent of the Protestant churches are 
poor), churches lost spiritual power and social credibility. The purpose of church 
growth is to serve the expansion of the kingdom of God, but if the church loses 
its purpose, numerical church growth will only matter for its institutionalization.
The church should be ready to adopt better methodology, while training 
believers to always witness to their faith. The evangelistic methods that were 
used in the time of industrialization are now inefﬁcient.
The quality of a Christian’s life has an inﬂuence on church growth. However, 
church growth can happen with or without the quality of the church. Poor 
quality necessarily causes a reduction in members in due time. This is exactly 
one of the reasons why Korean Protestant membership has declined. One of 
the impending tasks of the Korean church is to set qualitative goals and achieve 
qualitative growth. Another task is to accept the ways of holistic evangelism. 
Korean lay people have a passion for evangelism, but their methods are narrow 
and ineffective. I think what is needed is to recover our calling as agents of the 
kingdom of God, and the real meaning and proper methods of evangelism.
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Love your Enemies
Universal Christian Virtues  
versus Korean Christian’s  
Participation in National  
Independent Movement  
under Japanese Colonial  
Regime
Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you (Mt. 5:44)
Introduction
“Love your enemy” (Mt. 5:44). It is a representative expression that Biblical 
authors in the first century had used to interpret Jesus’ unlimited love (agape) 
for the world.1 It is clearly shown on the Cross where Jesus voluntary accepted 
his death in accordance with God’s will amid the violence of Roman authority 
and Jewish religious leaders. Jesus did not take any physically violent action or 
revenge against those who arrested him. Rather, he commanded the people to 
love and pray for them (Mt. 5:44). The authors showed three ways to achieve this 
command specifically; turn the other (left) cheek, give your cloak as well, and go 
also the second mile (Mt. 5:38-41).
Adherents of Jesus for the first three centuries imitate Jesus’ such behaviour 
dying for God amid persecution of the violent authority. We call classically those 
Christians martyrs. Thus, it may be fair to say that this becomes a principle or 
superior norm that Christians have to follow living in this world though the 
world might be evil. On the basis of this understanding one who read Acts 1:8 
in that time, “but you shall receive power (du,namin) when the Holy Spirit has 
come upon you; and you shall be My witnesses (moi ma,rturej) both in Jerusalem, 
and in all Judea and Samaria, and even to the remotest part of the earth”, he/
she might envisioned him/herself to be a potential martyr because the term of 
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‘witness’(ma,rtuj) was used as the same word of ‘martyr’. For them, therefore, the 
power received from the Holy Spirit is not a secular one bringing every worldly 
success by any means but an ability to accept voluntary death for the sake of their 
faith in Christ. Namely, the power the Holy Spirit bestows upon the people, is an 
ability of taking death in which new life paradoxically can be given to birth not 
an expedient of bringing worldly socio-economic success or political authority.  
This phrase “love your enemy”, however, does not mean to cover all evil doings 
without any judgement with justice. It is not an exemplum of non-resistance 
against the evil doer or system. Rather, it is indeed an act of non-violent resistance 
against the evil system or power-holder who persecutes and kills the faithful in 
justice challenging them. As Walter Wink fairly pointed out that to love your 
enemy is an act of “nonviolent struggle for justice”2 recognizing that “the enemy, 
too, is a child of God”3 to open a space of reconciliation between the perpetrator/
persecutor and victim/persecuted in hostile history. As Jesus achieved God’s will 
taking violent death on the cross, if we perceive ourselves as his true disciples 
imitating his life and death, the phrase “love your enemy” should be our principle 
of life though it is a quite difficult command to practice in our real life. 
During the Japanese colonial regime, 1910-1945, ruling principles for colonized 
Korean people took at least three stages: military rule to 1919, cultural rule to 
early 1930s, and rule on a war footing to 1945. The first stage of colonial regime, 
especially, was truly a period of a brutal reign of terror controlled by gendarmerie 
armed with guns and swords. Under this fierce situation, Korean nationalists 
put up a resistance assassinating Japanese colonial leaders, governors, and 
pro-Japanese persons whether it was successful or not. Even strong Christian 
nationalists conducted and engaged those resistances. However, for the 
Christian nationalists, who were reading the Bible and kept God’s teaching in 
mind certainly revealed through Jesus Christ, concerned the way of resistance 
applying the teachings. Their questions would be: ‘what is the true meaning 
and understanding of the phrase “love your enemy”?’ It is true that practically 
Japanese colonial authority was counted as the current enemy for them. At 
this juncture, to what extent can armed resistance using physical violence be 
allowed to the Christians participating in the independent movements to gain 
their human dignity and liberation from the inhuman reign of colonial power. 
Between ‘flight’ (non-resistance) and ‘fight’ (violent-resistance), is there any 
alternative third way to follow Jesus’s way against the evil? 
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This paper seeks to find an answer to these questions. Before going ahead to 
our context specifically, it will confirm a principle through a reading of Christ’s 
life and death, which was interpreted by the biblical authors. It will be presented 
as a principle paradigm, ‘dying for God: an act of non-violent resistance’. Then, 
this paper moves to our historical context in order to compare this principle to 
the post-Constantine paradigm in which this paper argues it as ‘killing for God: 
violent revenge’. It will be presented as a distorted paradigm. Given this paradigm 
shift of Christianity, this paper implies it to the Korean context, especially Korean 
Christians’ participation in the independence movement during the Japanese 
colonial regime as an exemplum practice of the principle. Through this research, 
we expect that we have a principle as all Christians have to take when we face 
with violent situations. It is ‘dying for God, an act of non-violent resistance’. 
A Principle: Dying for God, an Act of Non-Violent Resistance
It may not be difficult to agree that communities of Jesus’ adherents in the pre-
Constantine periods in Roman society are hold three characteristics: Diversity 
in the structure of the communal living and using materials for their worship, 
Minority in membership of the society, and accordingly Powerlessness in social 
and political stance. These three elements may be an essential figure of the 
Christian communities’ identity in the first three centuries. Therefore, under this 
figure, one way that they could take, when they faced with persecution of Roman 
or hostile of Jewish authorities, is to accept death, dying for God, imitating Christ’s 
death on the cross. 
It is indeed Christian communities’ interpretation of non-violent reaction that 
Jesus peacefully accepted violent death on the cross rather than using divine 
power by calling up “more than twelve legions of angels” (Mt. 26.53) and pleading 
with the Father for forgiveness of his persecutor (Lk. 23.34) rather than revenge. 
Persecuted Christians in the early period did not curse their oppressor, but 
calmly accepted their fate, thanking God for giving them the holy opportunity 
of martyrdom. A violent response against opponents evokes a deeper violence. 
It is truly the nature of violence. In accepting death without violent reaction 
by imitating Jesus on the cross, they halted violence making a touchstone of 
reconciliation. 
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Here, it is worth noting that those interpretations about Jesus’ life and violent 
death on the cross were initiated and settled in Christian communities during 
the persecution before Constantine’s conversion. Whether the persecution 
took place through state authorities or public antagonism, under oppression, 
pre-Constantine Christians did not dream of ‘earthly revenge’ against their 
persecutors. Rather, they clearly proclaimed the spirituality of the Cross, that is, 
his death for others (self-sacrificing, atonement), reconciliation, and liberation. 
The oppressed Christian’s weapon for overcoming rigorous persecutions was not 
the sword against others but death for others just as Jesus clearly showed his 
disciples and followers by his public life and crucifixion. This paradox of life and 
death in Christian tradition, that death in Christ is the gate of eternal life, was the 
core element of their interpretation of Jesus’ death and life, and this clearly came 
true and was proclaimed by his resurrection.
Specifically, in the pre-Constantine periods, though adherents of Jesus who 
died for God under persecution of Roman authority and named as martyrs were 
depicted as “the foot soldiers of God” in an eschatological cosmic war armed 
with the weapons of “faithfulness and endurance” expecting their participation 
in ultimate Christ’s victory,4 they practised no physical violence against their 
opponents. Rather they accepted the death they faced with “extraordinary 
patience”5 in “joy, peace, harmony, and love”.6 For them, the “strange victory” of 
Jesus on the cross in which violence was sealed or halted in his voluntary death 
proclaiming forgiveness for those who “condemned, executed, betrayed or 
deserted him” gave a model which Christian should imitate.7 The interpretation of 
the early Christians within the first three centuries for their fellows’ deaths caused 
by persecution was, therefore, focused on imitating Jesus who proclaimed and 
achieved God’s will through death. 
Given this understanding, dying for God imitating Christ became a Christian 
principle in the pre-Constantine periods to achieve the command, “love your 
enemy”. It is indeed an act of non-violent resistance against harsh persecutions 
under the unjust secular power base of the Roman system. However, this principle 
which various Christian groups in that time sought to follow was shifted when 
Christianity was secured by state/imperial power after Constantine’s conversion 
(or tolerance) in 313 onwards.   
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A Distortion: A paradigm Shift from Dying for God (Non-
violent Resistance) to Killing for God (Violent Revenge).
The position-shift of the Church from persecuted lambs to persecuting lions8 
took place after the edict of Milan in 313 when Roman society entered into 
the process of Christianization, and more concretely towards the end of fourth 
century, in 380, with the emperor Theodosius’ legislation on Nicene Orthodox 
Christianity which required all Roman citizens to become Christians and to 
accept the Nicene Creed.9 After becoming a state-sponsored religion, Christians 
were no longer at risk of persecution because of their faith. Rather, the legitimacy 
of Christianity in the Roman society gave Christian authorities the power to kill 
those who did not belong to that authority. Since then, in Christian literature, 
especially in the accounts of Christian martyrdom, the element of “killing others 
for the faith”10 has emerged along with the traditional feature of ‘dying for the 
faith’. The face of Christianity was thus changed from the persecuted to the 
persecuting. The essential figures of Christian community’s identity in the pre-
Constantine periods, ‘diversity, minority, and powerlessness’, were transformed 
into the figures of ‘uniformity, majority, and powerfulness’. Taking this shift, to 
sustain the uniformity of one catholic, orthodox, and apostolic Christian faith, 
legitimated and state-sponsored Christians were willing to kill other Christians as 
heretics and pagans. 
What we see here is a development of the function and nature of Christianity’s 
universal virtue, “love your enemy”. The functional progress led Christian 
authorities to another power practice apart from that which had led Christians to 
die under secular persecutions. Church authorities had to distinguish orthodox 
Christianity from various types of Christian groups, identifying one group as 
legitimate and at the same time, branding others as illegitimate. In the process of 
this selection, the state’s power played a vital role in both the picking out of the 
‘heretical’ and then the threat of legitimated violence to deprive those heresy-
branded groups of all authority and where necessary to deprive them of life under 
the name of conducting love. Regarding, however, the event of Jesus’ crucifixion 
in which he accepted his death in accordance with God’s will without any violent 
resistance or revenge, it may be fair to say that to use physical violence to kill 
someone for God is an obvious distortion of the principle as we have seen above. 
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We can easily find these Christian power practices controverting between 
orthodoxy and heresy such as Donatism, Arianism, and Pelagianism in the fourth 
and fifth centuries.11 For example, after Emperor Constantine’s conversion, the 
Emperor immediately intervened in the theological struggles among Christians, 
issuing edicts against the now-heretical Arians. Thereafter Arians experienced 
a rigorous persecution by the state-sponsored orthodox Church. Their books 
were ordered to be burnt and they were not allowed to build churches anywhere 
within the Empire. 
In North Africa, the Donatists were another persecuted minority.12 In their 
view, the persecution of this ‘minority-ship’ symbolised them as true disciples of 
Christ. They declared, “The Church which suffers persecution must be considered 
as the truly catholic Church, not the one which is responsible for persecutions”.13 
Though numerous Donatists suffered martyrdom on the basis of their deep 
Christian conviction, their deaths were not regarded as true martyrdom by the 
catholic majority. Especially, Augustine theologically legitimated the use of force 
justifying the persecution of the Donatists when he witnessed the Donatists in 
his own town being “brought over to the Catholic unity by fear of the imperial 
edicts”.14 Augustine’s argument on the acceptability of coercion15 exercised 
by the state in the service of the Church has often been reused in subsequent 
centuries and provided the legal basis for the persecution of heretics and pagans. 
For instance, Thomas Aquinas, the greatest medieval theologian, declared that 
obstinate heretics “deserve[d] not only to be separated from the Church by 
excommunication, but also to be severed from the world by death”.16 Since the 
argument formulated by Augustine in the fourth and fifth centuries had been 
accepted by the established orthodoxy of Western Christendom, bishops, councils 
and popes asked state authorities to eliminate heresies from Christian territories 
and to punish heretics. One of the logical consequences of these requirements 
was codified in the fourth Lateran Council of 1215. In accordance with the theory 
and practice of state-sponsored persecution of heretics and pagans, for instance, 
the Jews underwent a rigorous repression through massacre and expulsion in 
numerous areas of Europe.17
The Reformation period was no exception to the practice of Augustine’s theory 
of coercion and Thomas Aquinas’ death penalty for heresy. Early Reformers, such 
as John Wycliffe and Jan Hus, and later Protestants such as Martin Luther and 
Jean Calvin and their followers were persecuted and even killed. The persecutors 
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were the Roman Catholic Church and her sponsoring state authorities on the 
grounds of exterminating heresy for the health of all. However, the Reformers 
also shifted their position from persecuted lambs to persecuting lions when they 
obtained power under the aegis of local states and were the majority.18 After 
1525, for example, Luther agreed with the use of state-force to remove false 
religion, that is, Roman Catholics, Jews, and radical reformers such as Anabaptists, 
from Protestant territories. In Geneva, Calvin accepted the burning of the anti-
Trinitarian heretic Michael Servetus in 1541. The list is long on both sides. As Paul 
Middleton neatly pointed out, “Christians created other Christian martyrs”19 in 
the Reformation period. As William Monter rightly observed, in the Reformation 
period, the execution of heretics turned out to be a “form of state-building”.20 This 
means that any heresy execution which was conducted by or under the aegis of 
state-sponsored religious authorities was closely related to the majority’s desire 
to gain or maintain absolute socio-political power in their territory. 
At this juncture, it is worth noting that those controversies during the 
pre-Constantine periods were only controversies at the level of theological 
interpretation. There was no actual violence to kill others for the faith among 
various types of Christian group during those periods. However, the power 
to kill non-orthodox Christians by those of orthodox faith was actualised 
from Constantine’s Edict of Toleration in 313 onwards, when only one type of 
Christian group was granted, legitimated, and empowered by the state/empire 
as orthodoxy. Wherever orthodox Christianity determined to achieve “unity 
and concord” of Christianity within that legitimated orthodoxy, there could be 
many sorts of violence against others who were outside that bounded group 
of the true Church.21 This suggests that ‘killing for the faith’ could be actualised 
only when one group becomes the state-sponsored majority in a society. This 
metamorphosis of the idea is verified through church history, especially in 
the Crusade, Reformation, and the nineteenth century’s imperialist mission 
enterprises. How far does this go from Jesus’s death on the Cross? It may be fair 
to say that where the violence of killing others exists and conducts, there is no 
place of love.
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A Practice: “Love your enemy” in Korean Context under 
Japanese Colonial Power
Protestantism in Korea settled down into the local context during a period of 
national crisis occasioned by an Asian power. Indeed, Protestant Christianity in 
Korea appears to have functioned as a foundation for overcoming the national 
collapse, especially after the Protectorate Treaty in 1905 and the Annexation in 
1910 forced by Japan. Unlike Catholicism, which was still often regarded not only 
as an agent of western imperialism but also as a heterodox doctrine opposed 
to the modernising ruling principle of the government, Protestantism in Korea 
was positively and closely associated by Koreans with nationalism throughout 
the Japanese colonial regime. 
In particular, during the early harsh ‘military’ rule from the Annexation in 
1910 to 1919, when any political organization and action was banned by an iron 
fist military policy, Koreans used the Protestant churches and mission schools 
as the largest Korean community at the time for their socio-political activities. 
This meant that the most vital category of people to be put under the Japanese 
control at that time were nationalist Korean Christians. It is clear that under 
Japanese rule Protestantism in Korea and Korean nationalism were positively 
and closely associated each other. Naturally, prominent church leaders became 
national leaders, though many of them collaborated actively with the Japanese 
in the last two decades of Japanese colonial rule in Korea, an issue which has left 
bitter memories. 
In the view of the Japanese government authority, therefore, the Protestant 
Church in Korea (hereafter PCK), which worked as the well-organized headquarters 
of national liberation, was the first and major obstruction to their rule of Korea. 
Indeed, ‘Protestantism allied with nationalism’ was the core identity of the PCK 
under Japanese colonial rule. Recognizing this identity of the Korean Protestant 
Christians, the Japanese government undertook a variety of suppressions and 
persecutions to destroy the nationalism of Korean Protestant Christians. 
After the proclamation of the annexation of Korea by Japan in August 1910, 
the Government-General of Japan easily foresaw Koreans’ resistance and wish for 
independence, and immediately undertook to remove anti-Japanese movements 
in various ways. For the Japanese colonial authority, as Count Terauchi, the first 
Japanese governor-general of Korea, highlighted in his speech on 17 December 
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1913 in Tokyo, Protestant Christians as “the most powerful force” in Korea 
must be kept under “especial watch”.22 Though Korean Christian groups were 
perceived as the “most hopeful” body for colonised Koreans, they were “the most 
worrisome element” in the eyes of Japanese colonial authority.23 We can hear a 
witness from one of the survivors amid severe and brutal violent suppressions 
and persecutions of Japanese colonial power that he could endure “72 types of 
cruel torture”24 standing strongly on the spirit of the Christian faith drawing on 
Job’s trials and Stephen’s martyrdom.25 
Further persecution of nationalistic Protestants occurred after the March 
First Movement in 1919 which declared Korea’s fervent desire for independence. 
Though it was a pan-Korean nationwide movement in which over a million 
Korean people had been involved within two months of the start, the PCK 
clearly played a core role in leading the movement, providing leadership and 
organizational networks from the outset. Sixteen of the thirty-three national 
representatives who signed the Declaration of Independence were Protestant 
Christians, as among 7,835 major participants on the first day of the movement, 
1,719 (22%) were Protestant Christians.26 Not only as participants, prominent PCK 
leaders served to mobilise, organise and facilitate communication enabling the 
movement to spread quickly and coherently.27 Borrowing Park Chung-Shin’s 
argument, the PCK perfectly provided all three elements of “leadership, activists, 
and organization” that are essential for such a nationwide mass demonstration 
to occur.28 
At this juncture, it is worth noting that the March First Independence 
Movement was fundamentally grounded on the non-violent resistance which 
was clearly proclaimed in the three covenants appended to the Declaration of 
Independence though there had been serious bloody clashes between Korean 
demonstrators and Japanese military and police force since Japanese forces 
started an armed crackdown against the movement.29 The non-violent basis of 
the movement is said to show the strong influence of Protestantism30 and the 
teaching of Cheondogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way).31 More concretely, the 
‘Dokripdan Tonggomun’ (Notification Statement for the Participant), a sort of 
Code of Conduct, supposed to be distributed especially to the Christians during 
the early stage of the movement prohibited the partakers from making “any 
insult and violence of beating or stoning” of Japanese, and required “three-
time-prayer every day, fast on Sunday, and Bible reading provided”.32 Taking 
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this non-violent, peaceful way of the movement, Protestants took part in the 
demonstrations to restore “freedom bestowed from Christ following God’s 
will”.33 Even Rev Shin Seok-Gu, one of the thirty-three representatives, confessed 
that he had participated in the movement because he had realised his ‘dual sin’ 
in accepting the “loss of the nation” and in making “no efforts for its restoration,” 
after hearing God’s voice during day-break prayer.34 Given the facts, it might be 
said that the PCK’s major motif of participation in the demonstration was their 
religious consciousness and the way they took for the movement is based on 
Jesus’s command, “love your enemy”, non-violent resistance as their principle. It 
also clarifies that there was little gap between religious identity as a Christian and 
ethnic identity as a Korean. Their involvement in the independence movement 
was a way of participation in Christ’s suffering on the Cross. As emphasised by 
the Protestant missionaries who witnessed Japanese forceful suppression in 
Korea at that time, the wholesale arrest and beatings of pastors, elders, other 
church officers, and lay Christians was “simply because they are Christians”35. This 
observation brings to mind the martyrs’ identification as Christian in front of 
interrogators in the early Roman period. 
Though the March First Movement in which the PCK had played a crucial 
role providing the ‘leadership, activists, and organisation’ on the basis of non-
violence had politically failed to gain Korea’s total independence from Japan, it 
had resulted in a change of Japan’s colonial policy from ‘military rule’ based on a 
gendarmerie-police system to a ‘cultural policy’ (bunka seiji), under which in April 
1919 Koreans were allowed limited rights to publish, assemble, and organised the 
Provisional Government in Shanghai, China where became a base of continuous 
independent movement during the colonial period.
Conclusion
In the last scene of the famous movie, “the Mission”, screened in 1986, we can 
see two different reactions carried out by Father Gabriel and Mendoza against 
the Portuguese aggressors to defend the Guarani converters and the mission 
field where they have built. While Mendoza organised the natives to resist with 
weapons against the violent attacks, Gabriel marched with the native believers 
amidst severe gun fires and bombings holding a cross and signing praise without 
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making any violent action. Then, which one can we take as a Christian between 
defensive armed struggle and non-violent resistance envisioning death to 
defend or secure life of the weak/marginalised/persecuted? Otherwise do we 
run away from the situation? Can we reckon which action is right or wrong? If 
we say that defensive attack or just war have to be allowed to secure life, to what 
extent can we use violence? It is quite difficult to make clear answers to these 
questions which can be commonly agreed. However, as this paper argued above, 
we have a principle as a Christian to take when we are faced with that situation, 
which Christ evidently showed us dying on the Cross.
“Love your enemy”. 
Also, once again, we have to confirm that this is not an act of store up the evil 
or wrong doings but an alternative way avoiding dichotomy of black and white 
decision, fight and flight, as Walter Wink highlighted. It may be a radical way of 
resistance without making violence in order to open a space of reconciliation 
between God and human beings who were in an ungodly status, and among 
human beings who are in conflict or under oppression. It is not only an ideal 
principle which is not able to achieve in this world but a requested principle 
to carry out in our earthly life as Christians in the pre-Constantine periods 
implemented it imitating Christ. It is indeed proved in the Korean context under 
Japanese harsh colonial regime though this principle/norm has been distorted in 
our history when the Church gained a state-sponsored power after Constantine. 
Indeed, there is no place of love where violence is occurred.
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Part II
Hungarian Reformed 
Churches  
during Communism

Szilveszter Füsti-Molnár
The “Theology of the Servant Church” 
A systematic centralization took place in the political life of Hungary after World 
War II, which ended in a total dictatorship. Therefore when we talk about the 
so-called official theology of the Reformed Church we have to notice that the 
theological work was not realistic, nor autonomous. This kind of ‘theology’ 
belonged solely to the church leadership and their ruling theologians, with 
the primary aim to maintain the ambiguous church-state relationship in favour 
of the Communist Regime1 – however, with the hope that the Church might 
preserve its existence. To avoid misunderstanding about the use of the word of 
‘theology’, we often label it the official theology, whereby we have to make the 
following comments: 1) After the Agreement of 1948, the Synod of the Reformed 
Church of Hungary took over the ‘responsibility’ of spiritual leadership and 
‘productive’ theological work, which however never reflected the Hungarian 
Calvinist theological thinking. 2)  This kind of official theology grew out of 
political ambition, and therefore it was not primarily based on Christian doctrine, 
nor entirely motivated by Christian social-ethical principles, but this ‘servant 
theology’ was composed under the pressure of political circumstances. 3) The 
context of the church became the text, and even a pretext (false excuse) for 
theological thinking. 
Overview of the 
Hungarian Reformed 
Church’s ‘Official 
Theology’ Before the  
Collapse of Communism
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We have to make a short reference to some phenomena which will allow a 
clearer picture of the sources of the theology of the ‘servant church’, especially 
for an understanding of how and who this theology really served. One 
phenomenon was the collectivization which began in 1949. Collectivization was 
a continuation of the 1945 land reform, and this was plainly a part of the class 
struggle against the well-to-do landowners and farmers. Impossible compulsory 
quotas were imposed on those who were not willing to surrender their estates. 
The Protestant churches willingly took their share in centrally written sermons 
to support the actions of the Party. Meanwhile, by the liquidation of the small 
and middle landowners and their properties, the strongest basis of the Reformed 
Church fell apart.2 That fact certainly resulted in the beginning of the decline of 
the Reformed Church at that time. 
In parallel to the official theology of the Reformed Church, the continuance 
of different theological trends which began before World War I did not come 
to an end, although they were put mainly to one side, and their possibilities 
were restricted. Their significance was in their effect on the theological thinking 
among those who were not satisfied with the official theology of that time, 
although the theology of the servant church willingly used - in some cases – 
the older theological language as well. Those who could not identify with 
the ruling theological trend had no publicity at all and if they tried to raise a 
critical voice they were labelled as ‘political reactionaries’. Therefore, there was 
another phenomenon: the series of show trials of the early fifties which gave an 
assurance that the Party had gained enough power to settle accounts with those 
who opposed them, namely the “class-aliens” of the new Communist order. 
Even after the acceptance of the new constitution by the Hungarian Parliament 
in 1949, which declared the basic civil rights and duties in light of the freedom 
of conscience (including the freedom to exercise religion with the separation of 
state and church), a State Office for Church Affairs (Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal) 
was yet established in 19513. 
It later became evident that the AEH planned and executed the Communist 
Party’s attacks against the church, whereby the final aim was not less than 
to liquidate the church. This was done on three levels. The first level was the 
psychological, since the head of the ÁEH was above the bishop and in practice that 
meant that he was the head of the church. Without him no effective action could 
be taken in the church. This was known by the pastor of the smallest village, to 
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the bishops of the General Convent. The second area was the economic. The ÁEH 
apportioned and passed all annual budgets of the church. The ÁEH paid the full 
salary of the high church leaders with all their expenses, the seminary professors 
and the full budget of any publications. A total financial dependence was worked 
out which resulted in almost full control of church activities. The third area was 
the political. Every church law had to be approved by the government. The ÁEH 
had an absolute veto in the General Synod. The ÁEH office was under the State 
Security Department (Államvédelmi Osztály, ÁVO), which later was renamed as 
the State Security Office (Államvédelmi Hivatal, ÁVH4). This AVH functioned as a 
political gendarmerie and executed the tasks of the ÁEH with selective cruelty in 
all possible ways.5 One of the first tasks was to work out the directives of church 
politics according to the above mentioned system. The spread of the atheistic 
worldview and the transformation of the Christian society were a priority. 
According to the view of the ÁEH the existence of the church depended on 
following the guidance of the Communist Party, whose basic principle was the 
fight against a religious worldview. The system was worked out to the smallest 
details. Church politics was planned nationwide and internationally. The system 
found troops of collaborators in the church who became espionage agents. On 
the organisational level the ÁEH had a “Protestant department” and “Catholic 
department,” whose major task was to put forward the actual church politics as 
was determined by the Party. 
For the so called West, the goal of communication by the Party was to always 
state in the headlines that the Church was free in Hungary, and the Party made 
sure that only a carefully selected group of church leaders could go abroad to 
represent and give that appearance. The committee of the elders was changed to 
include those lower class people who represented the proletariat in the church, 
even with no church background, and they could become the ringleaders of the 
Communist propaganda. The same happened in the case of the higher levels of 
church leadership. As we have seen earlier, the new bishops and head curators 
were selected according to the same principle, namely, those who were willing 
to become subservient supporters of the Communist ideology in the church. 
We also have to mention the highly developed and very wide connections6 of 
the ÁEH whereby it could control almost all areas of life. The effectiveness of the 
ÁEH was due to the countrywide and international net of spies who had to give 
information regularly about people under observation. A wide scale of functions 
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can be distinguished among this secret work. There were silent observers, who 
were giving information only in a written form. If the secret observations were 
not successful, and if they did not know enough about a person’s thoughts, 
then the task was to make friendships and the spies would worm themselves 
into the observed person’s confidence. In most cases the only successful method 
was the provocation with lies and intrigues, and in that way the selected people 
could lose their closer or wider social esteem. One of the major rules was that the 
officially formulated accusation never could be a concern against the person’s 
political or religious views.
The above mentioned tactics were well supported by the Party policies 
by 1957. They found that the useful method against the church was not the 
direct opposition and persecution, but rather it was more effective if the Party 
controlled the aims of the church and church politics. In this way the Party was 
always one step ahead of the church and the church followed the Party and 
not vice-versa. 7 The first area for enforcement of the tactics of the Communist 
Party was the (re)education of the youth. All steps of re-education had to 
circle around the aim of the liquidation of religious convictions, which was the 
spawning place of reactionaries – according to the Communist Party’s thinking.8 
A comprehensive psychological terror characterized the educational work from 
the elementary schools to university level. The good quality of teaching and 
academic freedom disappeared from the schools, and this was succeeded by 
the communist ideology. Loyalty to the Communist Party and ideology was the 
measurement of getting into the levels of education and receiving diplomas. 
The propaganda practices did not leave untouched even the very few schools, 
colleges and academies of the church which could stay under church control.9 
The Party concentrated its espionage agent work with great circumspection in 
the church schools. Since the education under church control did not fit into the 
plan of the Communist Regime, the Party wanted to have assurance that the re-
education in these schools would bear fruit and would result in a contribution to 
strengthen the Party and its interests. 
The Party found a way to systematize and hold together the troops of 
collaborators in the so called “Peace Movement of Priests and Pastors” (Papi 
Békemozgalom). This movement was formed officially by those clergymen who 
did not agree that the church should be in opposition to the (church) politics of the 
Party. The most important aim of the Peace Movement of the Priests and Pastors 
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was to extend the influence and leadership of the Party, to create and strengthen 
the basis for working class power in the church by the leaders of the church. In 
this way the movement became one of the means of the state to transform the 
life of the church toward its own political purposes. The pastors and priests were 
under a continuous re-education, therefore they could become propagators of 
the Communist-Marxist ideology in the congregations. The Peace Movement of 
the Priests and Pastors, and also the Peace Assemblies, were the frame and forum 
for the acceptance of the Marxist ideology and activities. The Peace Assemblies 
were planned to the smallest details by the ÁEH representatives of each county. 
The main theme of the lectures, the lecturers, the commentators and the content 
of the comments, were all planned and designed beforehand. The designers 
of the “Peace Movement of the Priests and Pastors” were sensitive enough to 
delegate their representatives to go abroad, thus spreading their propaganda of 
Hungarian Socialism at international conferences, whereby this peace movement 
gained international recognition10 as well.11
The beneficiaries of the functions of the ÁEH were the faithful servants of the 
ideology of the Communist Party and its purposes. One of the most significant 
groups was comprised of the leaders of the Hungarian church, who were happy 
to receive high awards from the “Hungarian Workers Party” for their direct or 
indirect role in the activities of the ÁEH.12 We can also take into account - to a 
certain extent - as beneficiaries, those pastors and priests who were supportive 
and loyal enough to the Party’s ideology. However there was a characteristic 
distinction among them: 1) we can find pastors who were supportive to a 
“necessary minimum”; and 2) we can find those pastors who were enthusiastic 
and zealous in their assistance, which was well demonstrated in the way they 
preached of the Gospel (in a socialist manner). 
However, we can find a great number of pastors and church leaders who 
refused loyalty and service to the Party’s ideology and they became victims. 
They were ready to undergo persecution, jail, and even death for their faith.13 
Their awards were: selected cruelty from the state, but appreciation and love 
from the congregations. Their story is far beyond the boundaries of this study. 
They were the ones of whom “the world was not worthy.”14 The victims’ list is 
longer than those who lived in that time. The new generation who grew up in the 
poor nourishment of scientific socialism are victims as well, and their children, 
too, who form the majority of the present society with their injured souls.
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The above given introduction to the purpose and function of the ÁEH clearly 
suggests that the official theological teaching could not avoid the transformation 
according to the atheistic and communist ideology. Since the physical destruction 
of the church buildings was impossible (because they wanted to maintain a 
façade), the annihilation of temple of the soul was the aim, and the rebuilding 
of the soul of a person is always a greater challenge. The official theology of the 
Reformed Church of Hungary at this time was introduced by the changing of 
the guard, in church leadership. We can sum up in two characteristic names the 
different “theological” elements, although both names cover the same content. 
The church leadership taught about the purpose and task of the church under 
the title of the Theology of the Narrow Way until 1956, and after 1958 the title was 
changed to the Theology of the Servant Church. Istvan Szabó’s work puts the 
content of the ‘Theology of the Servant Church’ in the following framework: 1) The 
church and state interrelation was classified by subject matter; 2) The aspect of 
service (diaconal) was made universal and totalitarian; 3) The acknowledgement 
of the decisions of church politics in all recognized theological work (in other 
words, the application of this theology of the servant church).15 
The Theology of the Narrow Way
The vision of the The Theology of the Narrow Way as a point of departure of the 
new theology is associated with Albert Bereczky’s name16. The main disposition 
of the new theology was God’s self-revelation in history. The socialist historical 
and sociological reality was given by God after World War II. So Bereczky saw 
God’s judgement in the catastrophes of the war (judgement on the old feudal 
system and Nazism), and he saw God’s act of mercy in the liberation by socialism. 
Bereczky without doubt declared that according to the political reality the church 
was linked to the Eastern block by God’s mercy. As we have shown earlier, the 
confession of sins and repentance was one of the first tasks of the church to be 
able to receive God’s liberating mercy in socialism. The rhetoric of church politics 
by the use of the notion of the “narrow way” was very misleading. First of all, 
because it is rooted in Scripture (Mathew 7, 13-14), 17 where the understanding is 
to follow the narrow way of the decision of faith. Secondly, the use of the notion 
was abusive because it was already a phrase used by the pietistic movement of 
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the revival groups, with a different understanding than Bereczky. In a different 
way, Bereczky’s politics wanted to free the church from its sinful past (repentance) 
and fulfil the task of the church on the narrow way by means of its prophetic task 
in the new socialist order. We can see that the church leadership’s attempt at 
first was to not become identical with the world.18 That attempt became very 
ambivalent when the application of the narrow way’s theology became the 
same path as the ideology of socialism. That process can be well detected in the 
different “teachings” of other church leaders, like János Péter and Tibor Bartha.19 
Bereczky himself was convinced by the time of 1950, that the major tasks of the 
church on the narrow way was confession and obedient service. Therefore, “the 
believer can demonstrate that he/she is a useful member of the socialist society.” 
20 That view was even strengthened later by Bereczky himself when he wrote 
about the narrow way as follows:
The way of our people never leads us back to the past but always 
onwards, towards the future. Our way is always, everywhere and 
in every respect, a narrow way. We therefore, continually face the 
question: how can we keep to this way faithfully and how can we 
walk in it obediently, both as regards the inner, specific mission of 
the Church and as regards the service of the timely causes of man’s 
earthly life, of men and people, of the world which is the object of 
God’s love?21
This theology of the narrow way was used to prepare the next step toward the 
theology of the serving church. The specific mission of the church was to fulfil 
the new “exodus,” namely to lead the people of God to the Canaan of socialism 
by using religious rhetoric.
The Elements of the “Theology of the Servant Church”  
in the Light of the Notion of Service
The word service seemed to be the watchword which became the “right” 
formulation to explain and justify in theological terms the necessary 
transformation in the church, which however resulted in the alignment of 
the church to the communist ideology. Under the slogan of service, a double 
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guarantee22 could be confirmed: (i) The church (leadership) gave assurance of 
its commitment that the socialist life style would be desired by and realized 
among the believers. That was called the service of teaching. (ii) The state, in 
turn, guaranteed that it would strengthen the position of the (new) leadership 
in the church. 
This double guarantee helps explain the ambivalent nature of this theology. 
For it was teaching the people to aquiese to atheist socialism, while meanwhile 
using biblical phrases about service. We should not loose sight of the fact that 
we are facing cooperation with an atheistic ideology, whose final purpose was to 
liquidate Christian thought and life.
The following services were distinguished23 in the church after the contract 
with the socialist ideology in light of the “Agreement” of 1948: 1) Sacerdotal 
service was the mediatory service of the church for the sinful people. 2) The 
service of teaching created the arena and forum of orientation and support of 
ministers in their ministry, concerning how to deal with issues of relevant public 
services. 3) Service of orientation refers to the justification by God through Jesus 
Christ and the justifying Word of God. Jesus Christ, who gave his life for our 
justification and salvation, is present to lead us in the midst of everyday life. If 
the church does not recognise this fact, Bereczky said, then it would be facing 
two temptations: a) by not recognising the sins of the age the church would 
preserve and defend what God has judged and condemned; b) the church would 
accommodate to the changes of the saeculum in a such a way that the sacrifices 
and the values given by God would be left unused. The frame of interpretation 
for all of this was socialism, “where times required new people and new people 
needed new hearts”24. 4) The prophetic service should also be fulfilled according 
to Jeremiah 1,10: “today I appoint you over nations and kingdoms to uproot and 
tear down, to destroy and overthrow, to build and to plant.” Péter’s interpretation 
of Jeremiah meant that the Reformed Church of Hungary arrived at an historical 
turning point where the church had to give a hand (to the Communist Regime) to 
destroy and to build.25 Colijn also calls attention to Bereczky’s view on the church 
which doubtfully states that the church cannot fulfil it prophetic task, since the 
church is not really a church.26 5) The above mentioned lack of the prophetic 
service of the church suggested another theme to the new theologians: the 
service of intercession or substitution. Since after the “Agreement” (1948) a 
number of pastors did not agree with the truth of the new social order, it was 
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said that this service was most needed on behalf of the church leaders. However, 
it is now clear that the substitutionary death of Christ was reduced to a political 
interpretation. 6) The next category was the service of the whole nation. Colijn 
simply cites Bereczky to describe what it meant: “For the Marxist we (the church) 
have to become Marxist!”27 Bereczky earlier explained more gently the same 
thing: “We confess the faithfulness of our church to the wellbeing of our nation. 
The joy of our nation is our joy, all the burdens of our nation are our burdens. 
We are willing to offer any service and sacrifice for the nation’s sake.”28 7) Under 
the service (diaconia) of society and politics we find a hermeneutics which 
christologises the political position of the leadership of the church. The rich 
theological meaning of diaconia and all the related theological notions, such as: 
the diaconia of the Triune God, Jesus Christ’s kingship, and also serving lordship, 
the saving work of the Shepherd, were all reduced according to the requirements 
of the socialist context. That resulted in a view where Christ as Kyrios in the 
original sense could not be pictured in absolute authority but Christ’s obedience 
could be emphasized where the word ‘Christ’ could be changed for the word 
Church, whereby the purpose was obedient suffering. In this way the church 
gives testimony to God’s cosmic love.29 Practically, that meant that the church 
ultimately gave up its existence. In the words of Békefi, this was explained as 
follows:30 
If the church understands that she is in the world to carry out Christ’s 
diaconia, she will die of that, because she will not be needed anymore. 
For the church does not exist to assure her own existence to eternity 
but that by sacrificing herself, by sharing in Christ’s suffering a new 
creation will come, in which there will be no temple, but where God 
dwells in the universality of the people: in the city without temple. 
(…) let us learn that such a world is made by his salvation where 
finally the Son himself will be submitted to the One who had cast all 
things under his feet and where God will be all in all.31
If we take into consideration the purpose of the Marxist-Leninist ideology with 
religion32 we can fully agree with the analysis of Szabó, when he says that Bekefi’s 
train of thought was in harmony with that purpose. Namely, that the church 
with its obedient suffering takes part in the liquidation of the church. Since the 
Kingdom of God is realized in the new socialist order, the church must die in its 
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suffering (like Christ died) in order to reach the land of plenty, namely, socialism. 
The ecclesia crucis was left without the ecclesia triumphans, since Békefi did 
not find it important to point to the resurrection as the central meaning of the 
existence of the church, with Christ present through the Holy Spirit.33 
“Grace that Works within also from Outside”34 – The Role 
of Common Grace35
The subtitle itself refers to János Victor’s articles from the time of the theology of 
the servant church. Victor’s articles became an often used and abused reference 
for the proponents of the theology of the servant church. Our intention is to 
introduce the theological elements of Victor’s view, rather than to evaluate any 
position in the debate concerning Victor’s direct or indirect role, as a founder of 
theology of the servant church.36 
The background of the article was a conference in Prague, where Bereczky 
received an honorary doctorate from the faculty in 1952. The participants of 
that event from international and inter-church circles did not show a sign of the 
former tensions and conflicts that had occurred between the churches. (These 
tensions were obviously the consequences of the Trianon Peace Treaty and it’s 
afterlife between the two World Wars and after World War II.) Victor came to the 
conclusion according to his experiences of the meeting that the reconciliation 
was imposed upon the Christian Churches becasue it was carried out by the 
secular, political and ideological factors as a mutual appeasement. The new order 
of socialism made that happen and the struggle for peace between the churches 
was successful. The theological realization following from that experience, was: 
1) the church should not overestimate its ministry when it states that through 
its work the Word of God captures the human heart in such a way that all our 
outer attitudes necessarily turn in the right direction. Victor calls attention to the 
conviction that sanctification can arise only from rebirth, which is that half of the 
truth which can be misused in a way that “we overestimate the significance of 
our ministry in a sense that we forget about other means and methods of God 
which He can use to transform the attitudes of people towards one another, and 
towards the direction of His will.”37 This is the heart of the article, from a rhetorical 
point of view. Szabó points out that in the above mentioned statement by Victor, 
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his main question is: while we emphasize the renewing and morality-forming 
significance of the Word, we cannot exclude influences coming from outside.38 
Victor answers the dilemma:
The person who does not recognize, with grateful and humble heart, 
the fact that God works in the lives of humans outside His Word as 
well, and that numberless morally good acts can proceed from that, 
such a person has not understood the majestic testimony of the 
Word about God’s ‘universal grace’. Among the factors that God’s 
‘universal grace’ uses to transform the moral lives of men, we can 
find, in distinguished position, the political, legal social economic 
orders that humans live in. And this order does not only form one’s 
outward deeds, but one’s thinking, emotions and spirituality as well. 
Yes, there is something indeed that forms humans from outside.39 
In the following part of the article Victor contrasts capitalism with socialism in 
favour of socialism. Victor’s intention was to clarify the relationship of the world 
and church. He found his clarification in the theme of Grace that Works Within 
also from Outside, and these effects have to be revealed in the church’s public 
use of ministry. He recommends following the example set by the apostles:
(the apostles) who did not consider what exclusive or not exclusive, 
what long lasting or limited significance their ministry would bear 
in the moral lives of their fellow men. (…) The basis of their ministry 
was not their rational consideration, but the decision of their faith. 
(…)This ministry that we are entrusted with, if we do not fall into the 
mistake of overestimating its significance, will be in harmony with 
the work of God which he does through other means of His in the 
lives of the people.40
Szabó calls attention to Victor’s purpose in light of his earlier writings,41 that the 
Christian church has to recognise in the midst of great historical changes that 
God’s general grace in the world and outside the church is not only present, but 
social changes are to be seen as God’s plan, thus justifying the new social order 
by this.42
Victor in the series of studies on common grace, himself gives warning of 
the danger of formally applying ‘grace that works within also from outside’ or 
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‘common grace’ to justify social changes. First he outlines the Calvinist locus 
classicus43 that human nature is corrupt, but God’s grace sets a limit to the power 
of sin. Then sin influences all life, but it does not destroy everything. Humanity 
cannot do anything good by itself, yet Reformed confessions44speak about the 
good deeds of humans, which are imperfect and burdened with sin. If some 
things in life are still more or less void of corruption it is due to God’s grace. Special 
grace includes only the elect, whereas common grace includes all people. 
According to Szabó’s evaluation, Victor acknowledged that the formal 
application of common grace or the theme of Grace that Works Within also 
from Outside, when used for the justification of social changes, could lead to 
the German Christians’ position in the time of Hitler. Therefore Victor argues 
that both manifestations of grace are attached to Christ.45 From his article it is 
obvious that special grace in the church and common grace outside the church 
need to be harmonized.46 Victor’s article can be questioned on many points, but 
it is also true that he was cautious and careful with the formulations of common 
grace. Victor stopped at a certain point, whereas other church leaders like Tibor 
Bartha47 twisted and overdeveloped his thoughts into propaganda. 
The ‘Reformed Confessors’ of 1956 – Attempts for 
renewal 
The year of 1953 opened the way for changes in the Hungarian society and also 
in the church. The famous year of 1953 is connected to the death of Joseph 
Stalin. Things changed under the leadership of his successor, Khruschev. The 
denunciation and exposition of Stalin’s dictatorship led to changes of internal 
and external affairs, and these effects were experienced in Hungary as well. 
Changes were taking place in the upper leadership of the Hungarian People’s 
Republic. Imre Nagy48 replaced Mátyás Rákosi as prime minister in the summer 
of 1953, although Rakosi remained General Secretary of the Party and was able 
to undermine most of Nagy’s reforms. The changes were due to open the way 
for reforms in most communist countries as a consequence of a moderate 
liberalization. Nagy’s purpose was to develop socialism according to his reforms 
in light of the existing laws. He dissolved the internment camps, re-examined 
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the ‘show trials’, and put an end to the collectivization. Even with the welcoming 
of the reforms by the majority Nagy was not able to achieve essential changes 
for two reasons. First, the inner opposition of the Party and the circle of Rákosi 
could undermine Nagy’s attempt with the help of the State Security Office 
(ÁVH). The international changes put Nagy seemingly in a position of right-
wing opportunism, and he was deprived of all his offices in April 1955. The 
international changes were due to the fact that Austria became a demilitarized 
and neutral country, which had raised Nagy’s hope to see the future of Hungary 
as the same. Austria’s neutrality had changed the cold war military planning. 
Hungary’s strategic importance increased, with the result that Hungary signed 
the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955 by means of the new prime minister, András 
Hegedűs. In the rapid changes of the situation Nagy managed to hold together 
a circle of reform–communists, which was one source of the tension leading to 
the revolution of 1956. The increasing international tension, the uprising of Polish 
workers in Poznan (Poland), had caused Moscow to change its policy. Party chief 
Mátyás Rákosi was replaced by Ernő Gerő, and János Kádár received the second 
place in the Party. With the loss of the credibility of the former leadership, Imre 
Nagy again became a member of the party. These events inevitably lead to the 
1956 uprising.49
At the time of the revolution of 1956, a silent and growing resistance in 
the church became most visible by the ‘Reformed Confessors’ in the form of 
a declaration against the policies of its leaders. The declaration was entitled: 
“A Statement of Faith, 1956.”50 It was written in similar intention and style as 
the Declaration of Barmen in 1934. Since the WCC’s Executive Committee 
had a meeting in Galyatető (Hungary) in the summer of 1956, copies of the 
Hungarian declaration were handed over to the representatives of the meeting. 
The Statement of Faith denied the highly praised superiority of the Marxist–
Communist ideology and denounced any theology which would support it. The 
declaration stated as follows: 
‘Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today and forever’ (Heb. 13: 8)
1. Whoever believes in the Son has eternal life; whoever disobeys 
the Son will not see life, but must endure God’s wrath (John 3: 36)
(…) We reject as false teaching the tenets that Redemption works 
through profane history by introducing permanent developments 
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in a positive direction. This type of soteriological sanctioning of 
Historical Materialism and its false optimism contradicts the Bible 
and denies the truth of the Gospel. The historical philosophy of 
Historical Materialism in this theological disguise is anti-biblical. 
Our official Church government affirmed this false Materialism in 
Christian doctrines (…) 3. (motto: Rom. 13: 1 and Acts. 5: 29) We 
believe that our present political authority is appointed by God and 
we have to be obedient towards it in due respect, and also remember 
it in our prayers, in all matters that do not contradict God’s law.(…) 
We confess that our former social order has been condemned by 
God’s righteous judgement. But we also confess, in the light of the 
Gospel, that the present State and social order bear the marks of sin 
as well. Just as any other State or social order, the order we live in 
has numerous features which cannot be approved by the church.51
The above citied part of the declaration as a protest against the dictatorial 
behaviour of the clique of church leaders, had the effect of a bombshell. 
The attempt to return to the Reformed Presbyterian principles in church 
government affirmed the task of the church. The reception of the Hungarian 
status confessiones by the General Secretary of the WCC, Vissert’t Hooft was not 
surprising, since they were informed about the events of the revolution of 1956. 
The Hungarian representative at the meeting, János Péter the leading bishop, 
simply saw the declaration as a sign of disobedience, the acceptance of which 
by the Reformed Church of Hungary was not possible for anyone. As a matter of 
fact the declaration was signed and in this way won support by 160 pastors as a 
voice of criticism. Now it is generally accepted that the declaration had a great 
part in preparing the Revolution, as it appears in Gombos’ memorable words: “ 
The tradition of Hungarian Calvinism was an organic element in the spirit of the 
Revolution, because one root of Hungary’s ideals of liberty goes straight back to 
the political struggles of the seventeenth century…”52 
In the crisis and Revolution of 1956, the Reformed Church of Hungary was 
left without any effective leadership, while bishop Bereczky the president of the 
General Synod, was incapacitated by an illness. The other two bishops were passive 
as well for different reasons. On the famous date of the Revolution, October 23, 
1956, only one person, László Pap was acting in the name of the Reformed Church 
of Hungary; he was a professor and deputy bishop and was not one of the ruling 
clique. He was highly regarded by laity and ministers of the church.53 
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On the day of the Revolution the ‘Reformed Confessors’ in the Reformed 
Church of Hungary formed a “National Committee of the Reformed Church” as 
a support for the revolution. One of the aims of the committee was to provide 
sufficient leadership in a time when the official hierarchy had either resigned 
or been dismissed. They had to attempt also to prepare a general election in 
the church. The committee called back Bishop László Ravasz to active service, 
who became the leader of the church and the Renewal Movement along with 
Pap. In their broadcast on October 30, they asked people to show soberness, 
calmness and maturity. The Action Committee was working well after the second 
Soviet military intervention which began on November 4th, which suppressed 
the revolution and the fight for freedom. The committee sent a circular to the 
church sessions to find out if they would support the Renewal Movement. Two-
thirds expressed unflinching support, while they assured that the sessions would 
respect the 1948 Agreement.54 
After the reestablishment of the Communist dictatorship of János Kádár the 
new prime minister severely punished those who had taken part in the revolution. 
There was a fierce wave of assertions, imprisonment, torture and executions from 
which the church was not spared. Pastors and the laity of the Reformed Church 
were arrested as well, some were deported, some were hanged.
After the initial revenge and terror, the Kádár regime consolidated its grip 
on the country and restarted by the old methods55 the so called ‘normalization’ 
of state and church relationship. One of the most difficulties for the church was 
that the espionage agent system reached its ‘golden age’ after the Revolution of 
1956. That was true not only in the secular circles but in the church as well, since 
the church was the most frequented area where the so called reactionaries (from 
the state’s point of view) could become active. Many pastors were members of 
the spy net, willingly or unwillingly.56 
The immediate changes after the Revolution for the Reformed Church meant 
the arrival of new leadership. Tibor Bartha became the president Bishop of the 
General Synod and the life of the Church bore the stamp of his leadership for a 
decade, from 1958 to 1968. 
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“A Peculiar Hungarian Theology”
The first ten years of the Bartha era was determinative for developing and applying 
the themes of the Theology of the Servant Church, which were often stretched into 
extremes. In this way a genuine “Hungarian Theology” – as Bartha called it - was 
forming in the furnace of the new theologians. This continuance of the Theology 
of the Servant Church always was in the status of development and ignored 
the consensus ecclesiae and coniuratio testium. Here we have to notice that the 
Renewal Movement of the Reformed Church of Hungary had managed to shake 
the progression of the theology of the servant church by their critiques and refusal 
to accept it. However, by their method of oppressions already mentioned, the old 
and new set of church leaders managed to silence the critical voices.57
A new theological theme was crystallizing, called “Evangelical Calvinism,” by 
the time of the early eighties. Under the new theme they argued that the previous 
thirty years of the Reformed Church of Hungary had not resulted in the decline 
of Reformed identity, but in the rise and consistent carrying out of the original 
Reformed intention.58 The Calvinist heritage and pietism of the Reformed Church 
of Hungary was seen in Bartha’s view as a social–ethical concept. One of the most 
important elements in that concept was the recognition of responsibility as 
humanity’s active behaviour, for which the major source is rooted in our election 
by God. Therefore : “ (…) the Gospel makes God’s people stand on the side of 
social justice. Furthermore she [the church] was the first in her attempt to reflect 
on the facts of social progress from a theological point of view, and to build the 
relation of the church to a new social world system, that is socialism.”59 The new 
watch word was: “Go ahead like Calvin!”60
Remarks Concerning the Religious and Theological  
Life of the Church at the Periphery During the Years  
of Communism 
General Remarks
The church at the periphery was the church marginalised by the ideological-
political system of that time.61 We do not aim to give a detailed historical-
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theological description of the subject. Our aim is rather to give a short 
comprehensive reference (since the subject would deserve a study of its own) 
about the living theological and religious life of the Reformed Church of Hungary 
in opposition to its official theological work. This latter was maintained by the 
mostly uncritical, ideological practice by the theology of the ‘servant church’ 
leadership and its circles during the time of Communism. The majority of the 
Reformed Church of Hungary was squeezed into a ghetto situation during this 
time. As we could see from the introduction to this chapter, the official theology 
was mostly the theology of the church leadership, and the effects had a very 
ambivalent nature. On the one hand, the meaning of theology went through a 
radical transformation whereby the major focus was directed by church political 
aims. On the other hand, it became obvious that such a quasi theology is not able 
to serve the God-given aims of the church. The theology of the servant church 
was a display-window theology and its effect was limited on the followers of 
Christ. Pásztor’s remark needs to be taken seriously, when he draws attention 
to the fact that one cannot get a clear picture about the life of the Reformed 
Church of Hungary during the decades of Communism only from the officially 
published source of the church-leadership of that time. One also needs to study 
the everyday life of the church, mostly depending on the oral history from the 
witnesses of those times, the sermons, memoirs and letters. When one does not 
recognize the importance of these less official sources, other aspects of the self-
recognition of the Reformed Church of Hungary will always be missed.62 
Before 1975
A formal, official church decision was made by the declaration of the ‘Fraternal 
Message’ (Testvéri Izenet, 1950), that the life and influence of the church voluntary 
associations should be ended, and by means of the Missionary Regulation 
(Missziói Szabályrendelet, 1952) the leftover outreach (evangelistic and diaconal, 
etc.) activities of the church were also liquidated. Any church activities besides 
the regular worships services could only be practiced secretly in small circles. In 
other words, the church could not reach beyond its own walls, and even within 
the walls there were ‘informers’. It was also clear that to rise on the ladder of 
success was only possible by means of increasing one’s loyalty to the church-
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leadership at any time during Communism. The exposed and subordinate 
position of the Reformed Church of Hungary resulted in different levels in the 
church to be able to maintain its everyday life. Appeasing became a concomitant 
feature in a number of cases with various intensity, in order to “survive.” The 
different levels were well distinguished: 1) there were small groups of pastors 
who held a critical position in opposition to the church leadership’s view; 2) 
others did not make any public standpoint concerning the delicate questions; 3) 
part of the pastors held the same view as the church-leadership, namely that the 
Reformed Church of Hungary was obliged to maintain the well-being of socialist 
system in Hungary; therefore the service by the church to Communism and the 
justification and affirmation of its decisions and acts were necessary because the 
situation was at first seen as a judgement and later even more emphatically as 
grace given by God. In this short section we aim to give some remarks about the 
church life which was led by the attitude of the first two groups just mentioned 
(while the rest of the chapter is about the third group’s servant church theology). 
Basically in the smaller parishes the Reformed congregations had a relative 
autonomy (ghettoised church) to practice their religious belief in their local settings, 
if they did not show notable resistance to some basic rules which guaranteed 
that the desired image of loyalty to the Communist ideology was not harmed. 
Numerous directives were given by the church-leadership to the pastors, elders 
and the congregations about the actual political, social, economic and ideological 
questions and also the official standpoints of the church in these matters. The 
enforcements of these directives were necessary in the so called representative 
sermons, elders meetings and their minutes or conferences.63 The refusal of the 
application of these guidelines led to legal proceedings by the higher church and 
state authorities. For example, it could easily happen in a number of cases that the 
representative sermons were written and handed in to the authorities, but were 
never preached from a pulpit. Or, for example, the records of the elders meetings 
only formally fulfilled the requirements and directives of the church-leadership, 
but in reality the situation was different. In a number of congregations this led to 
a double life, according to the restricted possibilities which could be somewhat 
different in the local contexts. A number of collections of sermons64 give testimony 
to this situation during the times of Communism (obviously only published after 
1989) which well demonstrates that the pastors did not entirely follow the church 
leadership’s orders in the everyday church life, and they even made a notable effort 
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to find answers for the challenges solely from the Scriptures. The oral tradition65 
also gives evidence that a number of small pastor-circles were formed (illegally) to 
reflect on the different areas of theology which could enrich the pastoral work in 
the congregation. The theological work in these groups greatly differed from the 
officially organised meetings and conferences, both in the themes and answers, 
and any publicity for these small study group meetings was impossible. 
After 1975
After the Helsinki Accords66 (1975) the situation of the countries of the Warsaw 
Pact (Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance) started 
to ease, which resulted in more activities in the inner life of the church. Basically 
we can differentiate two levels where notable changes were experienced: a 
sociological and a political. From an analysis of the different time periods of 
the Reformed Church of Hungary during Communism, the period 1968-1985 is 
called the time of instrumentalisation (when the state used the church) and the 
period of 1985-1989 is called the time of disintegration (when state control of the 
church was eased). One also has to face the fact that the forced collectivisation, 
as well as the process of urbanization and industrialisation, created a very critical 
situation in the Hungarian society whereby the problems of families breaking 
up, alcoholism, an increasing number of suicides, corruption of the work ethic, 
and an increase of crimes among the youth were all taking place. The context of 
the church already showed the sign of serious problems in society. 67 The church 
recognised its duty which needed to be actualised in its social mission. The 
changes resulted in an increase in the local mission activities among the youth 
from the beginning of the nineteen-eighties, just as well as mission and diaconal 
outreach among the addicts, disabled people (blind, deaf and dumb), among 
the gypsies, among the physically handicapped, and the church also organised 
telephone counselling. The discrimination against the active church members 
was also lessened during these years. 
In the times of disintegration (1985-1989) the centralized control started to 
loosen in the area of economics, as well as in the social and political spheres. Many 
signs of the desired democratic changes were taking place. From the beginning 
of the nineteen eighties onward, democratic opposition parties were formed. 
[ 100 ] Szilveszter Füsti-Molnár 
The strict church politics was eased according to the changed circumstances. For 
example, the ÁEH new well that in order to keep the loyalty of the church leaders 
they needed to be more tolerant. A further weakening of the position of the 
church was not necessary anymore in order to continue the existence of the ÁEH. 
The loosened control of the state over the church was experienced in number 
of ways. For example, the official church journal (titled: Református Egyház) in its 
exegetical studies and sermon outlines no longer showed any (party) political 
tone in their application of the interpretation of the Scriptures. Other scholarly 
journals (Confessio and Theológiai Szemle) started to publish occasionally 
the papers of the ignored theologians,68 who had supported a critical tone in 
opposition to the leaders of the church. Major theological themes, for example 
the ordination of women, could publicly and freely be discussed.69 Some of the 
pastor-circles could become more and more active and could raise their critical 
voice in a number of questions. The so called Andor Enyedy Pastor Circle (Enyedy 
Andor lelkész-kör)70 from the second half of the nineteen eighties could make a 
number of appeals to the church-leadership in various aspects of church public 
life about the status of the pastors who studied theology part-time. The circle 
also raised criticism about the proposed law concerning abortion and about 
the laws concerning religion71 (1989). They also had a sharp critique about the 
pressure of the state on the election of office bearers in the church (1988-89).72 
With this introduction of the other side of the Reformed Church of Hungary 
during the time of Communism, a time when the leading characteristic of church 
life was its survival attitude, we aimed to demonstrate the living theological side 
of the Reformed Church of Hungary. It will be the task of the coming chapters 
to reveal how the number of initiatives from the church’s marginalized status 
could become determinative and have a positive influence on the whole of the 
Reformed Church of Hungary after the changes of 1990.
Concluding Remarks: the Reformed Church of Hungary 
(1945-90) 
Our remarks can gathered as follows: 1) the identity crisis of the Reformed Church; 
2) lost Christology for ecclesiology; 3) the sociological aspect in relation to the 
Reformed Church of Hungary.
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1) The identity crisis of the Reformed Church of Hungary, besides all the positive 
signs between the two World Wars, did not come to an end. One set of causes 
we already discussed were the different theological trends, as they appeared in 
different movements and associations in the Reformed Church of Hungary. Most 
of them were contradictory by nature, although they all represented their program 
in order to solve the identity crisis. Some of them tried by evangelisation, others 
by awakening, and some called attention by means of direct political programs, 
while others by the propagation of evangelical Calvinism. On the one hand, the 
folk-church setting or Cultural Protestantism was far too big a challenge for them. 
On the other hand, the reality of the church, as a consequence of secularisation, 
showed the marks of disappointment, unconcern, and apathy, and all good 
intended efforts in the church were paralyzed. This was not only true for the 
common believers but also for the pastors of the church. 
The existential need and the low values in the Reformed Church of Hungary 
provided a fertile ground for the Communist Regime’s church politics in which 
the collaborators of the church were ready to maintain all the purposes of the 
Communist ideology almost without any critiques. The ambivalent nature of this 
kind of church politics was obvious. On the one hand, the aim was to liquidate 
religion and the church. On the other hand, the church became a means of the 
socialist propaganda, which was known by the creators of the “official theology” 
of the Reformed Church of Hungary and its leaders. The question about the church 
leaders’ choices cannot be seen as “discretion and valour”73 – as Trevor Benson 
suggested, but rather “weakness and cowardice” - as Szabó has pointed out.74 
Cowardice was conjoined with lies and falsified theological work, which represented 
an identity crisis of the Reformed Church of Hungary on a wide scale.75 
The church leaders’ attitude was shaped by the atheism of the Communists. 
The responsible church leaders did not question the existence of God but they 
lived in the church and led the church according to aims of an atheistic ideology, 
where God was not seen as the Kyrios. We also have to remember that there was 
the other theological attitude of the ‘Reformed Confessors’, which was critical of 
the official theology of the time, although it could not have publicity because 
of the given circumstances but its exsistence is unquestionable after 1956. It 
will be an important task to show whether this movement will be able to play a 
determinative role after the changes of 1989.
[ 102 ] Szilveszter Füsti-Molnár 
2) The identity of the church has to be seen as transcendent, which is rooted 
in Christ extra nos. Any national-confessional identities such as Hungarian-
Reformed, etc. would be lost without that basis. Jesus Christ’s attributes, his 
being truly divine and truly human (inconfuse and indivise - Chalcedon, 451), 
clearly requires that. The essence of the Church can only be pictured in this 
‘duality’. Ecclesiology’s interrelation to Christology is obvious by the notion 
of sóma Christou. Christ is the head of his church (the soma) –and the reality 
of this connection means that the body (church) cannot have another head, 
political or otherwise. The believers’ identity with Christ will be pictured in their 
service of Christ. That obedience is primary in the following of Christ, which also 
determinates the believer’s life in the world by the preaching of the Gospel with 
his/her whole life. That is the only service that the church can do for the world in 
opposition to the teaching of the ‘theology of the servant church’s’ concept of 
service. Therefore the church has a pneumatical reality and an institutional reality. 
The church’s essence is also realized as an eschatological ‘event’ and existential 
character in time and space. These attributes have to be seen together. False 
Christology provides false ecclesiology, as is detectable in the teachings of the 
‘theology of the servant church’ in Békefi’s interpretation.76 
Christology was lost (in the full sense of theology /ecclesiology/) according to 
the ‘official theology’ of Reformed Church of Hungary. In this way an existential 
crisis of the Reformed Church was unavoidable, and the influence of this on the 
time after the collapse of Communism is significant. The ground for the relevance 
of the Donatist Factors was prepared by means of the negative course of events 
in the life of the Reformed Church of Hungary. 
3) The secularization of church life and the sociological aspects were unique in 
the setting of socialism compared to western society. The Reformed Church of 
Hungary would not have been able to avoid facing secularisation if socialism 
had not happened in Hungary. The western European churches’ experiences are 
clear evidence of that. Some of our ecclesiological difficulties are also based on 
the fact that the official theology of the last decades did not allow the facing 
of secularisation. On the one hand, facing secularization would have harmed 
the aims of church politics, and would have given an actual opportunity for the 
attempts by those who were a minority in their theological thinking. On the other 
hand, the whole program of the ‘peculiar Hungarian theology’ (worked out by 
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Tibor Bartha and Elemér Kocsis) would have resulted in a different understanding 
(a socialist one) of the concept of mission as missio Dei. 
We also have to highlight that the church in the Communist society was 
exposed to all the negative ethical tendencies whereby this society could be 
maintained and be under the control of its leader. For example, the mechanism 
of the net of spies, the carefully planned and worked out Communist propaganda 
on every level of society, also in relation to the church (ÁEH, ÁVH), was not without 
consequences in the peoples’ life, mentality and worldview. 
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Gusztáv Bölcskei
Self-identity of the  
Hungarian Reformed 
Community
I believe that when an individual or a community tends to talk a lot about their 
own identity, trying to define for themselves or others who they really are, we can 
be sure that there is something wrong with their self-image. Those with a healthy 
self-image do not dwell on this subject. For them, this is simply not an issue, they 
just live their lives. The characters in a classic psychological story come to mind, 
in which two people meet, one of whom has a full beard. The one without the 
beard asks the bearded man:;
‘Tell me one thing: when you are asleep, is your beard under or over the blanket?’
‘I have no idea, I have never really thought about it before.’
The pair say goodbye. They meet again two weeks later. The bearded man has 
lost a lot of weight, he can barely walk straight.
‘ You won’t believe it but I haven’t been able to sleep ever since you asked 
me that question. I keep thinking before falling asleep whether my beard will be 
under or over the blanket.’
Well, the situation is somewhat similar when a person keeps talking too much 
about their own identity; it suggests they do not know who they are exactly and 
what they want. They cannot find their place in life and in the world.
There are certain natural stages in person’s life when this soft of uncertainty is 
obvious: these are the stages of getting used to adolescence, adulthood and old 
age. During these times, they have to go through intense sufferings before they 
are able to find their way and place. For our church, the issue of identity has come 
up in such a drastic and urgent manner during the past decades because there 
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used to be an external identification on the part of the state and its ideology. 
This ideology labelled Reformed faith and Reformed Church representatives 
as having a clerical and idealist world view. Since there was hardly any free 
communication between individual denominations, we - although aware of the 
fact that there are differences between Reformed and Catholic views - tended 
to overlook such differences, and they did not come up as a problem. No new 
denomination or church appeared in society. Due to changes in society, however, 
this external uniformization disappeared. As a result, the pre-existing but so far 
suppressed internal church tensions became more apparent, and the various 
directions in thinking and in piety began to drift further apart. The appearance 
of new, unknown or little known denominations and religious groups shook up 
the public opinion of the church as well as society, reshaping the religious layout 
that had seemed rock solid and unchangeable before. So this is the situation 
today in which we may and we must ask the questions of who we are and why so.
Having a self-identity naturally entails identifying with something. From the 
Reformed perspective, this is easier to accomplish for a church that adheres more 
strictly to tradition. Even in this case, however, it probably still holds true that the 
grass is always greener on the other side of the fence. Yet I think that Reformed 
mentality is haunted by the feeling that it should not be attached to a mere 
tradition, because that is not what real faith, real piety is about. But Reformed faith 
must not be synonymous with moving around in a vacuum, void of any traditions. 
The motto “ecclesia semper reformari debet” that is, “the church must be reformed 
constantly” does not mean that each believer, each new church generation has 
to start from zero. Instead, the question should be put this way: Which tradition 
do we identify with, and to what extent? On the other hand, it has become clear 
that for the intelligentsia that can more or less identify with Reformed faith, the 
point of connection is frequently the realm of childhood or adolescent memories. 
A continuity of identification is rarely the case. Without going too deep into the 
analysis of the reasons, it can be stated that identification with Reformed faith 
as a whole, with the structure of the Reformed Church and the build-up of its 
congregations and church organization is greatly fragmented, hardly visible at 
all. What has changed is perhaps the fact that while in the past tradition was really 
something that a person was born into, today, with the appearance of diversity, 
the concept of elective tradition has been introduced, which may sound absurd 
and contradictory, but it still exists. It means that a person wants to choose the 
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tradition they can identify with, one that can carry their life. Identification also 
entails recognition. This is similar to the way a believer reacts to the statements 
Jesus uttered about himself. In these statements -1 am the good shepherd, I am 
the way, the truth and the life - Jesus makes us recognize something that we can 
identify with, something that gives meaning to our lives, something that can fill a 
space in our feelings and thinking that either used to be empty or was filled with 
something that failed to provide reassurance and a solution. Searching for one’s 
identity begins when it is not obvious any more that - in this case - only Reformed 
faith exists. I myself was born in a small village, and I must confess that for a very 
long time I was certain that all Hungarians were Reformed, because in my village 
only Reformed people lived. How was I to know that there was anything else out 
there? But now I know. A search for identity goes hand in hand with pluralism, 
and it can have a positive outcome: conscious Reformed faith. People can react 
to pluralism by refusing to acknowledge anything that is different from them, 
but this deprives them of the chance to have a faith that has been tested and 
is growing. It is only a faith that has been tested that can say: I know there are 
other options, but I will stay where I am. This attitude is analogous to the Way 
the First Commandment talks about other gods. There is no theoretical debate 
or roundtable discussion whether there are other gods. It does not deny their 
existence, it simply says: If I, the Lord, am your God, you need no other gods; so 
the commandment asks us to choose the redeeming God.
Among the classic features of a church, the Reformed tradition tends to 
emphasize the universality of church. This is what made it differ from the self-
identity of the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Church. The centre of the self-
identity of the Orthodox Church is the sanctity of the church: ecclesia sancta; 
while the Roman Catholic Church’s attitude focuses on the unity of the church 
- ecclesia una - especially the unity that is manifested in its unique nature. The 
Orthodox tradition concentrates on the doxological nature and function of the 
church the church as the church building of the Holy Spirit the Roman Catholic 
thinking of the Middle Ages emphasizes; the sacramental nature of the church - 
the church is the body of Christ in the meaning of Chrisius prolongatus, the Christ 
that lives on as a necessary supplement to the Head; but for Reformation it was 
the universality of the Church that was important. Neither Luther, nor Calvin ever 
gave up that claim. They considered the church to be God’s people, the spatial and 
temporal limits of which are akin to the spatial and temporal limits of the created 
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world. Let us just think of the way the classic question and answer No. 54 of the 
“Heidelberg Catechism” talks about the church: ‘What do you believe concerning 
“the holy catholic church”?’ ‘I believe that the Son of God through his Spirit and 
Word, out of the entire human race - [spatial limit] -, from the beginning of the 
world to its end - [temporal limit] gathers, protects, and preserves for himself a 
community chosen for eternal life. I would like to highlight this feature because I 
believe that even today many Protestants still believe in the notion and prejudice 
that the movement of Reformation resulted in the division and eventual split of 
the church, leading to the foundation of various new denominations. Well, let me 
repeat: Reformation never gave up the claim that it was the renewal of the holy, 
universal church. We should never, under any circumstances, forget about this. 
There have been and there are still temptations to create one new denomination 
after the other because of unresolved doctrinal or even organizational and 
power issues. The fact that when we talk about Reformed identity, we mean 
the universality of the church, I consider to be an incredibly significant factor, 
which is a mark of identity that can be claimed without any sense of inferiority or 
inflated self-confidence.
On several occasions, our church has Organized trainings for the pastors 
participating in worship services broadcast on radio or television. The institute 
that provided the trainings wrote a short study in which they summarized their 
experiences. The’ trainers had the following to say: “Neither the participants in 
the current training, nor those in the previous one were able to answer questions like 
‘What does it mean to be Reformed today? ‘If you came across ten people and they 
asked you what was good about being Reformed, what would you say? ’ or ‘How 
would you explain to an alien from space what the Reformed faith is all about and in 
what ways it differs from other religions? We feel it is a huge problem if there are no 
good and modern answers to these: and similar questions, answers that are relevant 
in today’s world and understandable to everyone. ”
After the changes in society, bur church also experienced a tumultuous 
period of changes in leadership and organization, but I am not certain that this 
brought about any real clarification, an important aim of which would have been 
the determination of a format that could facilitate the individual and communal 
confession of Reformed faith. It is always easier to state what we are not and what 
we do not wish to become, but it is a lot more difficult to pinpoint what we do 
want, what we see and find our identity in. In my opinion, the Reformed faith has 
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certain pivotal and unique tenets. We do not consider these to be eternal and 
unchangeable, because Reformed faith and Reformed creed are characterized 
by an attitude that does riot see the process of learning from the Word of God 
as a completed process. Therefore it is perhaps no accident that there is not a 
single from the age of Reformation today that is accepted by a Reformed church 
anywhere in the world. I am not talking about the Apostle’s Creed, but about 
those creeds that were written in the age of Reformation. There have been 
attempts from time to time to adopt such creeds, but these never succeeded 
in the end. Perhaps this constitutes a problem, perhaps it does not. If one were 
to say that the lack of a “once and for all” creed is not a tragedy, this attitude 
would somehow reflect the fact that a creed and the experience of faith should 
always remain an act that is characterized by relevance, which is never satisfied 
with taking over yesterday’s faith and upholding the realizations of the past, 
but wishes to redefine for itself its own faith over and over again. Not to offend 
anyone, but I find it somewhat comical when a person in his old age publicly 
repents his sins committed as a teenager. It must have had its relevance at one 
point, but today he should rather talk about the present. It had to be confessed 
in front of the Lord, and also in front of the congregation, if you wish, but if we 
keep confessing our sins of yesterday and the day before yesterday, we lose our 
respectability and credibility.
Well, our Reformed faith has its pivotal tenets that in my view give a shape 
to our sense of identity. The emphasis of God’s glory, of God’s fundamentally 
different nature is an element of Reformed teaching that Should never be given 
up. God cannot be identified with anything else but himself. I do not think that 
the motto “Soli Deo Gloria” is a mere phrase of piety. Instead, it is a statement of 
unimaginable consequences for every era, including our supposedly rational and 
sensible world and Society today. Because, although in a lot of senses today’s 
man is indeed very rational, able to think in a sensible and very “technical” way, 
our world is filled with the small gods that the First Commandment talks about. 
Let us just think of phenomena and expressions in which secularized men or 
humanity is glorifying things or people. What do these people of rational thinking 
get really excited about? Well, let us be honest, not about the Reformed church. 
The Reformed church is a source of excitement only when someone announces 
their resignation or gives a statement on current affairs. But in general it is not 
our church that gives people a thrill, but rather a sports event or a concert, 
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something that tries to replace what sanctity means and can mean, and so 
people create their own saints and sanctities. They create their own cult: if they 
refuse the cult pertaining to church life, they build up their own instead. And 
it leads to expressions like: social progress, development has its victims. Road 
traffic has its victims. Let us Stop and think for a moment about what this really 
means. It is as if we are trying to give some meaning to senseless and inexplicable 
destruction and death by talking about victims, victims of road traffic, instead 
of talking about the carelessness of those responsible. We talk about victims of 
progress instead of pointing out the inhumane and unprofessional behavior of 
those- whose decisions and actions have led to the birth and ultimate death of 
such “victims.”
This seemingly godless world is not only filled with gods where they are 
promoted in the name of some religion, they are everywhere. When the 
Reformed faith claims “Glory to God alone,” it means that God can be identified 
with nothing but Himself, and this statement can be of an incredibly great service 
to its peers who consider themselves to be rational and enlightened, because 
it points out that this world is indeed the world created by God, in which all 
other gods can only rule because people believe in them and take them upon 
themselves. God cannot be resolved in any physical, spiritual or intellectual 
reality of the created world. He cannot be put into any conceptual, intellectual or 
emotional categories. This Reformed emphasis is relevant today because there 
are countless attempts to identify God with the perfect harmony of impersonal 
existence, with the silence of the soul, or with history; or to elevate to a divine 
level certain phenomena of the world where it can dominate a person’s life 
exclusively.
Let us stop here for a moment. It is my belief that in order to have a Reformed 
sense of identity, we must definitely clarify and emphasize the fact that according 
to the Reformed faith, the place of the church is not between God and the world. 
It is not the church facing the world, but rather the church is in the world, facing 
God. Just like the so-called world. I do not mean to blur the differences between 
the church and the world, because there are obvious differences between the 
two, but these differences do not mean that the church is positioned between 
God and the so-called world, but it stands together with the world under Christ’s 
reign, before the Lord. If we forget about this, two temptations arise within the 
Reformed church that are very difficult to resist. One of them is the ministerial 
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temptation of the Reformed church, and the other one is the prophetic temptation 
of the Reformed church.
The ministerial temptation means that we believe it is the duty of the church to 
stand between God and the world and mediate between the two. This way the 
Reformed church can become clerical, despite claiming the opposite in its creeds 
and church regulations, but in this case desire and reality are not one and the 
same. In this regard it does not matter whether clericalism originates from official 
church bodies or elected church officials or from groups claiming to be bottom-up 
initiatives representing the real church. It is my belief that fundamentalism - both 
in the Reformed church and elsewhere - is nothing but bottom-up clericalism, a 
bottom-up “ministerializing” temptation, when a certain individual or a group of 
people stand between the supposed world and God, with the aim of mediating 
between the two. In order to resist this temptation, we need a sobering prophetic 
speech. However, prophetism can also constitute a temptation for the church, if 
it begins to believe that it is in possession of the knowledge that enables it to 
lecture and reprimand others, when it identifies its own word and own will with 
God’s word and God’s will.
Karl Barth, in his formidable work Dogmatics, provides an interesting example 
to illustrate the way he sees the role and place of Christian man and Christian 
congregations. He says we should use the imagery of the liturgy of the Roman 
Catholic mass. The role of the Christian, he writes, is not that of the person 
reading the Scripture and performing the sacrifice, but that of the altar boy. The 
only starting point we can have is believing, truly believing that Christ, after 
His resurrection and transfiguration, is seated at the right hand of God, He is in 
charge, and under His direction we can only be altar boys, yet we have a very 
important role. Because what is the role of the altar boy? To ring the bell, and to 
ring it at the decisive moment. What Barth says, therefore, is that the bell has to 
be audible and timely. Two characteristics that are worth keeping in mind. We 
must be audible, we must be heard, and things should happen at the right time, 
we should speak up and act in a timely fashion. Well, if the church considers itself 
to be the “altar boy of Christ”, then it is not positioned between God and- the 
world. While it is different from the world in this respect, it is still present in it, 
calling attention to what is happening. ‘
The role and place of the church, if it takes its mission seriously, are not 
characterized by holy anger, but rather a sense of sobriety, modesty, Objectivity, 
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humaneness and topicality. The Reformed search for truth is not goal-oriented. 
We must accept the fact that we cannot accomplish everything. The fact that 
not everyone pays attention to us, not everyone takes what we say seriously, 
not everyone is interested. Stating the fact, however, that our Search for truth is 
not goal-oriented is not a call for negligence, instead, it is a way of surrendering 
the claim of exclusivity. When determining the marks of our Reformed identity, I 
believe it is indispensable to answer the questions of where we are, what we want 
and who we are, because the only question can be this: Do we know what we 
have been called to do, and are we acting according to this calling? No reference 
to the Reformation, Calvin, Melius or anyone else will determine whether we are a 
Reformed church or not. Instead, the only thing that can determine that is whether 
the characteristics that belong to the Reformed identity can be recognized in us. 
A unique feature of Reformed faith is that its identity is never considered to be 
a given, to be something that has already been completed, and it does not say 
that we, the church are basically one and the same with the Kingdom of God: Our 
identity can be found along the lines of the promise that He has made Who says: 
“I am the way, the truth and the life.” And only the wandering people of God can 
walk on this road, living its life with self-identification and self-recognition.
A further unique and fundamental tenet of Reformed faith is the central 
importance of the Scripture. This entails a concentration on the Scripture, the 
Book of Books, the document of the history of God’s covenant, and in and through 
this concentration we can find reference points to what is happening here and 
now. Just as it can never become a mark of identity that we are here to erase 
the past completely by making a clean slate, it cannot be a mark of Reformed 
identity that we are here to “go straight ahead back to the past.” We have seen 
examples and attempts to do that, and it is a possible option, but in the end, it 
will not be justified by the Word of God.
When discussing our marks of identity, we must not forget about the 
relationship of the gospel and the law. It is crucial to emphasize the difference 
between the two, because if we fail to do so, we create a false blurring of the 
elements of the Biblical revelation. If the Bible is reduced to a mere book of 
laws, it does nothing but harden and repel, making people feel hopeless and 
disillusioned; it has no attraction. And the preaching of the gospel without 
mentioning the law is the false and Simplistic portrayal of “free grace,” which 
has nothing to do with the will of the holy and merciful God. The gospel, to put 
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it succinctly, is the statement of the fact that you are free. The original meaning 
of the law is the call for you to remain free. The gospel tells us that man does not 
have to fight for his own freedom because it is a gift from God. It is man’s duty 
to preserve and protect the freedom that God has given him. Just as the law and 
the gospel speak together, the Word and the Holy Spirit work together in the 
individual, in the church and in the created world. The reign of Christ is realized 
in this world through the Word and the Spirit. It is important to view the two 
together because otherwise we find ourselves in the realm of either rationalism 
or that of “experience Christianity.” It is the movement of the Spirit that makes 
the Word relevant, otherwise it remains mere words that can kill, while the 
Word lends credit to the experience which otherwise evaporates and turns into 
infatuation that can be manipulated easily.
A unique feature of Reformed thinking is the fact that it puts great emphasis 
on the need for joint testimony. The community of a congregation is not a place 
where a number of religious geniuses, the fervent facilitators of the holy cause, 
strong-willed people are able to take matters into their own hands at any time. 
A congregation, apart from listening to the Word, is a place where people listen 
to each other as well, because it is only through this that a jointly undertaken 
testimony can be achieved. However, this joint testimony, to connect it the idea 
of universal ministry, must never become an alibi for dilettantism and mediocrity, 
a playground of manifold powers operating under the motto of “we are all 
experts.” This joint testimony must not mean that each and every Reformed 
person has to think about everything the same way. It is a misleading attitude if 
we claim that there can be no differences of opinions among us. I think we should 
take to heart the remark that István Török made: It is not the debates themselves 
that are problematic, but the way we debate. We can only perform a testimony 
by practising our responsible Christian freedom, where it is not experts guiding 
minors; but everybody serves by using the gift received from God.
I know that what I am talking about is a reality only in a handful of places. 
Although we claim to believe in the principle of universal ministry, when it comes 
to practising it, we are in trouble. The responsible service of Christian freedom is 
supposed to benefit those as well who are under the reign of Christ, but outside 
the walls of our church, including the practice of intercessory prayer for those 
who do not pray, as well as undertaking responsibility in specific political and 
economic issues. We do not have to be leaders in such actions, but we must take 
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our part in this responsibility by getting rid of an indifferent attitude that belittles 
all human efforts. The knowledge that we are the wandering people of God in 
this world is sobering and it is also a commitment because we can be assured that 
the world is operated by the love and wisdom of He Who has been merciful to us. 
This knowledge lends seriousness to our responsibility, breaking us free from the 
power of the temptation to despair or become disillusioned, and I believe that 
this mark of Reformed identity is just as important as the previous ones.
Gábor J. Lányi
Bishop  
Albert Bereczky  
(1893-1966)
A Life Full of Questions
Bishop Albert Bereczky (1893-1966) was undoubtedly one of the most significant, 
controversial, and yet ambivalent persons of the Reformed Church in Hungary 
during the 20th Century.1 If we call the period between the two world wars the 
“Ravasz-era,” then the first half of the 1950s can definitely be characterized by the 
name and activity of Albert Bereczky. After Ravasz’s retirement, Bereczky followed 
him in the bishopric seat of the Danubian Church District, then in the presidency 
of the Synod and Convent of the Reformed Church in Hungary. His office term 
was overlapped with the harshest anti-church policies of the Communist State 
led by Mátyás Rákosi.
The Bereczky’s contribution to these policies are still debated.2 Did he act 
on conviction or was he only the unconscious tool of the communist political 
interest? Did he save the Reformed Church from a much greater peril, like total 
eradication, or would there have been another way for the church instead of what 
Bereczky described as “the narrow road of the obedience by faith”? This study 
gives a short introduction to the main stages and formative events of Albert 
Bereczky’s life and activity, while represents the main opinions concerning his 
motivations.
Albert Bereczky was born in Budapest in 1893. According to his baptismal 
records kept in the Roman Catholic Parish of Bakáts tér, his father was Endre 
Bereczky, a Reformed landowner, while his mother was the Baroness Mária 
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Pongrácz, the descendant of an impoverished aristocratic family. According to 
the aforementioned record, his godfather was Count Albert Apponyi, the famous 
politician and diplomat of the era. It was rumored throughout Bereczky’s life that 
he was the illegitimate son of Count Apponyi, which belief was confirmed by 
Bereczky himself on several occasions.3
After the death of her husband, Bereczky’s mother moved to Dunabogdány 
where she married the local Reformed pastor, Géza Kovács. His stepfather’s 
positive pastoral example was important for Bereczky to become a pastor 
himself.4
Bereczky pursued secondary level education in the Reformed high schools 
of Kunszentmárton, Kecskemét, and finally in Pápa, which became one of the 
most significant places of his life.5 There, he not only made a life-long friendship 
with Zoltán Tildy, later his influential political sponsor, but also met János Victor, 
the young secretary of MEKDSZ, the evangelical movement for students. Victor’s 
evangelical thoughts made a huge impact on the young Bereczky. Victor acted 
as a spiritual father for him even during Bereczky’s time as a bishop.6 Bereczky 
also became friends with Imre Szabo, later dean of the Budapest Church County. 
During the interwar period their friendship made them good co-workers in order 
to increase the Reformed Church’s significance in Budapest. In the early 1950s, 
however, Szabo turned out to be the natural leader of Bereczky’s opposition 
within the Synod, in what resulted in Szabó’s coerced deposition and relocation 
from Budapest to a remote Eastern-Hungarian village, where he died within 
three years.7
After Bereczky finished high school he applied to the Pápa Theological 
Seminary, mostly at his evangelical friends’ urging. During his seminary years, 
Bereczky went through a conversion experience in a MEKDSZ summer camp and 
became a passionate member of the revival movement, while he looked at the 
official church more and more critically.8
In 1916, he finished his seminary education in Pápa. He studied in Basel, 
Switzerland for a short time, then he got married and was sent by Bishop Elek Petri 
to Salgótarján with the assignment to plant a new congregation in the fast growing 
industrial city.9 Serving in the miner communities of Salgótarján, Bereczky got his 
first personal and positive experiences in a congregation where the majority of 
the members belonged to the worker class. During the short and chaotic reign 
of the Hungarian Soviet Republic (21 March 1919 - 1 August 1919) following the 
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collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Bereczky and his small family had 
to flee from Salgótarján. They moved to Dunabogdány where Bereczky replaced 
his stepfather as a pastor until 1924, when he left for the prominent and reform-
minded congregation of Pécel.10 Pécel was the home of Pastor Gyula Forgács’s 
“Pécel Circle,” a movement of pastors and laypeople who discussed the post-
war challenges of the Hungarian society, politics and church in an evangelical-
revivalist manner. In the 1920s Bereczky became known and respected as a 
devoted member and passionate preacher of the revival movement, meanwhile 
he also functioned as a prolific publicist for many revivalist publications. His love 
for the press followed him throughout his life: he edited many publications and 
authored hundreds of newspaper articles.11 Bereczky left his ministry in Pécel in 
order to become the Director of the Sylvester Press and Publishing Company, co-
founded by his closest friend, Zoltán Tildy. The Sylvester Press, specialized on the 
publication of Gospel tracts and other revivalist literature, went bankrupt shortly 
after its new headquarters was finished in Budapest in 1930.
After the failed business venture, Bishop László Ravasz assigned Bereczky to 
be the pastor of a mission congregation in one of the socially challenging worker 
districts of Budapest, the so-called “Tutaj Street Congregation,” which later moved 
to the Pozsonyi Street. By his warm and open personality, moving sermons, 
cutting-edge church planting methods and, last but not least, his sensitivity to 
social issues, Bereczky turned the mission congregation into one of the most 
flourishing congregations of Budapest within a decade. He organized Bible study 
groups according to the diverse age and societal clusters of his parishioners and 
established social institutions for the accommodation of young apprentices and 
impoverished elderly. By the support of his old friend from Pápa, then Budapest 
Dean Imre Szabó, the congregation finished the building of a new capacious 
church complex on the banks of the Danube (Pozsonyi Street) in 1940.12
In 1944, after the occupation of Hungary by Nazi Germany, Bereczky joined 
the resistance movement at the influence of his friend, Zoltán Tildy. Tildy already 
belonged to the left wing of the Independent Smallholders Party and as such 
became a Member of Parliament from 1933 on. Cooperating with the resistance, 
Bereczky became a prominent participant in the Reformed Church’s attempt to 
save Hungarian Jews from transportation to extermination camps. The rescue 
work was coordinated by the “Good Shepherd Mission Committee,” established 
by Bishop László Ravasz in 1942. The committee’s original mission was the spiritual 
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and social care of converted Jews, but during the last two years of the war its 
main focus became rescuing as many Jews as possible by issuing Christianization 
documents. Officially, the “Good Shepherd” was led by Gyula Muraközy, Ravasz’s 
second in command. The Committee’s fieldwork was done mostly by József 
Éliás, a young pastor and Jewish convert himself, who became a close confidant 
of Bereczky during this time. In August of 1944, approximately 1300 Jews (40% 
of the baptized Jews in Budapest) were baptized at Bereczky’s Pozsonyi Street 
Congregation in order to protect them from deportation.13 Furthermore, with 
Bereczky’s approval, the congregation’s “Kaláka” teenage circle also played an 
active role in the rescue missions.14 According to the church’s secretary: “The 
greatest wave of baptisms took place during the summer of 1944. Mostly the Old 
and the Young and women came, since the man have been already taken away. 
/../ It was not about faith any more. It was about saving their lives.”15
Bereczky also played an active role in the information network between the 
cells of the resistance and Governor Miklós Horthy, while he personally delivered 
Bishop Ravasz’s protestation letter against the deportations to the Reformed 
and Lutheran bishops.16 During the last days of the siege of Budapest, at the 
highpoint of Nazi terror, Bereczky hid Tildy and his family at the Pozsonyi Street 
church building.17 Right after the war he wrote an account about the rescue 
efforts of the Reformed Church under the title “Hungarian Protestantism against 
the Persecution of Jews.”18 By the work of the “Good Shepherd Committee” 
about 60,000 Hungarian Jews have been saved during the war. Since he put his 
own life at risk, Bereczky was posthumously honored with the title “Righteous 
among the Nation” in 1997. Nevertheless, his significant contribution to the 
resistance movement and the rescue mission brought him substantial popularity 
and admiration right after the war.19 
Bereczky joined the resistance movement by the impulse of his old friend, 
Zoltán Tildy. After the war, Tildy’s political career was on the rise. Tildy served 
as the Prime Minister of Hungary from November 1945 until February 1946, 
when he was elected the first President of the Republic of Hungary until the 
communist takeover in 1948. Bereczky’s deeper affiliation with left-wing politics 
can be accredited to Tildy. At the beginning of 1945, Bereczky also joined the 
Smallholders Party and became a member of the Provisional National Assembly 
as early as the April of 1945. Among many minor offices, Bereczky functioned as 
the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Culture in 1945-1946 and Chairman of the 
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Foreign Affairs Committee in 1946. By 1947, he belonged to the leadership of the 
Smallholders Party.20
Named in full the “Independent Smallholders’, Land Workers’ and Citizens’ 
Party” was founded in 1930 to represent the interests mainly of landed farmers. 
The Smallholders Party was the biggest left-wing bourgeois opposition and 
parliamentary party in the 1930s. It acted as an umbrella for people ranging from 
wealthier-landed farmers to the village poor and some urban strata, advocating 
land reform and other liberal democratic demands. After the first general elections 
after the war (4 November 1945) the Smallholders Party became the largest 
party in Parliament, with an absolute majority. Its leaders accepted the need for 
nationalization to limit the scope of big capital and supported the dissolution 
of the system of great landed estates, but insisted on basing agriculture on 
private landownership and maintaining a multi-party system of parliamentary 
democracy. The Hungarian Communist Party (MKP), led by Chief Secretary Mátyás 
Rákosi, used legal and illegal methods – which became famous later as “Salami 
Tactics”,21 – to combat the Smallholders. By their Machiavellian adversaries the 
Smallholders’ power began to break early in 1947, when charges of a conspiracy 
against the republic were fabricated to dissolve a secret organization known 
as the Hungarian Brotherhood, which could closely connected to adherents of 
the Smallholders Party.22 Through the show-trials of the Brotherhood’s real and 
alleged members, the direction of the Smallholders got into the hands of its left-
wingers, like Zoltán Tildy, who did not have other choice than to cooperate with 
the Communists. By the Summer of 1947, the only Smallholders Party politicians 
remaining were ones who unconditionally accepted the leadership of Rákosi 
and the Hungarian Communist Party. It was only a matter of time before Rákosi’s 
Salami Tactics reached their fulfillment and the Communist Party transforms 
the young Hungarian democracy into a dictatorship by the intimidation and 
false accusations of opposition leaders, forced party mergers and even voting 
fraud23 Finally, Rákosi’s one-party system succeeded on June 12, 1948, when 
the Communists assimilated their last independent coalition partner, the Social 
Democratic Party. The communist takeover was complete. 
Due to Bereczky’s revivalist past, his achievements as a church-planter, and his 
newly-gained political authority and connections, Bereczky became the natural 
leader of those church-persons who criticized the inter-war conditions of the 
Reformed Church, expressed the church’s responsibility in the political process 
[ 128 ] Gábor J. Lányi
resulting in the lost world war, while they had a neutral or even positive attitude 
toward the socialist transition of Hungary. Discussing the possible orientations 
of the church in the newly-formed socialist society, Bereczky and his supporters 
inevitably challenged the church establishment of Bishop László Ravasz.24
Experiencing the rise of communist dominance, it became apparent that it 
would only be a matter of time before the Ravasz leadership had to give way 
to those who could better serve the secular political interest. Bereczky had an 
active role in the negotiations, which convinced Ravasz to resign, and at that 
point Ravasz also gave his approval. Due to the circumstances, it was decided 
Bereczky was the right person to replace Ravasz in the leadership of the Reformed 
Church.25 
Karl Barth, one of the most famous theologians of the era, also argued for 
the election of Bereczky in an open letter. Earlier in 1948, Barth, accompanied by 
Bereczky, visited Ravasz personally and tried to convince him of the necessity of 
his resignation.26 Barth was purposefully misled by Ravasz’s opposition (namely 
János Péter), and totally misinterpreted the Hungarian situation trusting the 
Communist State would secure the independence and freedom of the church 
and its members. From 1951 on, Barth realized his mistake and started to use 
a more critical tone against the collaborative attitude of the Bereczky church 
government.27
After the other candidates were convinced to withdraw, Bereczky was elected 
by the small majority to be the Bishop of the Danubian Church District at the 
end of 1948. In the following year, after the forced resignation of the Bishop 
of Debrecen – Imre Révész – Bereczky became the President of the Synod and 
Convent, the Reformed Church’s highest legislative and administrative body.28
During Bereczky’s church leadership, the Communist State implemented its 
anti-church policies step by step. By the nationalization of the church’s educational 
institutions, the abolition of missionary organizations, the relocation, suspension, 
forced retirement and intimidation of disloyal pastors, the church was forced into 
the margin of the Hungarian society within one decade. The Reformed Church 
lost almost all of its 400 years-long political and, most importantly, educational 
and cultural role within the Hungarian society.29 
Bereczky, even before his time as a bishop, already took part in the work 
of the preparatory committee for the nationalization of religious educational 
institutions.30 Under strong political pressure, the Synod of the Reformed Church 
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adopted the state’s proposal for the nationalization of schools on 14 June 1948, 
two days after the Parliament already proclaimed state ownership over church 
schools.31
The nationalization of the schools was an important step toward the birth 
of the so-called Agreement between the Communist State and the Reformed 
Church, signed on the 7th of October 1948. On the surface, the Agreement 
advocated the idea of “free church in a free state” and promised to end the 
state’s involvement into church issues. In reality, it led to the gradual eradication 
of church autonomy and the church’s total financial dependency to the state. 
The Agreement regulated that state subsidies would decrease by 25% every 
five years. The cut was explained by saying the church would become more and 
more self-sustaining, but it was apparent that the state expected the church to 
be dissolved within the next twenty years.
However, it was officially signed by Bishop Imre Révész, President of the Synod 
and Convent until his forced resignation in 1949. Bereczky was the Agreement’s main 
ideologist and promoter; he summed up its relevance and necessity as following: 
By Christian realism, we had to take into consideration the place and 
time where and when we live. The past is irreversibly over and the 
church’s task in the present is to build, help, serve by its own tools 
there and then where it has its possibility and opportunity to do it. 
The vision of the serving church originated from this comprehension. 
/…/ The state agreement with the Reformed Church – and later 
with all the Hungarian Christian churches – was the result of this 
theological understanding.32
Though Bereczky declared in his inaugural speech that he would decentralize 
the church hierarchy,33 under his government the church went through 
an unprecedented process of centralization. The traditional Reformed 
congregational autonomy was weakened. The church government got involved 
into the free elections of pastors in many cases to support their own loyal 
candidates. Meanwhile, the deans’ and especially the bishops’ power over 
their pastors became legally reinforced. According to the 1951 amendment of 
the church’s bylaws, any pastor could be relocated from his congregation by 
the church government– an “administrative tool” which became very useful to 
discipline defiant pastors and establish a system of fear and mistrust. The most 
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famous victim of these “administrative tools” was Bereczky’s former friend, Imre 
Szabó, Dean of the Budapest Church County. After Szabó acted as Bereczky’s 
opposition in the Synod, he was relocated to a remote insignificant village in 
Eastern-Hungary. 
As part of the centralization process, the majority of missionary societies were 
dissolved until the end of 1950, while the rest of them were placed under the 
firm control of the church authorities in 1952. This stifling process ended the 
longstanding tradition of voluntary lay service of the Reformed Church.34 The 
church press had a similar fate. Many church newspapers ceased to exist, the 
rest was thoroughly censored by the church authorities. The adjustments of the 
Church Counties’ borders in 1952 also served for the purpose of centralization 
and personal purges. For example, the dissolution of one of the four traditional 
Church Districts, the Tibiscan Church District, also resulted in the deposition of its 
bishop, Andor Enyedy, a representative of the old era.35
The most criticized point of Bereczky’s activity was that he sometimes 
adjusted his church policies to the state’s demands, not out of necessity but out 
of compliance. For example, when he approved the absorption of the Sárospatak 
and Pápa Theological Seminaries by the ones in Budapest and Debrecen in 1951 
or when he offered to the state three secondary schools which still stayed in 
church ownership according to the 1948 Agreement. Giving up these schools left 
only the Debrecen Secondary School in the hands of the Reformed Church.36 The 
abolition of the two historic Semninaries, both founded in the Reformation Era, 
made Karl Barth aware of the harmful tendencies within the Reformed Church 
in Hungary and motivated him to raise his voice. In a letter dated 16 September 
1951,37 which had been published in the West despite his intention, Barth 
drew parallels between the Nazi Germany’s Deutsche Christen movement and 
Bereczky’s church leadership: “Must Reformed Hungary always be 100 percent in 
agreement with whatever regime happens to be in power?”38 The letter caused 
great panic at the Bishop’s office and its response was written and published by 
the supervision and approval of Mátyás Rákosi, who desperately wanted to keep 
the appearance in the West that religious freedom was protected in communist 
Hungary.
Interestingly, another area where the communist interest tried to use the 
church for its purpose was the ecumenical movement. The State Office for Church 
Affairs and even Mátyás Rákosi himself paid close attention to the participation 
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of the Hungarian Reformed delegates in various ecumenical organizations such 
as the World Council of Churches (WCC) or the World Alliance of the Reformed 
Churches. The Communists sought to co-opt these organizations as a tool for 
their political propaganda.39 The freshly founded WCC could not shut out the 
heated political climate of the Cold War and sometimes became the theater of 
clashes between Eastern and Western political ideologies. Next to those who 
wanted to preserve the neutrality of the organization, there were always some 
delegates, both from the West and the East, who attempted to use the WCC’s 
publicity as the channel of their political message.
As early as 1946, Bereczky, being involved in various forms of foreign affairs 
that time especially as the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, attended 
two preparatory conferences of the WCC in Switzerland. Consequently, he was 
also present at the initial WCC General Assembly in Amsterdam during the 
late-summer of 1948. On 8 July 1949, Bereczky became the President of the 
Ecumenical Commission of Hungary. When in July 1950 the Toronto meeting 
of the WCC Central Committee condemned North Korea’s “war aggression”, 
Bereczky criticized their statement by an open letter sent to the WCC General 
Secretary. Bereczky’s criticism focused on the credibility and objectivity of the 
UNCOK (United Nations Comission on Korea) report about the Korean War, on 
which the Toronto statement relied. Bereczky also pointed out the contradiction 
of the statement which supported “police action” against North Korea, while 
expected a peaceful solution the same time.40 Since the Toronto statement also 
condemned China’s support for North Korea in April 1951, Chinese Protestant 
Bishop Tzu-Chen Chao, one of the six presidents of the WCC, resigned from his 
position as an act of protestation.41 In order to express his solidarity, Bereczky 
also resigned from his membership in the International Affairs Committee at the 
next meeting of the Central Committee in August 1951 in Rolle, Switzerland.42 
Though he accredited great importance to his resignation, it did not bring him 
the accolades he expected. In spite of his aspirations, Josef Hromádka, Czech 
Protestant theologian, became the generally recognized leader of the Eastern 
churches within the WCC instead of Bereczky. It was only a cold comfort that in 
1952 the Comenius Faculty of the Charles University of Prague granted honorary 
doctorate to Bereczky acknowledging his ecumenical service.43 Bereczky also 
attended the 1954 WCC General Assembly in Evanston, USA, where he delivered 
the Hungarian Reformed Church’s invitation to hold the next WCC Central 
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Committee meeting in Galyatető, Hungary, during the summer of 1956. In spite 
of his attempts, by that time, Bereczky’s impact on ecumenical matters was 
gradually overshadowed by the diplomatic talent of his Hungarian rival, János 
Péter, new Bishop of the Transtibiscan Church District.
The examples mentioned above show us the Bereczky leadership became 
the simple executor of the Communist State’s will and interests, mediated by the 
State Office for Church Affairs founded in 1951. This communist intention and 
method was later aptly described by the resigned Bishop Ravasz as “weakening 
the church by the church.” The Communist State was wise enough not to choose 
the way of direct confrontation with the Reformed Church, like it did in the case 
of the Catholics, but acted out its anti-church program by the help of inside 
collaborators.
One of the key questions about the assessment of Bereczky’s activity and 
personality are his true motivations during this process. His official statements, 
articles and sermons testify that he was deeply convinced by the righteousness 
of his church policies serving state purposes. However, Bereczky failed to 
develop a coherent theological system, his attitude toward the Communist 
State was reinforced by a theological justification, his so-called “theology of the 
narrow road.”44 This theology finds its origins in Bereczky’s personal experiences 
during the last phase of the Second World War. He considered the horrors of 
the war and the total defeat of the inter-war Hungary as the result of God’s 
judgement. Bereczky’s life was in permanent danger because of his relationship 
with the resistance movement; and he experienced the Russian occupation as 
personal deliverance and the manifestation of God’s grace. This intense personal 
experience brought him to that assumption that both judgment and grace 
manifest themselves in the historical and social context of this world. In his 
words: “His judgment made the old Hungary to collapse, and His grace gave us a 
wonderful opportunity to have a new beginning.”45
In his opinion, God’s legitimate judgment was caused by sins committed 
within the context of human, social relations, like the social injustice of the 
pre-war or the war itself. On the other hand, he believed the grace of God also 
reveals itself there, where there is a promise and intention to solve these social 
problems by the implementation of a peaceful and just society. According to him, 
the Marxism represented by the Soviet Union had this promise and intention 
to a peaceful and just society by which it becomes the tool of God’s grace. 
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Consequently, the church must also promote this new social transformation; with 
Bereczky’s words: “In this new situation, the church must recognize its radically 
new assignments and earnestly embrace the service waiting for her: this was and 
this remains the narrow road of the church.”46 Thus, in his public statements he 
never questioned the righteousness of his policies what he declared to be God’s 
will. Moreover, in the mid-1950s Bereczky in his speeches, articles and even in his 
sermons embraced more and more the style and terminology of the communist 
politicians, frequently using their usual phrases or favorite expressions.47
However, for a more comprehensive assessment of Bereczky’s motivations, 
it is also relevant to see that his close friendships, and in many cases kinships,48 
with the discredited and convicted members of the Hungarian Brotherhood, 
the Smallholders Party (and especially with the disgraced Zoltan Tildy) made 
him vulnerable to blackmail after the communist takeover. Eventually, Rákosi’s 
“Salami Tactics” reached Bereczky’s political supporter, Tildy, on 30 July 1948, 
when Tildy was forced to resign from Presidency of the Republic after his son-
in-law had been arrested for corruption and infidelity. Thereafter Tildy was kept 
under house arrest from the end of August 1948 until May 1, 1956. Tildy’s downfall 
resulted in the end of Bereczky’s secular political aspirations, too. According to 
the contemporary opinion of László Pap, Dean of Budapest Seminary:
I knew what Bereczky, as Smallholders Party member, thought of the 
Communists, and I had no doubt that what I knew, the Communists 
knew it too. / ... / I was afraid that because of this political burden 
Bereczky will have to make concessions in church matters.49 
Considering Bereczky’s delicate political situation caused by his Smallholders 
past and particularly Zoltán Tildy’s downfall, if he wanted to secure his position 
he had to prove his loyalty to the Communist Regime constantly.
Interestingly, many of his closest colleagues and even friends wrote reports 
about him to the State Security Services, which were always suspicious and 
distrustful toward Bereczky. In these reports, he is characterized as somebody 
who publicly advocates state politics, but secretly hinders and sabotages them.50 
The State used him, but never trusted him. It was also true, that on several 
occasions Bereczky used his remaining political connections to intervene for 
deported or imprisoned pastors, church members or their relatives.51 The State’s 
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mistrust was also strengthened by the biased reports of those young careerist 
church-officials who tried to blacken the “old fool” – as they called Bereczky – 
in order to assist János Péter, Bishop of the Transtibiscan Church District and 
Bereczky’s rival for the supremacy over the Reformed Church.52
Inside the church the growing discontent against Bereczky’s church policies 
led to the formation of the Reformed Renewal Movement, which harshly opposed 
Bereczky’s servile attitude towards the Communist State even before the 1956 
Revolution.53 During the 1956 Revolution, the members of the Reformed Renewal 
Movement could step forward and reinstall László Ravasz as old-new Bishop. 
The 63 years-old Bereczky lived through the events of the 1956 revolution in 
a hospital. Earlier that year he had a stroke on his return from a conference in 
Germany; under the pressure of the new circumstances he had to announce his 
resignation by phone from the hospital bed.54
After the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Revolution, Bereczky’s leadership 
was restored with the help of the regenerating Communist State, led by János 
Kádár. However, Bereczky still suffered from the consequences of his stroke and 
could not completely fulfill his responsibilities. He was reinstated as Bishop by 
the State Office for Church Affairs in order to symbolize the continuity of the new 
Communist Regime of János Kádár with the pre-revolution order.55
In his 1957 episcopal report, Bereczky admitted some of the mistakes of his pre-
revolution leadership. According to him the harshness of his church policies, 
especially the so called “administrative tools” – such as the relocation, suspension 
and forced retirement of pastors, or the abolition of missionary organizations – 
can be viewed as the “temptations of love,” meaning that their intention was to 
save as many pastors and church-people as possible from waking the attention 
of the Communist State and thus suffering harsher retribution.56 After the 
consolidation of the Kádár-regime, Bereczky’s service was not needed anymore 
and the State Office for Church Affairs approved his retirement in 1958.57 He died 
in the age of 73 in 1966.58
When the criticisms of the Bereczky-era resurfaced after the political changes 
of 1989, Endre Nagy, Bereczky’s son-in-law and former synodal co-worker, replied 
with the argument that Bereczky’s primary motive was the preservation of the 
Reformed Church and its members even if this meant to suffer some losses and 
damages on several fields, like in education, culture and inner-mission. Nagy 
refreshes Bereczky’s apology from 1957, when he states that his father-in-law’s 
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tough church policies were needed in order to protect the anti-communist 
church-persons from the possible harsher retribution of the state.59 In his opinion, 
the church and its leadership was on a forced course. If Bereczky had resigned, 
he would have given way to more willing collaborators, like János Péter and his 
circle of young arrogant careerists.60 If he had resisted, he would have become 
a martyr like the Catholic Cardinal László Mindszenty or the Lutheran Bishop 
Lajos Ordass, but even this could not have prevented the State to execute its 
anti-church policies. In Bereczky’s own words: “No one claims that this road was 
without mistakes, nor that it was easy. But yes, it was the only viable road for the 
Church here and now: the narrow road of the obedience by faith.”61
On the other side, in the opinion of Gyula Gombos, Bereczky’s former 
parishioner at the Pozsonyi Street and his expatriate critic in the 1960s, it is 
also necessary to take into consideration what has been saved and what is lost. 
Although, the church’s organization, some of its institutions, most of its pastors, 
elders and members, so the “outside” of the church has been preserved, on the 
same time “Hungarian Calvinism” gave up its 400 years old formative role in 
Hungarian culture and education and, above all, it degraded the preaching of 
the Gospel to be the channel of government propaganda. With Gombos’s own 
words: “the church government sacrificed the essential for the nonessential, 
the inner assignment for the outer appearance, the wine for the wineskins, the 
heritage for one bowl of lentils.”62
Bereczky’s final evaluation is still debated. There are still some who emphasize 
his sanity, by which he preserved the church from a possible eradication. It is 
expressed that nobody could give a different path to the church among the given 
circumstances. There are also many, who still harshly criticizes his conformism 
to the Communist State, especially how he sometimes went beyond the “extra 
mile” and sought to satisfy every demands of the State, for which he is accused 
of opportunism and unprincipled careerism. There are also many who wonder 
how someone who was a devoted revivalist, church planter, and rescuer of Jews 
could so easily be mistaken and become the tool of a totalitarian dictatorship? Or 
is it even possible that this background was the very reason for what he became? 
Was he the victim, or the perpetrator; or maybe both? The debate is still going on 
as well as the research of his life, therefore it is also possible that new evidence 
will shed some more light on his motivations.
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At the beginning of his bishopric service Bereczky declared: 
“The road of the Church leads between two temptations: the first 
temptation is to ignore the signs of the times and protect something 
what has been already condemned by God’s judgment; the other 
temptation is to adapt ourselves to the changes of time, while 
sacrificing those values, which were entrusted to us by God.63 
We might say that in his struggle to avoid the first, Bereczky might have exposed 
himself too much to the latter. In order to not protect something which he 
considered be condemned by God, he might have sacrificed too many values 
which were entrusted to the church and to him as its responsible leader. 
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Ábrahám Kovács
Interchangeable  
kingdoms of God(s)? 
A Critical Theological Reflection  
on Conversions or Journeys  
from Christianity to Communism
Introduction
It was a peculiar phenomenon during Communism that several well-known 
persons participating in the revivalist movement of the Hungarian Reformed 
Church not only sympathised with socialist ideas but also showed a further 
‘development’. They converted from Christianity to Marxism. One may say that 
they exhibited an ‘advancement’ in their knowledge as Marxist ideologues and 
via their collaboration with the atheist state which was communist.1 
This paper seeks to investigate how it was possible that Christians, especially 
several leading revivalists of the Hungarian Awakenings movement, collaborated 
with the communist state.   The membership of this movement included the 
names of many future bishops, particularly Albert Bereczky, János Péter, Tibor 
Bartha.  It also included other notable personalities such as Sándor Fekete, István 
Finta, Benő Békefi and Imre Kádár.  The actions of these members provide much 
food for thought.  Let me draw attention to a perplexing, if not bewildering 
particular example of the Rt. Rev. János Péter.  How it was possible for Péter, a 
Christian Bishop close to revivalist circles to join the communists? Furthermore, 
why did he present himself as a „believer” of that ideology to such a degree that 
he was entrusted to as a trusted advisor and eventually the foreign minister 
of Communist-controlled Hungary (13 September 1961 – 14 December, 1973)? 
It is also an intriguing question whether he „converted” to Communism. If so, 
when, how and why did he make an unusual ‘leap of faith’? These and other 
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issues also lead to larger questions regarding how those with Christian identities 
at this time reconciled their faith with communist belief.  In Péter’s case, was he 
an opportunist, a careerist or a devout member of the Party?   Did he truly believe 
that he served the church and the state equally and fairly? Additionally, from a 
theological perspective, could one serve „two Lords” at the same time? Finally, 
the further bewildering question arises: is the belief in Marxism, especially in 
its extreme form, compatible with Evangelical Reformed Christianity? Rt. Rev. 
János Péter’s life and work is just one example of the many revivalists and other 
Christians who decided to collaborate with the communist state.  Though almost 
30 years have passed since the collapse of Communism, the beliefs of these 
collaborators have escaped scholarly attention.  In sum, the core question of this 
paper is how Christians related to Marxism (Communism) during the 40 years 
of oppression that began shortly after the end of World War II. In sum the main 
research question of this reflection is how and why he and other revivalists of the 
Reformed church made a shift of allegiance? In other words, why those people 
‘converted’ from proclaiming Kingdom of God to propagating the ‘earthly 
paradise’ of Communism.  Before attempting to sketch out a framework of 
reference by which categories may be stated to offer an interpretation, it is vital 
to address the core question from various aspects and make some observations.
What does Jerusalem have to do with Athens?
It is helpful here to raise the famous question of Tertullian: What does Jerusalem 
have to do with Athens? Before we are quick to judge that this is perhaps to radical 
question that would imply a response that could only be reductionist in its possible 
response, I need to make several qualifications. First, I have already alluded to 
the fact that history has shown us that extremism in any form is dangerous and 
that it takes on an evil form capable of destroying human dignity and the lives 
of millions of people. Communism, as an extreme form of leftist ideas, is not 
immune to this charge. Second, we must remember that a responsible Christian, 
regardless of his or her political orientation to the direction of leftist or right-wing 
ideas, is obliged to avoid political extremism. Third, I entertain the thought that 
Christianity is a theist religion that cannot be married with an atheist worldview 
such as Marxism in that form that had appeared in Central Europe. One might 
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agree with the fact that it is possible to learn from some of the critical analysis 
of Marx. But to embrace Marxism as an ideology in its entirety, or to serve and 
approve its Leninist or Stalinist versions as Hungarian former revivalist did, is 
such a self-deception and lack of sense of reality and proper gospel, if I may be 
allowed to say so, that is really puzzling and disturbing. 
Here I deem it crucial to distinguish between Socialism and Communism. 
Both drew ideas from various leftist thinkers. But Communism, which I perceive 
as the applied for of Marxist ideology, particularly in Hungary, was an extreme 
form of the Left.   Like Nazism, Communism was an ideology that produced many 
evil deeds in Central Europe.  Indeed, when Hungary was first occupied the Nazi 
Germany in March 1944, it was called properly as occupation.  Yet when the other 
extremist power, the Soviet Army, came to Hungary, it the Communist leaders 
hailed it as a liberation. This conscious propaganda of the servile Hungarian 
Marxists resulted in a schizophrenic and regrettable reality for decades in 
Hungary.  Its isolated people were taught that the Soviets were liberators and 
that the German Nazis were evil.   But of course, evil has no colour, race or specific 
form of embodiment. Extreme leftist ideologies such as Marxism (Communism 
as it is referred popularly) or right-wing extremists like National Socialists (Nazism 
as it is popularly referred to) produce equally immoral and evil systems that 
must be, and should have been, rejected by any Christian leader who took the 
Gospel seriously. However, it is a grim reality that the majority of Christians in 
Hungary, like those in in Germany failed to speak out against extremism, albeit 
of a leftist orientation. Only a very small minority stood up against the enormous 
pressure of prevailing ideology during the course of the national history of the 
aforementioned nations.
Worldviews, either from left or right, may enrich our Christian theological 
understanding of the world. Nevertheless, the bewildering phenomenon 
that some of most fervent Christians, the revivalists, were the most faithful 
collaborators of building an openly atheist society in the name of Communism 
is really a peculiar phenomenon that invites researchers for investigation of 
primary historical sources. The issue also calls for a serious theological reflection. 
The more specific intention of this lecture is to sketch out some of the major lines 
of investigation which could be followed when a proper in-depth research will 
carried out. It also seeks to establish the categories, to identify factors/elements 
and highlight impacts that may contributed to the shift of a worldview (from a 
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theist to an atheist) or, in other cases, where two views remained side by side, 
albeit in a perplexing formation just like people who inhabit strange or unusual 
marriages. In some cases, erstwhile revivalists did not really give up their piety, or 
their reckoned, self-justified Christian life.  They simply made special concessions 
or accepted the ‘faith’ of Marxism. Surely such cases were realities during the 
time of the totalitarian communist regime. But, in this syncretism, yet another 
question arises with even more pressure and imperative: (how) could a Christian 
be a theist and atheist at the same time? Is it possible to be a Marxist communist 
and proclaiming the Gospel of Jesus Christ? Had it been not a self-deception? For 
some the biblical argument is that one cannot serve two Lords at the same time 
as mentioned above. This perception of faith produced martyrs in the history of 
Christian church. Others argue that a person’s life journey is really complex and 
a picture is never black and white but it has many colours, even each colour has 
shades. Therefore, this fact calls for careful investigation and analysis and one 
must avoid making quick judgements. Needless to say, it is possible to find biblical 
justification for this latter stance too. Nonetheless, the main concern of this paper 
is to raise the issue a phenomenon called ‘conversion’, that I believe with careful 
analysis, is possible to comprehend. Therefore, the core research question, which 
reappears again and again in different forms shedding lights on different aspect, 
is how come that many revivalist leaders did not realise or were blind to the very 
fact that had been openly propagated by the Hungarian Communist namely 
their aim was to abolish religion. In other words: their final dream of victory was 
to eliminate Christianity that was the major religion in Hungary. For Hungarian 
theologians like me the question is rooted in a historical, existential and very 
vividly remembered experience that has still a sad and lasting imprint on the life 
of the Reformed Church of Hungary. 
The Difficulty and Challenge of Doing a Research Regarding 
a Sensitive Issue
Let me make some remarks. Apart from some theological reflections on the 
theology produced during the communist era often but not exclusively developed 
by former revivalist leaders as future to be collaborator of the totalitarian regime, 
there is very little historical research done on the recent history of our church. 
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This curious development might be explained along the following lines. First, 
some contend that it is too close in terms of time to do any objective research. 
Second, some of the collaborators are still alive, or has been alive for a long time 
after the collapse of Communism in 1989. Furthermore, there sons and daughters 
are very much part of the ‘renewed’ structure of the Reformed Church of Hungary 
that also impedes proper and open discussion. Third, people were indoctrinated 
to be indifferent to issues that are not immediately important to their lives and 
well-being. The new church members are not interested in issues of the past as 
they did not attend the church at that time either due to their age or were part 
of the silent masses. Rather the newcomers, seek jobs and carrier opportunities 
in the church structures that is over financed for national reasons by the current 
government. This observation has another side. There are members of the 
congregation, the former church goers, who dared to attend the church during 
Communism. They were extremely small in number at that time and even today 
they constitute a small minority of the current local church membership. Despite 
of the reasons listed above one must appreciate the little we have at hand 
produced by theological or historical research. István Bogárdi Szabó’s book is a 
very fine study on the servile theology of the HRC that coined a term “theology 
of service” to seek the favour of Marxist Communist leaders by distorting the 
gospel.2 Upon this work drew the dissertations of Szilveszter Füsti-Molnár,3 who 
develops some aspect further and László Gonda’s fine work throws light on the 
missiological consequences of such behaviour.4 Recently other like Gabriella 
Rácsok, Ábrahám Kovács and other wrote articles on the nature of theology and 
historical events of the Communist period.5 As for creating databases Tibor Filep6 
books contain excellent sources for research. It is also welcome that in Budapest 
Réka Kiss7 and Gábor Lányi8 as well as other began to fill the lacuna left open 
by historians for decades that should have been done at least 20 years ago. All 
in all, it one looks at the meagre sources of theological and historical research 
done about the relationship between church and state during Communism with 
a view to the Legacy of Reformed Church of Hungary the state of research is 
in a lamentable state for producing so little. However, let us be thankful to the 
little we have and urge new people to do more research and start discussion 
about this modern “donatist”, ecclesiological issue that might be condensed to 
the paraphrased Tertullian question: what does a theist, especially a revivalist has 
to do with an atheist ideology?9
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Before doing any case studies on the theology, work and life of persons such 
as Bereczky, Bartha and alike, it is vital to identify the core lines of analysis. As 
a theologian and historian, I believe it is possible to bring the two disciplines 
into a fruitful dialogue to wright out a line of analysis. My intention is to create a 
viable framework of intelligent interpretation that may disclose the complexity 
of the pending and puzzling question. A more specific research question is: what 
does the Red Star has to do with Jesus Christ’s cross? In order to ‘decipher’ the 
phenomenon why ‘conversion’, change of faith, or shift of allegiances happened 
as well as collaborations were made,  it is of utmost importance to delineate the 
lines of investigations. Therefore, I seek to sketch out a preliminary framework of 
reference that may be refined during future research.10 
Creating an Interpretative Framework and the Explanatory 
Tools for the ‘Conversion’ Phenomenon
To explain the phenomena that a significant number of evangelical, pious 
Christians became so susceptible to Marxism which was clearly anti-religious, 
vehemently against Christianity, one needs to set out some lines of investigations. 
This phenomenon I call a transition from Christianity to Marxism or label as 
‘conversion’, used in a broad sense. I would like to establish three categories that 
I consider inner (related to modes of thinking of given worldviews, that is their 
philosophy and theology, the way they articulate their ‘dearly held’ beliefs), outer 
(circumstantial, social sensitivity and political views etc.) and the psychological-
biographical one. To find possible answers to the why some Christians fully or 
partially ‘converted’ to Marxism, that is were willing to collaborate with the very 
enemy of the church, perhaps it is helpful to state the question differently: What 
created the „ ideological bridge” that one perception of the world led so smoothly 
to the other one. To put it differently: what are the common denominators that 
both worldview commonly share. If those could be identified, it might be possible 
to assert and state various results of observations arriving from intellectual 
reflection as well as deriving from research data. 
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Inner Categories (modes of thinking, dimensions of religion)
Let me start with the ‘inner’ categories. Yet, each category may be divided into 
further subcategories. It is vital to scrutinize the nature of Christian faith and the 
belief in Communism from a science of religion perspectives that is very much 
aware of the underlying religious nature of the two inimical worldviews, their 
philosophical premises, the worldviews expressed in their respective doctrines 
and the embodied structures (liturgies/ceremonies or the organised forms e.g. 
‘ecclesiology) of both worldviews out of which one is called a proper religion 
(Christianity) and the other is a quasi-religion (Marxism with is applied form 
Communism). 
First, I shall argue that both worldviews are deeply religious and even the 
‘atheist’ Marxism could be perceived as a religion. To prove my point I shall 
use the theoretical tool offered by two famous scholars Paul Tillich and John. 
E. Smith.11 Secondly, when the philosophical-religious (theological) premises 
of each competing worldviews are examined, it could be discerned that both 
emphasise a foregone ‘truth’ before indenting to prove it. Third, their core 
doctrines seen from a science of religion perspective (eschatology, ecclesiology, 
soteriology to use terms borrowed from Christian theology) show striking 
resemblances that, I believe, enable people examined in future case studies, to 
unconsciously embrace the ‘foreign’ ideology from their own faith. This realisation 
might be one of the several factors that created the ‘ideological bridge’ to ease 
the decision to accept, collaborate with a similar but not essentially the same 
ideology/worldview. Fourth, there is a vast literature on the religious nature of 
Communism when the tomb of Lenin or Ho Shi Minh attracts pilgrims to the 
‘saint’ similar to that of medieval or even contemporary saint of the Catholic 
church. Not only on conceptual level but also on its physical embodiments, the 
phenomenon of humans creating religion(s) in the Feuerbachian or Barthian 
sense may be discerned.12  Of course, here one may list many other features of 
religious practices such as worship, devotion, gatherings and alike that are in 
nature very similar to one another when Communism and Christianity with its 
cultural form, Christendom is compared.
[ 148 ] Ábrahám Kovács
Outer categories (historical, political and social elements)
The other outer factors are circumstantial, that is the historical, political, and 
social contexts may make a vital and lasting impact on both levels, individual 
and communal. Even the latter may be unpeeled as an onion that one’s one 
own family, larger church context and national circumstance may be studied 
in relation to each of the other layers plus to the individual life. These mutually 
interactive relations, realms or spheres may produce one’s own life story in its 
entirety. In this regard it is really revealing to see how Gábor Lányi’s slowly and 
steadfastly attempts to uncover the social and political aspects of Bereczky’s life 
that may have a bearing, in fact, I would also intuitively say, a vital imprint on the 
theology and actions of this former revivalist.
Psychological-Biographical Category
Finally, there are overarching lines/structures and modes of being underlying 
any persons’ life story when he or she is subject to any case study, that is the 
psychological make up of a person. What makes this perspective even more 
difficult to grasp and analysis, if there are written sources remaining at all, that a 
person’s personality, and psychological make-up may also evolve during his or 
her life time.13 Therefore to grasp the essence(s) of how one’s spirituality/theology/
even changing worldview is formed by his psychological determinative factor 
inherited from parents seems to be an impossible task to identify. Yet, if certain 
characteristics may be established such as vanity, desire of power, desperate 
search for glory, having sense of being elected/chosen or other features such as 
a coercion to prove something due to childhood experiences as it is in the case 
of Bereczky, as Lányi points it out, the very complex phenomenon of ‘conversion’ 
from one perception of the world to the other may be explicable and might 
provide comprehensible possible explanations for one’s action.
After outlining the inner, outer and an psychological-biological categories, 
that creates an overarching bridge even between the categories flowing into 
both directions, I intend to begin to tackle one of the first crucial issues, that 
is a claim: communism may be perceived as a religion like Christianity, or its 
Reformed realisation, and if so, I believe that Marxism and Christian theology 
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is comparable to a certain degree. In consequence, bridges may be discovered 
which enabled the ‘conversion’ of revivalist to Marxist ideology.
Some Inner Categories Unfolded 
A Philosophical and Phenomenological Approach. The Possibility of Building 
Bridges
From a religious studies perspective, the vital issue at stake for scholars of science 
of religion is what constitutes religion. Let us first examine the theory of John. E. 
Smith about quasi-religions may provide useful ground for comparison.14  Then, 
we try to see whether Ninian Smart’s model of seven dimensions of religion  is 
applicable to both worldviews dealing with the first, I shall offer a definition of 
religion in order to articulate what constitutes a quasi-religion, then we move 
on to identifying one of the dimensions of proper religion in Christianity and 
Marxism.15 I assert that a philosophical and phenomenological approach to 
understanding religion provides a basis when a definition of religion is reached 
for comparison. John E. Smith wrote that religion is “an expression of human 
response to the sacred, transcendent or whatever reality regarded as ultimate and 
worthy of an unconditional devotion”.16 Smith also stated proper religion is “an 
enduring facet of experience that concerns what is believed to be the reality on which 
human life and destiny ultimately depend”.17 What did he do in fact? He rephrased 
what theology addresses as God question and brought it into the discussion. 
Smith endeavoured to create a definition where he introduced skilfully the 
notion of transcendent through the notion of the sacred, a truly religious, theist 
concept. Here the Transcendent of a philosophical phenomenology could be 
equated by the God concept of Christian theology. But by changing the naming 
of the subject matter, he was able to prove his point.
It is well known that Christian theology perceives God as an infinite, 
transcendent being, and carefully developed a highly complex system of speaking 
about God. It is also true that Marxism as an ideology did not have a God. It was 
openly atheistic. Therefore, it looks like that the two are not comparable at all. 
One is a religion, a proper religion the other is an ideology, or a quasi-religion 
as Smith calls it that is a crucial difference for many at first sight. Before jumping 
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into hasty conclusion of agreeing with this assertion, it is indispensable to see 
the innate nature and structures of a worldview, be it a religion, or an ideology. I 
believe that there is far more in Smith’s definition of religion what comes to the 
fore at first sight. Paying close attention to the way Smith articulated his concept, 
one realizes the significance of the second part of the definition which states that 
reality regarded as Ultimate is often perceived worthy of an unconditional devotion 
by the adherent of a religion/religious tradition. And we may add: this is also true 
for any ideology, or worldview. This second clause provides the ground for 
comparison since this is inherent in the ‘philosophical/theological’ structure of 
both Christianity and communism. It is still worth unveiling the concept further. 
Let me make some other useful remarks and make some statements.
I seek to offer a definition of quasi-religion that dismisses ‘religious language’, 
leaves the theological notion of God, or philosophical concept of Transcendent 
behind in order to decipher one of the tool through which it might be plain and 
intelligible why some evangelical Christians moved so easily from a devoted 
from of Christianity to Communism. Following Paul Tillich’s conceptualisation, it 
is asserted that quasi-religion is a state of being seized by an Ultimate Concern, 
a deeply held belief which relegates all other concerns of life to subsidiary status 
and at the same time it encloses the only answer to the true meaning of a real 
life.18 Consequently that such concern must be observed with utmost gravity, and 
exhibits an all surpassing willingness to sacrifice any secondary concerns, which 
is in conflict with the Ultimate Concern. The embodiment of this philosophical-
theological notion appear in evangelical songs like “all to Jesus I surrender”, 
or Communist songs when an adherent of religion is submitting his will to the 
‘Cause’, that of the party with capital C.19
If religion proper and quasi-religion are understood as proposed above by 
Smith, then one is able to demonstrate that there is no essential difference in 
this regard, from an ‘objective’/outer science of religion perspective between 
conceptualisation of certain key concerns of Christian religion and communism. 
Since there is a great resemblance between how (not what) they articulate the 
Ultimate Concern, and the core of their innate ‘philosophical concept’ about life 
and society, and the solutions they offer, their answers may also be compared. This 
leads me to state that both communism and Christianity exhibit what could be 
termed as ‘religious nature of a given worldview, or philosophy of life’ regardless 
how the adherent, the insider perceives and labels his or her view about life.  
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Seven Dimensions of Religion. Comparability, the Issue of the Possibility of an 
Unconscious Bridge building
Having established what religion is, that has built a bridge for comparison between 
Christianity and Marxism, it is worth digging into deeper level that examines what 
constitutes a religion both in theory and practice. To realise how other kind of 
inner categories may click very well in world inhabited by special outlook on the 
world by each ‘religion’ Christianity and Marxism, I call as an aide the theory of 
Ninian Smart.20 He enlists seven dimensions of a religion, which I believe are easily 
applicable to Christianity too.21 These are the followings. First, Ritual entails Forms 
and orders of ceremonies (private and/or public). These are often regarded as 
revealed. Second dimension is named as narrative and mythic. This meant stories 
(often regarded as revealed) that work on several levels. Sometimes narratives 
fit together into a fairly complete and systematic interpretation of the universe 
and humans placed in it. The third aspect is coined as experiential and emotional 
feature of religion. Here are the words, that provided common ground such as dread, 
guilt, awe, mystery, devotion, liberation, ecstasy, inner peace, bliss are crucial. 
The fourth dimension is constituted of social and institutional aspects. It means 
that a belief system is shared and attitudes practiced by a group. Often rules for 
identifying community membership and participation (public). Fifth dimension 
contains the ethical and legal features. These are rules about human behaviour 
(often regarded as revealed from supernatural realm). Sixth dimension is doctrinal 
and philosophical: systematic formulation of religious teachings in an intellectually 
coherent form. Finally the seventh dimension is labelled as material. This is one of 
the forms of embodiments. It refers to ordinary objects or places that symbolize 
or manifest the sacred or supernatural. As mentioned above, any of these 
categories are capable to building the ‘ideological bridge’ between Christianity 
and Marxism without the person really noticing it. Nonetheless, I do not intend 
to deal with all of these here. Out of these dimensions Smith and Tillich dealt with 
the philosophical, I may add the philosophical phenomenological aspect. Now, I 
single out one striking feature of each worldview, Christianity and Marxism that 
is almost a backbone of their respective teaching, eschatological soteriology. I try 
to spell out the features and characteristics of this special doctrine. 
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Exclusivism as one of the dimensions: A common ground for creating an 
ideological bridge
First of all, let me state that exclusivism is a common trait of both ‘religion. Each 
has an exceptionally strong tendency for perceiving itself the only and just form 
of solution for the problem they variously state in regard to the state and life 
of humankind. This tendency had deadly and sad consequences within each 
respective tradition. Various other interpretations of Marxist ideology were 
severely persecuted by the party in the same fashion as Christians did it through 
centuries if they were found to be different from the official and orthodox 
doctrine.22 This propensity towards exclusivist radicalism is a typical trait of 
Judeo-Christian worldview which also gave religious tint to Marxism. Scholars 
often argue that Marx could not deny his Jewish background, the very world 
that shaped his mental map. Both Christianity and communism as an applied 
form of Marxism, laid an extreme importance on the correct understanding of its 
core doctrine, which in turn had affected all other dimensions of their worldview. 
On the one hand this is also an aspect why the two are excluding one another 
for the adherent, the insider of those ‘religions’ can only belong to one of the 
worldviews. One the other hand, from the outsider’s perspective of scholar of 
science of religion the nature of this concern, the fiercely held exclusivist ‘love’ 
for one’s own view, is strikingly similar. Besides the strong belief in the Ultimate 
Reality (whatever is meant by that) there is also a feature that both commonly 
share. They are missionary worldviews.
 Missionary Feature as a Common Point: Being Convinced and Sent to 
Convert
The missiological aspect of making the world a better place is a key concept in 
each worldview, Marxism and Christianity. Therefore, we have another aspect 
that explains why a „theoretical bridge” could have easily construed in ‘converts 
mind’ when a staunch evangelical person met with Marxism. It is also deeply 
imbued by a form of eschatology. Here we confine ourselves to the most essential 
teachings of both ‘religions’, which were valued highly as treasure by its ardent 
followers. Let me make some observations. First, the truth discovered about the 
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Ultimate Concern as the only Reality made a profound impact on its believers 
who felt constrained to share the ‘good news’ by all means, regardless whether 
the people wished to hear it or not.23 Second, sharing the same linear concept of 
human history an eschatological flavour was lent to their discovery of truth. In 
consequence the ‘message’ of the discovered truth had to be proclaimed to all 
the people. It was an innate coercion that the followers felt in their heart to do so. 
In both ‘missionary traditions’, it was assumed that people must hear what they 
discovered as a treasured, dear truth since they ‘lived in darkness’.
Then comes the question: how did this missionary fervour manifest itself 
in both traditions, do they speak about the same issue? Here the often illusive 
term of Christian theology, the multi-layered ‘Kingdom of God’ language comes 
afore that brought Christian faith often into trouble. It has been claimed that 
not only the ‘God’/main Cause concept of each worldview shows a totalitarian 
characteristics such as totality of a religion (Christianity) or an ideology (Marxism) 
but also both claim the entire life of the devotee. These ‘religions’ demand a 
full, an entirely focused devotion.  At the same they both believe to work for 
the betterment (regardless how and whatever is understood by them) of 
people and society. In other words, we save you even if you wish it or not. In 
this regard communism and Christendom, that is the contextualised and cultural 
embodiment of Christian faith, shows striking resemblances. Each has a vision of 
paradise like final, ideal state of society. Although, it must be underlined that they 
employ different languages for instance: Kingdom of God, or classless society. 
Studying their texts it is possible to assume that the eschatological nature of 
their vision is comparable. Finally, it is shocking to see the radicalism of the most 
committed members who were willing to surround everything to achieve and 
accomplish the reckoned aim/target of equal, idealised society prompted by the 
Ultimate Reality.
I singled out some features from the inner categories, also used one aspect of 
Smart’s dimensions (the sixth, the doctrinal one) to underline the possible points 
of contacts that may provide an ideological bridge that made the impossible 
possible, that Jerusalem may have a lot to do with Athens, depending on the 
perspective how the life and work such person like János Péter is explained and 
interpreted. If we add certain outer categories to these doctrinal elements like 
the radical social teachings of Jesus, they may also be compared to the radical 
reforms of Marxism. In so doing another bridge is discernible that enable revivalist 
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to connect to Marxist ideas. Initially they, as devout Christians, had a healthy 
social sensitivity to care for the masses, the people, the ordinary. They often 
exhibited a far better social care than those fellow Christians who were often on 
the scale of political right. However, it is crucial to avoid oversimplification that 
many right wing, patriotic revivalist were also really social sensitive too. What 
I am claiming here is that in certain cases people with leanings towards leftist 
political agendas may or might have found elements to grasp upon, to hold on 
and subconsciously reacted to a sympathetic leftist ideology. They may have 
done so without noticing that, when the extreme form of Marxism was being put 
into practice in the 1940s, communist party members were a danger for Christian 
faith rather than a common friend.
Kingdom of Theist and Atheist ‘Gods’: Attempts Recover the Paradise Lost? 
Following the line of argumentation of Paul Tillich and John E. Smith, if 
we compare both religious entities, that is Christianity and communism) 
and perceive them as comparable worldviews, we may be able to analyse 
conceptualisations such as how the ideal society is envisioned in both „models”. 
The both use a „religious concept and paint a picture of an ideal society, that 
is the “Kingdom of God” of language for Christians and the final stage of 
history, the communism paradise of the Marxist. Both worldviews really hoped 
and worked for the final victory of the God/god/ Ultimate Concern. All was 
surrendered so as to achieve the high end. Once this observation accepted 
the remaining intriguing question is how did selected persons in a future case 
study (such bishops János Péter, Albert Bereczky and alike understood the term 
„Kingdom of God”, and how that concept related to a similar view of Hungarian 
communist. This could be a really interesting line of investigation as an inner 
category. To this connects one religious feature of both worldview that is their 
deeply eschatological nature. 
Before making some other observations about eschatology, I need to draw 
attention to the psychological make-up of persons who are susceptible to such 
views. It would be revealing to study what kind of psychological characters are 
drawn into this form of religiosity, spirituality where this feature so prevailing 
and dominant. It is enough here to stay also the interrelatedness of the inner 
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categories to the psychological-biographical categories and acknowledge the 
interwoven aspect  of these categories.
Eschatological Feature of both Respective Religion: Another Commonly 
Shared Ground
It is also argued that eschatology is one of the most essential aspects of the 
doctrinal dimension not only of a religion proper, Christianity but that of a quasi-
religion, Marxism and its inculturated form, communism. My intention is to shed 
light on how remarkably similar characteristics exist between an atheist ideology, 
dialectical materialism of communism and theist religion, Christianity. I believe 
this is one of the inner categories/elements that formed a „ theoretical bridge” 
for individuals to shift so easily from a theist worldview to an atheist ideology. For 
Christians the Kingdom of God with its strong eschatological flavour has always 
been a challenge. Calvinist Puritans produced an Oliver Cromwell who sought 
to establish in a sense the Kingdom of God on earth, a desire that Jesus warned 
us not to do so. However, this resulted in a good endeavour that paved the way 
from a tyrannical feudal system to a democratic governance of state. Even the 
name of the state, ‘Godly commonwealth’ bears testimony to this dream. To 
some degree the Anabaptist movement of Thomas Münzer may be also regarded 
as an endeavour to form God’s kingdom on earth. Of course, human beings 
are always willing to ‘help’ God to establish such kingdom. It is certain human 
beings’ vanity. Especially of those who feel themselves ‘called or chosen’. Finally, 
to cite a third example, the American puritans put it into practice what Cromwell 
desired. A new democratic state was formed but sadly it is often forgotten fact 
that it was accomplished at the expenses of indigenous North American native. 
There has been an Indian holocaust too.24 Eschatological kingdoms hastened by 
human beings always come at a great costs of other peoples’ live that is, often 
silenced as a topic. Making these remarks one may ask the question: is it possible 
to believe that the Kingdom of God could be realised, materialised on earth, in 
our very context, country England, Germany, New England (The Americas), or 
Hungary perhaps Korea? Furthermore, a question raises itself before us: how it is 
best to understand the Kingdom of God as a place, or communist paradise? Can 
someone find a good balance to believe strongly in the possibility of a paradise 
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like human state that we partially did achieve with modern democracy and yet be 
aware of the fact that it cannot be fully accomplished in its ideal form in this world.
Cromwell’s, Münzer’s, or Bereczky’s inappropriate understandings of the 
gospel missed the dynamics and tension embedded in Jesus’ prophetic, wise and 
smart language. They all lacked to make a sharp distinction between the desired 
aim and the extent of the possibility to realise that. For some minds throughout 
history, especially for those individuals (being felt sent/called by God, destined 
to be a leaders) it caused a problem to realise the double layer of understanding 
of ‘already here’ and ‘not yet realised’ dialectical aspect of the Kingdom of God 
language.25 These two trends, the thoughts of already here and not yet realised, 
has to be held harmoniously together in a dialectical fruitful tension. If it is done 
so, then it is adequately dealt with. Otherwise this may prove to be a test of 
failure for those leaders who did not grasp the inner meaning of this religious-
philosophical deep truth. 
The Temptation of Recovering the Paradise Lost
Once the point I have been explicating is grasp, it is easy to see the similarity of 
the mistakes committed by Christians and Marxists. The borders of an earthly 
kingdom (state, country) and the envisioned, desired „Kingdom of God”, or 
name it as classless society, that is, the „paradise” are entirely overlapping, 
indeed they are identical for the Communist and some misled Christians who were 
willing to collaborate with the Marxist, atheist state. This gross error led to various 
forms of totalitarianism in various periods of Christendom and during Marxist 
communism. Both claimed to work for of absolute goodness for the people, and 
on behalf of people, and did attempt to justify their means of achieving their 
dreams and visions. This falsely held belief may have been one of the ideological 
bridges which enabled the shift for individuals to smoothly change the tracks 
at the „reckoned points of meetings/ where crossroads meet”. In such manner 
conversion may have taken place from Christianity to communism. Perhaps this also 
accounts partially for the shift, transition from Evangelical Reformed Christianity 
to a secularist, Marxist ideology. Research may prove this theoretical assumption. 
Finally when comparing the two ‘religions’, it is vital to underline that in both 
cases state and religion overlapped.
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Another Common Feature of Envisioned Eschatological „Kingdom”. The State 
and Church Will be One
Some questions may be posed for further research in this regard: What does a 
Christian mean by Kingdom of God, especially when it is applied to the „tangible” 
form of its realisation in society? How Marxism speaks about the paradise-like 
state of human society? What are the key words they keep reciting? These 
are: equality (rights, goods etc.), all needs will be satisfied. Each worldview 
promised a kind of happiness that reigns forever and alike. While it is possible to 
discern some similarities, it is vital to underline that there are, of course, crucial 
distinctions between Marxist and Christian faith. First of all, Marxism is atheist 
whereas Christianity is theist. Secondly, Marxism endeavoured to eliminate 
all other worldviews, whereas biblical Christian faith did allow for other views 
regardless what it thought about them. Christianity always had a room for other 
views.26 Third, Marxism is not interested in a human being, however, Christian 
faith really cares for not only for the material well-being of a person (see Jesus’ 
social teaching in the Sermon on the Mount) but also attempts to understand 
human soul, suffering, sin and offer a salvation the in its core entirely differs 
from the salvific intention of Marxism. It is imperative for evangelical and biblical 
Reformed faith to acknowledge that while Marxist (Communist) may believe 
not only in the possibility of being able to realise the „kingdom of god” (Marxist 
ideology) but also hold that it they can make it happen on earth in history. 
Christians should be aware of the danger and avoid the false belief that they 
(human element is valued so high) are able to achieve the fullness of Kingdom 
of God (personal or societal level) in this world (earth, history, their own country, 
context).
Let me make some observations about the nature both worldviews. Albeit, 
one system of belief allows for the possibility of „material” realisation of earthly 
paradise in the literal sense .But neither (Communism truly and falsely understood 
Christianity too) takes it into account the nature of human sin, and the corruptibility 
of human nature. A Crucial difference flows from this. While a Christian can be 
accountable for holding a wrong view, i.e. belief in the goodness/ability of human 
beings (individual) to make a paradise like state, “a reality on earth”, communist 
cannot since they do believe in the goodness of human beings. In sum, although 
their eschatology may show striking similarities for a religious studies scholars 
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doing a comparative historical phenomenology but it is clear for theologians 
who may employ comparative religion/theology and other scholars of various 
fields that their anthropologies are very different!
Outer categories history, social and political contexts
So far the lecture threw light on how many features of inner categories may 
provide ‘ideological bridges’ for Christians to connect to Marxism. These enabled 
the Reformed revivalist to step into a strange ideological marriage. It has been 
pointed out but not proved that the psychological-biographical category may 
deliver some revealing result after an in-depth investigation. Now it is time 
to turn attention to some outer categories that may also offer some points of 
connection and explain the reason why some top evangelical Reformed Christian 
leaders gladly and easily received and even welcome  communism in Hungary. 
It is important to contend that home mission societies such as Bible and Tract 
societies, YMCA, Sunday School movements, orphanages, revivalist societies 
like Bethany C.E., medical and diaconal societies or Soli Deo Gloria, the student 
movement as well as national organisations for ministers and elders did provide a 
para organisation structures for individuals who did not find a place in traditional 
ecclesiastical hierarchy but felt called to do something great for the church. Of 
course, this is not the only and by far not the main reason why many talented 
persons joined such movements but it is a fact that these parallel structures 
did offer a ground to be known nationally and be recognised as a respectable 
leader of a religious community. Secondly, voluntarism was a typical trait of these 
organisations where the most devout and committed members joined hand in 
hand not only for saving the lost, the sinful people spiritually in the name of 
Christ, but also exhibited a strong social sensitivity to the poor, the needy and 
the marginalised. This feature Christian faith brought them into the same camp 
with atheist, socialist or communist. Therefore, there was a bridge, a common 
point for those Christians who finally later left biblical Christian faith. Yes, I dare 
to claim that some of the top leaders not only distorted but falsified the gospel 
with the ‘theology of service”.27 They did cross the Rubicon to a degree that their 
theology cannot be called Christian from a faith point of view. The social drive 
of evangelicals and socialist prompted them to work for an eschatological end, 
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that is, a classless society/Kingdom of God, where people are equal. Although it 
needs to be emphasised that they do differ on what theoretical (ethical, spiritual, 
philosophical) basis they envision upon which to build their vision/dream.
Concluding thoughts 
Taking all into consideration, the inner, the psychological-biographical 
categories as well as the outer social categories did provide enough room for 
non-vigilant Christians to be attracted too close to a form of Marxism that was 
in fact seeking to eliminate Christian faith. As to the fact why revivalist Christian 
leaders like Bereczky, Péter, Bartha or Fekete collaborated with the atheist state 
a researcher needs to ask various questions mentioned in this lecture, and use 
archival resources, oral history analyse them. At the same time they need to, 
theorise, theologize and dare to make conclusions even if those may be painful. 
The crucial question, that keeps coming back, is whether it is possible to hold 
them Christian faith and Marxism together or such Christians, who experienced 
another conversion, should have left either Christian faith or Marxism. To 
understand their motivations, intentions and urge for leadership a researcher 
need to make the following steps. 
Personal stories need to be examined how their life stories evolved in 
Hungarian Reformed Christianity. He or she needs to be aware of the fact that 
socialism should not be confused with Marxism and its extreme applied forms 
of Communism. It is vital to identify areas where Christian Socialism rhymes with 
the biblical teaching of Jesus. However, differences must be pointed out too. The 
researcher needs to analyse the reasons for the failure of the established church to 
reach out to the masses. Therefore, an in-depth research needs to be carried out 
how pseudo-feudal-capitalism system between the two world wars prompted 
parachurch organisations to care for the needy. In other words, what evangelical-
pietist managed to do in this regard and how they succeeded in their missions, 
and at the same time what is the reason why the official church failed. A scholar 
also needs to study the relation of Home Missionary organisations and spiritual 
revival and its activist aspect. Finally, the researcher must try to grasp, delineate 
the individual character of persons from a psychological point of view even if 
it is difficult. However, if archival materials are available (letters, diaries, notes 
[ 160 ] Ábrahám Kovács
etc.) it might be attempted. To these relate further sub-questions: what kind of 
personalities of people were attracted to leadership, why they felt the need to 
persuade other to their deeply held belief, and what was the drive that made 
them willing to do activism. With these reflections I had hoped to sketch out the 
lines of investigations and attempted to create a theoretical framework that may 
offer interpretative tools for understanding one of the most painful and complex 
time of Christian church where unprecedented ‘conversions’ happened among 
top Reformed Hungarian revivalist.
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István Pásztori-Kupán
A far too eloquent  
silence
Karl Barth’s inexplicable  
reluctance to address or  
comment the bloody  
avengement of the Hungarian  
Freedom Fight in 1956
The present paper touches upon Reinhold Niebuhr’s open letter addressed to 
Karl Barth following the putting down of the Hungarian freedom fight against 
the Communist regime. Niebuhr’s letter entitled ‘Why is Barth silent on Hungary?’ 
was published on 23 January 1957 in The Christian Century. I intend to pursue an 
analysis of Barth’s inexplicable silence over the issue, including his outspokenness 
during the Second World War as well as the similarly striking attitude of his 
disciple Josef Lukl Hromádka. The attitude of these theologians can indeed be 
contrasted by the shocking abnegation of two declared, yet deeply indignant 
Communists: Jean-Paul Sartre and Peter Fryer. It appears that Barth’s image as 
a systematic theologian – and especially as a Christian ethicist – may have to be 
partially re-evaluated by and for contemporary theologians.
The Hungarian uprising against Communism and the US 
reaction in 1956
Having been ‘sold out’ again by the world’s superpowers to the Soviet Empire 
at the end of the Second World War, ordinary Hungarians began their move 
towards freedom by a peaceful march of protest on 23 October 1956. By ‘selling 
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out’ I mean for example the shameful backdoor deals cut between Churchill, 
Roosevelt and Stalin during their consultations on 4–11 February 1945 in Yalta, 
Crimea.
One of the firm demands of the 1956 Hungarian Freedom Fight was the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Stalin’s statue was indeed demolished 
by the demonstrators, but it is important to mention that mostly tin heads were 
rolling at the time in Budapest and in the country. A new government was set 
up, and for a few days it seemed that the country may return to some form of 
democracy, or at least to take the first steps towards it. The initially hesitant 
Soviet leadership, however, being reassured by the USA that no intervention of 
‘the free world’ was to be expected, ordered a full scale Russian military attack 
upon Hungary on 4 November, which ended the freedom fight in a massive 
bloodbath in a few days. Retaliations of an almost unprecedented cruelty were 
soon to follow. The US betrayed Hungary yet again. In order to substantiate the 
extent of this betrayal, we need to quote the address of Hon. Michael A. Feighan, 
US Representative of the 20th Ohio District, uttered on 31 August 1960 in the 
House of Representatives under the title The Captive Nations – Key to Peace:
Khrushchev proclaims that the Monroe Doctrine no longer exists 
because the new Russian ruling class refuses to recognize its claims. 
By this he means that .the entire world is his bowl of cherries and he 
will pick the cherry he feels is ripe regardless of in whose orchard 
it grows. What a contrast this is to the action taken by our State 
Department ‘Soviet Experts’ at the time of the Hungarian Freedom 
Revolution. You will recall the revolution broke out on October 23, 
1956, and that by October 28, the Hungarian patriots had rid their 
country of the Russian oppressors. A revolutionary regime took 
over and there was a political hiatus for 5 days. Then the State 
Department, allegedly concerned about the delicate feelings of the 
Communist dictator Tito, sent him the following cabled assurance of 
our national intentions in the late afternoon of Friday, November 2, 
1956: ‘The Government of the United States does not look with favor 
upon governments unfriendly to the Soviet Union on the borders of 
the Soviet Union.’
It was no accident or misjudgment of consequences which led the 
imperial Russian Army to reinvade Hungary at 4 a.m. on the morning 
of November 4, 1956. The cabled message to Tito was the go ahead 
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signal to the Russians, because any American schoolboy knows that 
Tito is Moscow’s Trojan horse. It took less than 48 hours for him to 
relay this message of treason to his superiors in the Kremlin. All the 
world knows the terrible consequences of that go ahead signal. 
This act of infamy was buried in the noise of the 1956 presidential 
campaign and the moral revulsion which followed in the wake of 
our failure to respond to freedoms call in captive Hungary. As we 
approach the promised new era in the conduct of our international 
affairs, I suggest the time is opportune for a full scale, bipartisan 
congressional investigation of this infamy. This would provide 
an appropriate answer to Khrushchev’s rejection of the Monroe 
Doctrine.1
To keep the record straight, the telegraphic message was transmitted by 
none else than John Foster Dulles, the then US Secretary of State and brother 
of Allen Welsh Dulles, the then head of the Central Intelligence Agency. One 
does not need any conspiracy theories upon facing blatant facts, and although 
this is not the main theme of our paper, the utter importance and disastrous 
consequences of this message cannot be overstated.2 The mere silence of the US 
State Department would have been better for Hungary than the above quoted 
dispatch to Tito, which was considered a ‘go ahead signal’ and ‘infamy’ even by 
US political representatives. The message was also labelled as being ‘cruel’ by 
Frank A. Sedita, mayor of Buffalo, who also called for a bipartisan congressional 
investigation of the entire event in order to ‘clear away the dark clouds of doubt 
which hang heavy over our national honor’.3
The sheer brutality of the Soviet military aggression dismissed any remnants 
of Eastern or Western illusions concerning the alleged ‘humanoid’ face of 
Communism – well, at least in the hearts and minds of decent thinkers. As 
Reinhold Niebuhr, a minister, theologian and philosopher who himself had been 
deeply involved in promoting Christian ‘leftist’ ideas concerning the assurance of 
social justice for working classes in Detroit, aptly put it:
Their [i.e. Hungarians’] revolution was suppressed in a bloodbath 
which has destroyed permanently whatever prestige still adhered 
to the Communist ideology in Eastern Europe and among the 
intellectuals and neutralist theologians of the Continent.4
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Surprising ‘defections’ from the international Communist 
camp
We mentioned ‘decent thinkers’, and this circle does not exclude people with 
leftist or even Communist attitudes. Perhaps one of the most famous western 
defectors from the Communist camp was Jean-Paul Sartre, who on 9 November 
1956 declared:
What the Hungarian people teach us with their blood is the 
complete bankruptcy of socialism as a commodity imported from 
U.S.S.R. […] I condemn the Soviet invasion wholeheartedly and 
without any reservation. Without putting any responsibility onto the 
Russian people, I nevertheless insist that its current government has 
committed a crime. […] I entirely regret my relations with my friends, 
the Soviet writers, who do not denounce (or cannot denounce) the 
massacre in Hungary. One can no longer be a friend of the ruling 
faction of the Soviet bureaucracy: it is horror that dominates.5
 
The other western Communist author, Peter Fryer, correspondent of the London 
Daily Worker, having realised that the reports he had sent from Budapest were 
entirely distorted and published as such by his own newspaper, indignantly left 
the London Daily Worker, and presented the reasons for his decision in two other 
publications, i.e. Daily Express and Manchester Guardian respectively:
For almost nine years I was proud to work for the Daily Worker. But 
no journalist can continue to work for a newspaper which sends him 
for a major foreign assignment and refuses to use what he writes. I 
am therefore compelled to resign from the Daily Worker and to seek 
other means of putting the truth about events in Hungary before 
British Communists and Socialists. This was my fourth visit to Hungary 
since 1949. I spent over a fortnight there, and I am convinced that 
Soviet intervention was both criminal and unnecessary. […] I will 
fight inside the Party for a return to socialist principles, for political 
honesty, and for real international solidarity. […] Only in this way can 
we hope to cleanse from the British Communist Party the stain of 
having defended in Eastern Europe oppression no less brutal than, 
say, British rule in Kenya: and of defending Soviet aggression in 
Hungary while deploring British aggression in Egypt.6
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Fryer’s previous boss launched a ferocious counterattack. Nonetheless, having 
been an eyewitness of what Soviet retaliation means, Fryer could not abstain 
from unmasking the policy of systematic misinformation carried out by the 
London Daily Worker and replied on a much wider scale in the New Statesman:
From start to finish the Daily Worker – or rather the Stalinists who 
control it – has lied, lied, lied about Hungary. It printed a gruesome 
photograph of a lynched man under the headline: The White Terror 
in Hungary, implying that he was an ordinary Communist Party 
member, whereas there was in the office another photograph of 
the same corpse, taken from a different angle, which showed that 
he was wearing ÁVO [Communist Secret Police] uniform. The Daily 
Worker cynically declares that for the Soviet Union to have ‘refused’ 
to intervene would have been ‘inhuman’ and that by denying this 
I am ‘quite obvious to reality’. After what I saw of the bravery, the 
sufferings and the sacrifices of the heroic people in the face, of terrible 
odds, this insult to their gallantry and to their 20,000 dead sickens 
me. Shame on a newspaper which can spit on a nation’s anguish and 
grief. Shame on Party leaders who can justify with smooth clichés 
and lies the massacre and martyrdom of a proud and indomitable 
people. These leaders are wholly discredited; they have abandoned 
socialist principles; they are destroying the Communist Party as a 
political force. They must be removed quickly, if the Communist 
Party is to hold its head up once more before the British people.7
As one may observe from the above, falsehood is not the exclusive privilege of 
Eastern Communists. Alas, nor is the application of double standards. No decent 
person could remain silent upon witnessing the Hungarian uprising and its 
aftermath. Even British Communists came to condemn the mercilessness of Soviet 
retribution. It is therefore a rather difficult task for any Hungarian, especially for 
members of the Hungarian Reformed Church in the Carpathian Basin to digest 
the reaction of two prominent contemporary theologians, namely that of Karl 
Barth and Josef Lukl Hromádka. 
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Barth’s reaction: silence, double standards and/or 
neutrality?
Apart from his Church Dogmatics, the fame of Karl Barth was established by 
his staunch resistance to and relentless assaults upon Hitler’s Nazi regime and 
ideology. Without trying to diminish his efforts to bring one of the greatest 
perils against humankind to an end, it is perhaps time to review some of the 
key moments of this resistance, to put all details into perspective. After having 
contributed to a great extent towards the formulation of the Barmen Theological 
Declaration in 1934, Barth loses his professorship in Köln in 1935 – evidently as 
a retaliation from the Nazi regime. On 8 July 1935, however, Barth immediately 
accepts the special invitation to become a professor in Basel and leaves Germany 
for good. This choice is understandable, himself being a Swiss, yet from that 
moment onwards he could criticise any regime – Nazi or Communist – from 
a truly safe haven. So in that respect his ‘resistance’ could and should not be 
likened whatsoever to that of other theologians, like Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906–
1945), who chose to stay on and resist Hitler from within the Third Reich. 
The move to Basel put Barth in a peculiarly privileged position. He was given 
a practically unique and equidistant perspective from a neutral Switzerland to 
assess the rising and destructive force of both Fascist and Communist systems. 
Our main question at this point is: Was his assessment of the two regimes 
also balanced and equally critical? Could he make the best of this point of 
observation? Well, on the one hand, on 19 September 1938, Barth addressed his 
faithful Czech disciple, Josef Lukl Hromádka in a widely publicised letter in the 
following manner:
Every Czech soldier who fights [against Nazi Germany] and suffers 
will be doing so for us too, and – I say this without reservation – he 
will also be doing it for the Church of Jesus, which in the atmosphere 
of Hitler and Mussolini must become the victim of either ridicule or 
extermination.8
Needless to say, had Barth written these famous lines from within Germany, he 
would not have lived to see the end of the Second World War. Probably not even 
its beginning in earnest. On the other hand, however, Barth did not write anything 
about the Hungarian freedom fight in 1956, although he was in Switzerland like 
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in 1938 and had absolutely no reason to worry about any threat upon his life 
and safety. That is why he was critiqued by Reinhold Niebuhr in The Christian 
Century on 23 January 1957.9 Barth’s rather solemn and theologically quite 
audacious declaration, namely that every Czech soldier resisting Hitler in 1938 
would be fighting ‘for the Church of Jesus’ stays in sharp contrast with his silence 
eighteen years later, when another military giant, the Soviet Union, mounted a 
ferocious attack upon a similarly small country (i.e. Hungary). Without trying to 
be pathetic, this silence in itself begs the question: The young students, workers, 
peasants, intellectuals and teenagers of Hungary butchered by the Soviet tanks 
had not been fighting at all ‘for the Church of Jesus’? Is this some theological 
amnesia or inconsistency on Barth’s part or is this double standard a key element 
of his system of ethical and political thought? To put it in simplest terms: was 
the godless, anti-religious and anti-Christian international Communism as bad as 
Fascism in Barth’s eyes or not?10 Sadly, his own words provide us with the answer:
Russia and America are both in different ways children of Europe. 
[…] They have both suddenly grown into giants, who each in his own 
way would like to be patron, benefactor and protector of Europe. 
Both are afraid of encirclement by the other. […] One must concede 
that the anxiety of the Eastern giant is better founded than that of 
the Western giant, when one considers the total ring of Western 
bastions. […] The church must concern itself with political systems, 
not in terms of principles but as seen in the light of the Word of God. 
It must reject every effort to systematize political history and must 
look at every event afresh.11
It is amply clear that for Barth the atheistic and inhuman nature of totalitarian 
Communism and Fascism cannot be rendered as being equally dangerous, which 
is par excellence an arbitrary as well as untenable ethical position, if not a very 
slippery slope in itself.12 One has to be utterly ignorant of the reality of the Gulags 
and of everyday life in the Eastern Block behind the iron curtain to formulate 
such preposterous statements. Moreover, Barth’s theological argument may 
seem indeed appealing in the sense that the church ‘must look at every event 
afresh’ in the light of the Word of God. Let us do exactly that by asking the 
question: how should one proceed based on this advice? To begin with, any 
honest reader of the Word of God may find it difficult to appraise how e.g. the 
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aggression of Hitler’s war machine against other countries during the war and 
the USSR’s bloody retaliation against Hungary in November 1956 respectively 
could be assessed as being fundamentally different on an ethical level on the 
basis of the commandment concerning the love of one’s neighbour. To quote a 
practical example: how is it possible to reach different conclusions concerning 
the above events based on a concrete admonition from the Word of God? The 
message seems to be clear enough:
Thus says the Lord: Do justice and righteousness, and deliver from 
the hand of the oppressor him who has been robbed. And do no 
wrong or violence to the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow, nor 
shed innocent blood in this place.13
Having been brought up in Communist Romania led by a fierce dictator, Nicolae 
Ceausescu, I am more than aware how the constant application of double 
standards can become a principle of governance over the country and over 
the controlled minds of its citizens – exactly by looking at every event afresh. 
As grandmothers in Hungary and Transylvania used to say: ‘the first invaders of 
our homeland, who raped us, were the ugly Nazi Fascists. The second invaders, 
who raped us again, however, were the Soviet heroes, our glorious liberators’. 
The most ridiculous or rather tragicomic aspect of the story: this was the official 
assessment of the events of the Second World War by the governing Communist 
parties both in Hungary and Romania (and in every other country which had 
been sold to the USSR in Yalta). Pensions to WW2 veterans in Romania were given 
only to those who fought on the Soviet side; the soldiers, who had been enrolled 
in the armies of the losing side and came home with serious wounds and/or 
disabilities were ignored or labelled as traitors. 
These Communist leaders looked at every event afresh – indeed, not in the 
light of the Word of God – and reached as well as publicised opposing judgments 
concerning the brutality of Nazi and Soviet military forces respectively. How can, 
then, a theologian, well versed in the Bible, look at every event afresh – this time 
in the light of the Word of God – and not reach an equally condemning position 
concerning both types of oppression, as a matter of unavoidable consequence, 
but rather apply the same double standards as both Fascist and Communist 
leaders have done instead? This is the insoluble dilemma concerning Barth’s 
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rather problematic ethical stance, and in spite of repeated attempts to absolve 
him, the best one can bring forward is a few attenuating circumstances like his 
efforts to assist Christian ministers who emigrated from or rather fled Eastern 
European countries. The basic error, however, persists in his wilful choice to 
ignore the seriousness of left-wing extremism in comparison to the horrors of 
right-wing terror. That is why Reinhold Niebuhr’s words still hit home:
Without the guidance of principles and looking at every event 
afresh in the light of the Word of God, Barth comes to the capricious 
conclusion that Communism is not as bad as Nazism be cause it is 
not anti-Semitic. […] A little concern for ‘principles’ would have in-
structed Barth that some of the barbarism of Nazism was derived 
from the same monopoly of irresponsible power from which the 
barbarism of Communism is derived. Look ing at every event afresh 
means that one is ignorant about the instructive, though inexact, 
analogies of history which the ‘godless’ scientists point out for our 
benefit.14
If one takes a glance back to Barth’s attitude towards resistance and fleeing one’s 
homeland upon encountering the Nazi terror, another interesting aspect arises. 
In 1938, Barth replied angrily to Hungarian theologian Béla Vassady, who had 
asked his advice concerning what true German Christians should do in the event 
of being called to arms. Should they desert their country? According to Barth’s 
reply,
Neither the acceptance of divinely appointed government, nor the 
correctly interpreted love of the Fatherland can force any German 
person to participate in a war initiated and enforced by Hitler. 
Whoever intends to take part in it, will do it for other reasons.15
Albeit ‘desertion’ was Barth’s very first choice upon facing the first hindrance – 
not yet of his life, but only of his career! – by the Nazi regime in 1935, he still 
felt justified in imagining even a mass exodus of a whole German nation from 
their homeland in order to avoid being enrolled in 1938, i.e. three years later, 
under a much more strengthened and authoritarian regime. Due to lack of space 
we cannot provide a full analysis of this rather interesting exchange. Vassady’s 
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courteous reply, however, proved to be spot on not only at the time, but in much 
later periods as well: 
My dear Colleague, please consider these questions as asked by a friend, 
who understands your political theology entirely, but at the same time 
considers that the concrete question at hand is far more complicated to 
the extent that the arguments of your simplified political theology are 
incapable to calm the nationally and racially involved people.16
It is perhaps superfluous to say that Barth never forgave Vassady for his justified 
critique, and did not reply directly to any of his letters in the following decades 
until his death, instructing only his secretary, Charlotte von Kirschbaum, to give 
occasional and courteous answers, but firmly reject any initiative concerning 
any personal meeting or collaboration coming from the part of his Hungarian 
colleague. Barth preferred to appear as peace-loving, yet his vanity and conceit 
often took the best of him.17
Discussing the disgusting: Hromádka’s attitude towards the 
Hungarian uprising
Whilst Barth remained silent about Hungary despite the justified critiques he 
had received from Niebuhr and others, his faithful disciple and addressee of 
his famous letter in 1938, the Czech theologian Josef Lukl Hromádka was not 
content to stay quiet. On the contrary: on 8 December 1956, in a revoltingly false 
declaration, Hromádka labelled the Hungarian freedom fighters as voicing ‘Fascist 
slogans’, ‘committing thousands of crimes’, carrying out ‘anti-Jewish pogroms’ 
and fluttering ‘the banners of social and political nationalism’. He even criticised 
the World Council of Churches for its sympathy towards Hungary.18 Although 
not one of his calumnies were ever supported by any evidence, Hromádka 
was allowed to stay on as a member of the WCC’s Executive Committee, which 
constitutes at least a complicity in his moral crime by the leadership of WCC at 
the time. Moreover, in 1958, Hromádka, who had equally praised the brutality 
of Soviet intervention in both cases of Hungary and Korea,19 was awarded the 
infamous Lenin Peace Prize20 by the very Nikita Khrushchev, who could obtain 
this most precious Soviet trophy only a year after the Czech theologian, in 1959. 
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One wonders how on earth could anybody attempt to describe Hromádka 
later as a theologian who attempted to resist Communist oppression. As my 
grandfather used to say, ‘only the mediocre apprentice does not surpass his/
her own master’. In this case, Hromádka truly surpassed his adulated master, 
Barth, who remained silent concerning the events in Hungary, and also about his 
lapdog’s loud and ill-mannered barking up the wrong tree. Barth never attempted 
to distance himself from his pupil’s disgusting opportunism by which Hromádka 
sought to besmirch the memory of freedom fighters, and ultimately obtained 
the highest possible honours of a truly evil regime. The silence of important and 
usually vociferous figures can indeed be most eloquent. 
A sad lesson: ‘sacred cows’ come in pairs
As a weird irony of fate, in 1948 – during the first General Assembly of the forming 
World Council of Churches, and twelve years before the Hungarian Freedom Fight 
– John Foster Dulles and Josef Lukl Hromádka represented the two sides of the 
Iron Curtain in Amsterdam. Dulles could speak on behalf of Western Capitalism, 
whilst Hromádka was given one of his numerous opportunities to eulogise the 
wonders of Christian existence in Communist countries. Twelve years later, in 
1956 these two men became instrumental in causing and justifying Hungary’s 
brutal destruction by the Soviets respectively – without ever being challenged 
concerning their statements and motivations.21
It also needs to be stressed, that Barth had relied almost exclusively 
upon Hromádka concerning every Central-European political and historical 
development, even after 1956. He kept silent not only about the Hungarian 
Revolution, but also concerning Hromádka’s blatant lies about it. We have yet 
to see any evidence of Barth reprimanding his Czech disciple for this repugnant 
betrayal. Great men make great mistakes. Nonetheless, they should know better, 
since ‘they will receive the greater condemnation’ (cf. Mk 12:40). 
I do not know how reliable Hromádka could be concerning the Korean crisis 
in the 1950s. What was proven, however, beyond any reasonable doubt is that 
he could not be trusted at all concerning Eastern Europe. The defence of his 
moral integrity is perhaps a job for those, who have lost some of their common 
sense concerning basic principles of Christian ethics – perhaps because of having 
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been influenced by some perplexing, yet largely useless exercises in theological, 
political and moral sophistry. Nonetheless, this common sense of basic Christian 
ethics should have been restored in all the witnesses of the bloodbath in Hungary 
in 1956, as a practical instruction offered by the Soviet regime for the European 
West, which had already begun to relapse into its preferred state of indifference. 
This, rather easily understandable and basic ethical stance was reformulated in a 
sad memento by none else than Albert Camus:
I am not one of those who wish to see the people of Hungary take 
up arms again in a rising certain to be crushed, under the eyes of 
the nations of the world, who would spare them neither applause 
nor pious tears, but who would go back at once to their slippers by 
the fireside like a football crowd on a Sunday evening after a cup 
final. There are already too many dead on the field and we cannot 
be generous with any but our own blood.  The blood of Hungary 
has re-emerged too precious to Europe and to freedom for us not to 
be jealous of it to the last drop. But I am not one of those who think 
that there can be a compromise, even one made with resignation, 
even provisional, with a regime of terror which has as much right 
to call itself Socialist as the executioners of the Inquisition had to 
call themselves Christians. […] Hungary conquered and in chains 
has done more for freedom and justice than any people in the last 
twenty years. But for this lesson to get through and convince those 
in the West who shut their eyes and ears, it was necessary, and 
it can be no comfort to us, for the people of Hungary to shed so 
much blood which is already drying in our memories.   In Europe’s 
isolation today, we have only one way of being true to Hungary, and 
that is never to betray, among ourselves and everywhere, what the 
Hungarian heroes died for, never to condone, among ourselves and 
everywhere, even indirectly, those who killed them.22
Based on the above, the moral classification of Hromádka-types becomes a far 
easier task. Thanks be to the Lord, such attempts, however late, begin to surface 
also in the western world. To quote an example of such formulation imbued with 
customary academic politeness:
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Hromádka was never a simple collaborator. But he misjudged the 
workings of communist power and became one of the ‘useful idiots’ 
whose good intentions Lenin had urged his henchmen to exploit.23
As it became evident during the aftermath of the Hungarian Freedom Fight, the 
Soviet regime did not have any reasons to complain about Hromádka’s ‘good 
intentions’. Unfortunately, neither did Barth, who could have chosen to rely on 
the words of credible eyewitnesses like Peter Fryer, or such eloquent writers like 
Albert Camus, but most emphatically did not. It is also true that Camus was never 
awarded the Lenin Peace Prize…
A small memento
One small, much less known memento than that of Albert Camus, deserves to 
be quoted here. This is a passage in a letter addressed to Karl Barth dated 24 
May 1966 by Prof. András Nagy, a Transylvanian Hungarian theology professor of 
Kolozsvár, Romania. The political reality in the country – one year after the rise to 
power of Communist dictator Ceausescu, whose totalitarian regime lasted until 
the end of 1989 – was quite similar to that of Hungary, including the suppression 
of free speech and movement. A lot of Hungarian Reformed ministers, theology 
professors and students were captured, imprisoned and even murdered in 
Transylvania as well, as part of the retributions in the aftermath of the events in 
1956. Amidst these circumstances, Prof. Nagy wrote the following lines to Barth:
In our time, just as Calvin in his own time, as a one-book man – that 
is, the man of a single theme, that of the very question of mankind  – 
you have written a lot, and did not only voice your opinion in certain 
matters of life, but being constrained by the Word of our God and 
Lord, moved by the Holy Spirit, assuming your own responsibility 
and risking even your life, you took a stand and caused millions to 
take a stand, inter alia, when you uttered: ‘résistez! résistez!’ (1938). 
Amidst later events, we also would have loved to hear from you a similar 
‘résistez!’ pronounced for the benefit of the suffering people.24
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We ought to add that Prof. András Nagy held Bible sessions in his own home, 
where theology students were also praying for the victims of the 1956 uprising 
in Hungary. Many participants at these praying events were later condemned 
to long years in Romanian Communist prisons. Given the fact that every piece 
of correspondence could be expected to be censored by the Romanian State 
Police, the very wording of the above letter represents an uncommon courage 
on Nagy’s part in 1966 – a certainly much bigger courage than that of Barth in 
1935, who had left Germany at the first threat upon his career! – in his attempt to 
remind the universally praised Swiss teacher of his ethical duty as an influential 
Christian theologian. Sadly, to no real avail…
Estne repetitio mater studiorum? As it appears, the only real lesson of history is 
that we never learn anything from it, so repeating it over and over again remains 
our only option. Nonetheless, if we may still conclude that certain attitudes and 
standpoints need revision even at the cost of occasionally ‘demythologising’ 
some of the most famous figures of our recent past – then this is a lesson worth 
taking. Oddly enough, we need to follow Barth’s advice of looking at all events in 
the light of the Word of God – yet this time with full honesty, not fearing where 
this light may lead us, and not closing our eyes when the very same Word points 
us towards revising some of our own, however aged misconceptions. 
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